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 Chapter one  
Introduction 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to explore how the discursive 
practices of critical journalism in China are conducted within the context 
of an authoritarian one-party state. Discourses shape understandings of 
the world. They are politically powerful as means of categorizing and 
organizing signs. Discursive changes reflect and generate social changes, 
which is why control over language use is important for maintaining 
relations of domination. In China, the development of more critical jour-
nalism challenges the party-state’s discursive control. The Chinese media 
has been, and still is, conceived by party-state authorities as central to 
upholding their power, and the media continues to be defined as the 
mouthpiece (houshe) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This 
mouthpiece role turns journalists into propaganda workers.  
To party-state authorities, the mouthpiece role of the media presup-
poses control and restrictions that are incompatible with freedom of ex-
pression. When Chinese journalists define themselves as investigative 
and critical, they exceed the limitations of the mouthpiece role and re-
define the media’s role in society, thereby confronting the party-state’s 
control of the public sphere. This contention cannot be explained simply 
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as an opposition between civil society and the state (Keane 2001). Critical 
journalism has evolved within a state-controlled media system where the 
boundaries between state and society are blurred. An ambition of auton-
omy is central to the professional identity of critical journalists, but in a 
context in which the media is subject to state control, they employ a 
three-fold strategy of adapting to constraints, utilizing new opportunities 
and pushing at the boundaries constraining their work. 
Critical journalists work within a state-owned media system while 
seeking to establish new spaces of representation by including previously 
absent perspectives and voices in the public sphere. When the media pre-
sents stories about people who suffer from poverty, the abuse of power 
or corruption, these narratives reach audiences beyond their local context. 
Such representations confront political authorities with the population’s 
discontent. Media narratives focusing on people’s grievances point to the 
authorities’ responsibility for these circumstances. Such exposure of ille-
gitimate political practices may contribute to strengthening accountabil-
ity within authoritarian political systems, which may explain why party-
state authorities meet critical and investigative journalism with caution, 
containment and boundaries. Nevertheless, the authorities accept critical 
journalism as long as it targets limited problems on the local scale, be-
cause it provides them with important information. When the party-state 
acts and addresses these problems, it enhances its legitimacy and con-
tributes to conveying an image of the party-state as responsive. If critical 
journalism remains within the limits imposed by the party-state, it can be 
compatible with a modernized version of the mouthpiece role. 
The development towards more critical journalism within the Chinese 
media illustrates some general characteristics of political reform in the 
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post-Mao period of economic reform which began in the late 1970s, such 
as the tension between political control and market forces. The transition 
from a planned economy to a market-driven one has transferred power 
to social actors other than the ruling Communist Party. Conflicts between 
political control and the power of the market have been at the core of 
Chinese politics during the last thirty years of economic reform, often 
manifested as disputes within the political elite over the pace and extent 
of reforms. The diversification of the media field and the development of 
more critical journalism can be described as unintended consequences of 
economic reform, and the party-state’s coping strategies are revealing for 
their attempt to balance key political interests and the development to-
wards a market economy. This tension has resulted in periods of relative 
liberalization followed by tighter control. 
Within liberal media theory, the media’s ability to assume a watch-
dog role is understood as a consequence of its economic independence. 
This positions private ownership and freedom from state involvement 
as preconditions for the media’s ability to contribute to democracy 
(Curran 2005). Throughout the period of economic reform the Chinese 
media has achieved increasing financial independence from the party-
state. As a result, the sheer number and variety of media products have 
increased enormously. In the same period, the internet has revolution-
ized information access, and has contributed to the fierce competition 
within the Chinese media market. Combined with a decentralized con-
trol structure, this has made more problem-oriented, critical journalism 
possible within Chinese media. When in the 1980s the party-state re-
duced subsidies and allowed the media to retain its own profits, this 
raised observers’ expectations of a potential transition. Political liber-
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alization was believed to follow in the wake of economic liberalization. 
As the actual development of Chinese media has proceeded, it has 
become obvious that economic liberalization has not erased the politi-
cal conception of the mouthpiece role of the media. In China, as else-
where, critical journalism does not reflect a particular economic devel-
opment, but is constituted through contextual, political processes. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The dissertation is structured around two research questions. The first 
addresses how critical journalism adds new dimensions to the political 
roles of the media, and the second addresses the relationship between 
party-state authorities and critical journalists. To explore the political 
implications of critical journalism in China, the first question asks: 
What are the political roles of the Chinese media? 
The understanding of the term political that is applied in this dissertation 
goes beyond practices that are limited to formal, political institutions. 
Within discourse theory, politics are connected to the way people organ-
ize and control meaning. They are means of producing identities and 
antagonisms. Through mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion they make 
some social acts and strategies more likely than others (Howarth, Norval 
and Stavrakakis 2000, Laclau and Mouffe 2001). In a discursive under-
standing, the political denotes conflicts of interests, and the strategies of 
power, domination and resistance that are inherent aspects of every so-
cial system. Politics, on the other hand, are strategies designed to reduce 
or deny conflict (Mouffe 2005). Hence, the political role of the Chinese 
media is not limited to what it is assigned by the party-state authorities, 
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but is also a product of the media’s own ability to convey conflicts and 
diverging perspectives in society. 
The development of more critical perspectives in the media has not 
been a uniform tendency, and critical journalism exists in the form of 
pockets within a larger structure. The Chinese print media has been at 
the forefront of the development of more problem-oriented, critical and 
investigative journalism, and this dissertation focuses in particular on the 
role played by a newspaper affiliated with Guangdong Province authori-
ties, Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo). For a number of years it has 
been very influential, and its journalists and editors have been crucial in 
developing and conveying an idea about what it means to be a critical 
and investigative journalist (de Burgh 2003a). Geographical variations in 
levels of control have created different opportunities in various locales, 
but the influence of critical journalism is not limited to these places or 
only to the print media. The discursive and social strategies of print jour-
nalists influence the understanding of the media’s role in general, and in 
cases when critical journalists from the press take up work in television, 
they bring their previous experience with them.  
Critical journalism challenges the restrictions placed upon media con-
tent and practices within the Chinese media field, and the power rela-
tions between the restrictive party-state and critical journalists form the 
background of the second research question: 
How is the media’s conditional autonomy being restricted, and how do critical 
journalists attempt to increase their autonomy? 
The conditional autonomy of the media is a concept that is designed to cap-
ture the combination of increased freedom and the continuation of con-
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trol and restrictions that characterize the Chinese media field. The intro-
duction of market mechanisms into the media sector has led to competi-
tion and diversification, which have provided Chinese audiences with 
more access to information than ever before. When the media’s auton-
omy is conditional, it is because party-state authorities have retained 
their power to regulate and sanction the media. Journalists are vulnerable 
to interference not only from party-state authorities, but also from private 
actors. There is no media law to protect the work of journalists, and this 
absence enables party-state authorities to regulate the media according to 
their varying political interests. 
In this dissertation, critical journalists is a label used to refer to journal-
ists and editors who conduct investigative and problem-oriented journal-
ism; this identity is constructed in opposition to the media’s mouthpiece 
role and its propaganda discourse. By focusing on social problems rather 
than the authorities’ achievements, and by crossing the limits of propa-
ganda discourse, critical journalists differentiate themselves from the 
majority of media workers in China.  
By asking what critical journalists do to increase their autonomy, I ad-
dress how the social and discursive strategies of journalists are conducted 
within a particular context. Critical journalists’ social strategies involve 
choices about issues, locations and investigative methods. Their strategies 
are designed to avoid crossing boundaries while retaining their ability to 
communicate about social problems and critical issues in the media. Dis-
cursive strategies are important in achieving this end because conscious 
and careful choices of narrative techniques, framing and vocabulary 
make it possible to discuss issues that would otherwise be judged to be 
too critical and not suitable for publication.  
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Investigative journalism and the idea that journalists should serve the 
people have become an ideal for the professional identity of Chinese 
journalists (de Burgh 2003b). The everyday practices of most Chinese 
journalists, however, do not correspond to this ideal. The work of most 
news journalists explains the necessities of current political policies, em-
phasises the importance of respecting authorities and conveys informa-
tion about the activities of the CCP leadership (de Burgh 2003b). This 
general compliance reflects the party-state’s willingness to, and capacity 
for, controlling Chinese media (Esarey 2006, He 2004). One perspective 
on the Chinese media field is that relative financial freedom has not led to 
any increase in substantial media freedom. This notion is supported by 
the many cases where the party-state has interfered, sanctioned and even 
imprisoned journalists and activists who challenge the party-state’s limits 
on freedom of expression (He 2004). Reports by non-governmental or-
ganizations such as Reporters without Borders1 and Committee to Protect 
Journalists2 state that interferences against journalists in China are grave 
and common. The continued repression of freedom of expression in 
China illustrates the existing relations of domination, but the persistence 
of transgressions and journalists’ willingness to challenge these relations 
of domination demonstrate resistance. This resistance indicates that there 
have been changes in the power relations within the Chinese media field. 
Those who dispute and challenge the boundaries of the Chinese media 
belong to a minority of journalists, who utilize particular circumstances 
to promote a different understanding of the journalist’s role in society. 
 
1 http://www.rsf.org. 
2 http://www.cpj.org. 
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The impact of their practices, however, has consequences for the percep-
tion of media’s role in general. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
Chapter two, Media, power and spaces of representation, is divided in two 
parts. Part one addresses theoretical perspectives on the conditional 
autonomy of the media. Media scholars are among the main contributors 
to this debate, and a central question under discussion is whether or not 
state-independent ownership is a precondition for the media’s ability to 
serve as a democratizing force in society. This argument is criticized by 
critical media scholars who argue that in many cases state-owned media 
have served the public interest precisely because they are not subjected to 
the same economic interests as privately owned media. The ownership 
and organization of media institutions are not sufficient to determine 
what role the media plays in state-society relations. To answer this, it is 
necessary to take the media’s social and discursive practices into account. 
In particular, the media has a central role to play in shaping public dis-
course, and this is a crucial aspect of the political agency of critical jour-
nalists in an authoritarian context. 
Chapter two – part two is entitled Containing resistance: hegemony and 
domination. The perspectives under discussion here all relate to the con-
cept of power. Power is a nodal point for social science, it is contested 
and is inscribed with different meaning depending on its theoretical con-
text. In the scholarly debate in the 1950s, power denoted the ability of a 
social actor to decide the outcome of a conflict. Subsequent Foucauldian 
perspectives have suggested that power is about the structuring of mean-
ing, and have described it as a capillary and productive force. To analyse 
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the conditional autonomy of media, it is necessary to turn to more discur-
sive understandings of power, while keeping in mind that political op-
pression is conducted through relations of domination that are direct and 
physical as well as discursive. In such relations, the oppressed voice their 
concerns and their resistance in a hidden transcript. Confronting that 
transcript is a public transcript offering representations of existing rela-
tions of domination as natural, legitimate and in the public’s best inter-
ests. Inserting elements of the hidden transcript into the public transcript 
is a strategy of resistance which can create new spaces of representation. 
In a context of domination, this is one way the media can contribute to 
processes of democratization, by making new perspectives, which openly 
challenge hegemonic representations of space and politics, become part 
of the public sphere.  
The discussion of the relationship between discourse and the physical 
reality of materiality continues in chapter three, on Meaning, materiality 
and the research process. The chapter begins with an examination of the 
disagreement between critical realism and discourse theory concerning 
the power of language. The outcome of this evaluation is that while these 
approaches places emphasis on either side of the materiality/discourse 
opposition, they are more compatible than mutually exclusive. The com-
patibility of discourse theory and critical realism stems from a shared 
emphasis on structure rather than agency, and a less developed under-
standing of social practice. To do fieldwork is to engage with meaning 
and materiality, structures and agency, and in the latter part of this chap-
ter I present my reflections on my approach to the field of critical journal-
ism in China. Fieldwork is a learning process in which the researcher’s 
ability meaningfully to interpret her findings increases in tandem with 
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her knowledge of the social context. My daily life in China both as a lan-
guage student and during fieldwork and the cooperation and discussions 
with student assistants were important means of acquiring contextual 
knowledge for this project. This forms the background for my interpreta-
tions of the data material, which consists mainly of interviews with criti-
cal journalists and of newspaper articles that demonstrate critical Chinese 
media discourse. 
Chapter four, State-society relations in China, presents the political and 
institutional context of Chinese media. A main characteristic of this con-
text is that the boundaries between state and society are blurred. Under 
Mao, the party-state was constructed in order to incorporate every aspect 
of society. Party and government institutions were established from the 
local level to the central and there was no clearly defined private space. 
This has made civil society a problematic concept in the Chinese context. 
The design of the Chinese propaganda system reflects the absence of a 
clear division between state and society. It is based on the conception of 
the party as the vanguard of the people, and of propaganda as means of 
educating and enlightening the people. In addition to the media, propa-
ganda involved literature, art, music, scientific research, public health, 
sports and museums, because all these fields were regarded as important 
in engineering a new socialist culture. The positioning of the media as 
part of the propaganda system means that the media’s primary place in 
the state-society continuum is as an integrated part of the party-state.  
How the role of media has changed during the period of economic re-
form is the main topic under discussion in chapter five, Diversifying media 
practices: the changing political roles of Chinese journalists. The media’s posi-
tion within the propaganda system means that it has an instrumental role 
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that is captured in its metaphorical assignment as the mouthpiece of the 
party. Journalists have been defined as propaganda workers, but they 
have also been required to mediate information about social conditions 
and people’s responses to party policies. This information, however, has 
been communicated through an internal media channel. Economic re-
forms and marketization have added new aspects to media’s role, and 
have also opened for more critical journalism in some parts of the Chi-
nese media. The role played by the newspaper Southern Weekend is of 
particular interest in this regard because it has defined what it means to 
be an investigative newspaper seeking to mediate information in a bot-
tom-up manner. Critical journalism challenges the mouthpiece concep-
tion of media, but it also maintains the ambiguity between information 
and propaganda that has characterized the political role of Chinese me-
dia. This chapter argues that one of the important contributions of critical 
journalism lies in the normalization of critical discourse. This means that 
to an increasing extent social problems can be discussed in the open me-
dia, rather than being restricted to an internal channel. 
Chapter six, The polyphony of Chinese critical press discourse, continues 
the discussion about the political role of media through a discourse 
analysis of newspaper articles from Southern Weekend. This analysis also 
sheds light on what critical journalists do to increase their autonomy. 
Because freedom of expression is limited in China, critical discourse must 
be presented in ways that make it acceptable within the boundaries estab-
lished by the party-state. These requirements are reflected in careful ways 
of approaching and framing social problems, and in the polyphonic ex-
pressions that include the dominating discourse in representations of 
social problems. A general feature is that criticism must be limited and 
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local, and explicit systemic perspectives on social problems must be 
avoided. Individualized narratives about human misery and suffering 
form an alternative to overriding social criticism, as do limited but seri-
ous problems on the local scale that only provide vague hints regarding 
the political responsibility for such misery. 
Chapter seven, Conditional autonomy: restrictions and resistance, focuses 
on journalists’ strategies for dealing with the limits and boundaries of 
critical journalism. In this chapter the emphasis is on the social, rather 
than the discursive, strategies of critical journalists in China. Self-
regulation is the principal response to the limits and potential sanctions 
of critical journalism. Critical journalists take into consideration what 
they think can be accepted and what must be avoided, basing their deci-
sions on experience and their interpretation of political signals. Mecha-
nisms of self-regulation are also built into media organizations, through 
hierarchical structures that make editors responsible for the work of their 
subordinate journalists. Both local and central authorities are responsible 
for imposing limitations on critical journalism. Local authorities control 
and sanction the media entities under their jurisdiction, and can restrict 
access to sources when the outside media seeks to report on local issues. 
Nevertheless, critical journalism in China has developed because journal-
ists have found ways to work within and around the limits and bounda-
ries imposed by the party-state. They apply investigative methods, are 
skilful in utilizing their own networks and seek to approach issues and 
problems in the ways that are least likely to invoke negative sanctions. 
The result has been the emergence of new spaces of representation within 
the Chinese media that allow voices other than those of the authorities to 
be heard in the public sphere. 
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Chapter eight, Conclusion, returns to the research questions and pre-
sents a condensed outline of the main arguments of the dissertation. This 
chapter expresses how the dissertation contributes to an understanding 
of political reform and the media’s role in China, and discusses how the 
conditional autonomy of the critical press in China sheds light on more 
recent developments within the Chinese media field. 
 Chapter two – part 1 
Media, power and spaces of representation 
During the twists and turns of the development of the social sciences 
during the last decades, language and the politics of meaning have be-
come focal points for discussion. This dissertation attempts to shed light 
on how the social and discursive practices of critical journalism in China 
are conducted within an authoritarian political context. In the following 
analysis of the political role of Chinese critical press, the main finding is 
that the relationship between the state and the critical media is one of 
conditional autonomy: the media has taken on a freer and more critical role 
compared to its former propaganda function, but the Chinese party-state 
remains a dominating force in relation to the media. The development of 
the media is part of a process of political reform that is motivated by the 
necessity of adjusting politics to the realities of a market economy, inter-
national integration and information technology. This context has pro-
vided opportunities for more critical and problem-oriented journalism, in 
spite of regulations and strict control mechanisms aimed at restraining 
public critical discourse. The situation appears paradoxical: there is in-
creased freedom for the media, but continuing repression; a critical press, 
but no independent media. Critical journalists lack the capacities for po-
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litical agency assumed to be decisive for political participation in estab-
lished democracies. This raises the question of what kind of power it is that 
characterizes and enables critical journalism within an authoritarian state? The 
aim of this chapter is to outline a perspective on power and the media 
that results in an understanding of how political processes evolve in con-
texts characterized by domination.  
This chapter is divided in two parts, of which the first discusses the 
conditional autonomy of the media. Within the academic literature on the 
media, media freedom is usually evaluated in relation to ownership 
structures and independence vis-à-vis political authorities. Here it will be 
argued that the media’s influence on society cannot be reduced to a ques-
tion of ownership, because its political role also depends upon discursive 
practices. To the extent that representations put forward by the media 
challenge the worldview favoured by political authorities, the media is a 
source of resistance. The relationship between an authoritarian state and 
a discursively bold media can be described as one of conditional auton-
omy. Understanding the media’s political role through its discursive 
practices and connections to the state necessitates a contextual approach 
which takes the particularities of the political system and discursive and 
social practices into account.  
The second part of the chapter continues this contextual approach to 
social and political institutions, discussing the concepts of power, he-
gemony and domination. The question of what power is and whether or 
not it is connected to resources is central within political geography, and 
the way in which power is conceptualized is decisive for which processes 
are considered to be politically important. In this dissertation, the empha-
sis on discursive practices presupposes a notion of power that includes 
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the construction of meaning. Discourse and the politics of meaning are 
also central to the discussion of hegemony. Gramsci’s theory on hegem-
ony underscores how state and society are relationally constituted 
(Simon 1991). The Gramscian concept of hegemony as a means of up-
holding a relation of domination is incorporated in discourse theory’s 
concept of discursive hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Hegemonic 
strategies involve discursive and material practices, and the latter part of 
the chapter discusses more material aspects of domination and resistance. 
Relations of domination are spatial, and hegemonic representations of 
space contribute to domination. However, resistance is also conducted 
through spatial strategies, through which social actors communicate 
points of view which challenge the hegemonic perspective. This source of 
resistance is captured in Lefebvre’s (1991) concept of the spaces of represen-
tation. The spatiality of power emphasises the necessity of studying me-
dia practices as contextual, as they acquire meaning according to specific 
political practices and discursive environments. 
THE CONDITIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE MEDIA 
The speed, extent and level of detail of the information currently avail-
able to many people in most societies are thought to separate our time 
from the past. In his trilogy about the rise of the network society, Castells 
(1996) describes the present as the information age, characterized by 
more extensive communication and mediation than ever before. The 
mass media influences the social, political and economic spheres of soci-
ety, since mediation is central to the functioning of the information age. 
Mediation is about inscribing the social with meaning and has a govern-
ing capacity, in the sense that mediated representations shape conduct 
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through presenting its recipients with a certain world order. Media texts 
construe hierarchies of social life, zones of relative safety and danger, and 
as such exercise power (Chouliaraki 2006). The media’s crucial role in 
shaping people’s outlook on their own societies, and the rest of the 
world, makes it a powerful tool for political authorities and other social 
forces. In the following pages the discussion centres on why the media 
has become an important angle from which to analyse state-society rela-
tions. The argument is made that in order to capture the importance of 
the media’s role in relation to the state, it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween power over the media and the power of the media. This distinction 
helps explain how controlled and restricted media practices can contrib-
ute to a more democratic space, if media discourses challenge and criti-
cize relevant authorities’ representations of the world.  
THE MEDIA’S ROLE IN THE STATE-SOCIETY RELATION 
In modern societies, the state needs to communicate with its citizens, and 
the power of mediation means that the mass media is of great importance 
to the state. The principal objective of the pre-modern state was to in-
crease the wealth and power of the sovereign. The idea of the importance 
of governing the population first became widespread during the six-
teenth century, when feudalism dissolved and territorial, administrative 
and colonial states appeared. During this period, questions about how to 
govern others and how people should govern themselves were intensely 
debated (Foucault 1991). In this discourse of governmentality, the popu-
lation was construed as central to the running of the state. This new per-
ception of the state’s role later developed into an ambition to improve the 
lot of members of society, as better health and skills would lead to im-
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proved longevity and morals, and would in the end result in an im-
proved tax base and more welfare (Scott 1998).   
The close relationship between state and society has become an issue 
at the core of state theory, and theoretical questions have centred on the 
nature of state-society relations and how these reflect power relations. 
During the last two decades, approaches to state and society relations 
have placed the relational constitution of state and society at the forefront 
(Migdal, Kohli and Shue 1994). Instead of a concept of the state either as a 
monolithic entity imposing its power upon society, or as a mirror of soci-
ety, the relationships between social and state actors become the object of 
analysis. When the media is analyzed in light of the relational constitu-
tion of state and society, the decisive question is then how the media 
work within the state-society nexus. 
There are two aspects of media power: power over and the power of 
the media (Street 2001). Power over the media is achieved through state 
regulation, censorship and patterns of ownership. The power to decide 
what is supposed to be reported is decisive for the role of the mass media 
in society. The power of the media is a more subtle form of power, one 
which relates to the ability to mould and change discourses and practices. 
The media has a privileged position in influencing people’s perception of 
events, people and issues which they have never observed in person. The 
media’s power consists in its ability to influence and change its surround-
ings. The two aspects of media-related power are clearly interrelated. 
Ownership interests, advertisers’ requirements as well as state regulation 
and control all influence how and what mass media communicate to their 
audience (Curran 2005). Nevertheless, the distinction between the two 
aspects of media power is useful because it contributes to an understand-
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ing of how the media may play a political role that goes further than the 
function the media is assigned by private owners or state regulators.  
The media is never independent of the social system within which it 
operates. It channels information between different parts of society, it 
shapes and influences discourses and representations and is a mediator 
between state actors and society. The media serves as a conduit for in-
formation transferred between the constituent components of that sys-
tem; this makes it socially, culturally, politically and economically em-
bedded (Randall 1998). The need for contextual analyses of the media’s 
role is not reflected in most of the media-related literature. Here, the con-
text of liberal democracies dominates, and this literature tends to empha-
sise the importance of private ownership in securing the media’s inde-
pendence of the state and thereby ensuring the democratic role of the 
media (Curran and Park 2000, O’Neil 1998). This perspective has less to 
offer in explaining the media’s role in social contexts marked by authori-
tarian rule, state control and lack of press freedom. In such contexts, the 
media’s ability to contribute to the democratization process cannot solely 
be deduced from its status as ‘free’ or ‘restricted’: this will depend on the 
actual media’s practices as a producer of discourse and mediator of rep-
resentations.  
Rather than defining the media’s relation to the state on the basis of 
the degree of state involvement, it is possible to construct a more contex-
tual approach building on insights from the debate on state-society rela-
tions. At the core of this debate has been the question about the state’s 
autonomy vis-à-vis society, which again is a version of a more general 
discussion of the relationship between economy and politics. Orthodox 
Marxism sees politics as part of the superstructure mirroring economic 
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relationships in society, and the state is conceived as a means or tool in 
the hands of the ruling class. Later Marxist thinkers such as Gramsci 
(1971) and Poulantzas (1978) have inspired criticism against the economic 
reductionism inherent in classical Marxism, and their work has been cen-
tral in developing the concept of the relative autonomy of the state. If the 
state has a relative autonomy, it means that it is capable of implementing 
decisions even though they may be contrary to the immediate interests of 
the dominating class. The relative autonomy of the state introduces the 
political as a more independent sphere, one that transcends the orthodox 
Marxist concept of the political as an epiphenomenon of the economy.  
The theoretical recognition of the relative autonomy of the state as-
sumes that it has a political capacity. Evans (1995) criticizes this tendency 
to equate autonomy and capacity. As part of a more empirical approach 
to state-society relations, he argues that a state can be nearly completely 
autonomous, but still weak. The state’s capacity to implement decisions 
depends on its relationship with society, and if these linkages are absent, 
or weak, the state is autonomous, but lacking political capacity. In the 
opposite situation, when there are strong linkages between state and so-
ciety, the state has a strong political capacity. This situation can be de-
scribed as the embedded autonomy of the state. The same analytical distinc-
tion between the state’s autonomy and its capacity is present in Gramsci’s 
work, but here it is expressed as relating to the strength of the civil soci-
ety. When the state relates to a weak civil society, this situation forces the 
state to rely on its coercive means to implement its policies; in contrast, 
hegemony based in a strong civil society reduces the need for coercion 
(Simon 1991). 
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More recent work on the relations between state and society advocates 
a non-monolithic view of the state (Migdal et al. 1994). Neither ‘state’ nor 
‘society’ are clearly demarcated entities, and to analyse their relations it is 
necessary to identify the various parts, organizations and practices which 
constitute them. Some parts of the state may have high autonomy and 
high capacity, while other state organizations may lack similar resources. 
Analyses of the media’s role in society usually point to its independence 
from the state as a decisive factor. However, if Evans’ (1995) argument is 
applied, and independence means the same as autonomy, the picture 
becomes more complex. In Evans-inspired thinking, media organizations 
that are highly autonomous, but low on capacity, will be able to do what 
they want, but have little influence on state policies. On the other hand, 
mass media that has an embedded autonomy with strong linkages to the 
state might have a high capacity resulting in a strong influence on the 
political development of the society. This opens the way for evaluations 
of media’s political role that do not rest solely on the basis of media’s 
independence, but takes the contextuality of state-society relations into 
account. 
In authoritarian states, where state power cannot be influenced 
through democratic elections, media independence is often highly re-
stricted. When a certain level of autonomy is allowed, the media can be 
one of very few channels of influence from society to the state. I suggest 
that this situation can be understood as conditional autonomy. This concep-
tion is grounded in an understanding of the social as open and of hege-
monic orders as changeable, while also recognizing the relative strength 
of the state versus social actors. It is a conceptualization of the state-
society relationship that allows for an analytical separation of autonomy 
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and capacity, important for explaining situations where political influ-
ence on the state depends on close ties rather than on autonomy. Finally, 
conditional autonomy is a concept that opens the way for an analysis of 
democratizing political practices and their implications, in contexts 
where the state remains in position to impose sanctions upon any un-
wanted political developments. 
THE MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY  
A free and independent media is conceived as being a precondition for a 
vital democracy. The media provides information that is regarded as cru-
cial for citizens’ ability to make informed choices in elections (O’Neil 
1998). An important question then becomes what the media’s role is in 
authoritarian societies and one-party states, such as China. Is the media 
in non-democracies only a propaganda machine, or is it possible that 
state-controlled media can also contribute to democratizing political prac-
tices? The discussion which follows suggests that the simple opposition 
between independent and restricted media is insufficient as a basis for 
understanding the media’s role in different societies. This distinction 
rests on a belief in the unrestricted position of the mass media in liberal-
democratic countries. The argument put forward in this text is that an 
understanding of the political role of the media depends on a contextual 
approach that encompasses both discursive and institutional perspectives 
on media practices.  
Within traditional liberal theory, the importance of the media is con-
nected to its role as a free-market watchdog. The media’s major task is to 
function as a check on the state by monitoring state institutions and ex-
posing abuses of state power. The fulfilment of the watchdog role de-
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pends on private ownership and freedom from state involvement. Any 
state engagement within the media sector is perceived as a threat against 
the media’s freedom that will prevent it from exercising its role as a 
watchdog (Curran 2005). The liberal theory of the free-market watchdog 
represents a state-centred approach to the relationship between state and 
society. The state’s monopoly on legitimate violence sets it apart from 
other social actors, and the state is construed as the seat of power from 
which the public needs to be protected. Investigative journalism is sup-
posed to safeguard public interests and uphold democracy by uncover-
ing obscured truths, exposing immoral or illegal practices and defending 
of victims of injustice (Curran 2005, de Burgh 2000a). Equally important 
for democracy is the media’s role in providing an arena for information 
and debate. Through journalistic practice that reflects conflicts and gives 
voice to a plurality of interests, journalists mediate the interests of the 
people in a way that responsive governments take into account. As such, 
the mass media serves as a channel for continuous feedback from citizens 
to their elected representatives (Curran 2005). 
A principal problem with the above conception of the relationship be-
tween the state and the mass media is that it places insufficient emphasis 
on sources of power other than state power (Curran 2005). A substantial 
portion of global media is owned by large corporations, such as media 
conglomerates, and even in liberal democracies it is naïve to conceive of 
the media as being fully independent. The power of corporate interests 
demonstrates that private ownership of the media is not a sufficient 
guarantee for the freedom of the media. If the public/private distinction 
is made synonymous with the restricted/free opposition, the countervail-
ing interests involved in the media’s relationship to corporate as well as 
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government power remain hidden. For instance, privately owned media 
have supported authoritarian state rule in Argentina and Chile (Curran 
2005), and private media in Taiwan accepted and contributed to legiti-
mizing authoritarian rule (Lee 2000). Media mogul Rupert Murdoch, who 
controls the Star TV network in China, removed the BBC’s World Service 
channel in response to Chinese authorities’ negative reactions to the 
channel’s reports from the crackdown on the democracy movement in 
1989 (Chambers 2000). In the late 1990s, there was a strong belief that the 
globalization of media and the development of the internet would bring 
down totalitarian regimes and pave the way for democracy (Monbiot 
2005). This optimism did not take into account that internet technology 
has developed on a commercial basis that has also made it susceptible to 
state interests that weigh in the opposite direction of free information. In 
other words, private ownership is not a guarantee for a critical attitude in 
relation to state power; in order truly to be a watchdog, the media needs 
to extend its control and criticism to corporate power as well as state 
power.  
The image of completely free, unconstrained media power in liberal 
democracies is an idealized picture of a more complex situation. In liberal 
democratic countries, the relationship between government and the me-
dia is often characterized by mutual dependency. The media needs access 
to power holders, and politicians depend on media coverage. Watchdog 
journalism is facilitated by the political opposition, as they have an inter-
est in exposing problems and misconduct that can be blamed on their 
political antagonists (de Burgh 2000a). The implication is that even inves-
tigative journalism does not take place the place of independent of power 
holders and state authorities. 
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Private, free market media is also subject to economic constraints that 
influence how the media contributes to democracy. Deregulation and 
commercialization of media appears to have reduced rather than in-
creased the amount of watchdog journalism (de Burgh 2000b) . Investiga-
tive journalism is expensive and resource-intensive and requires editors 
and owners who are willing to place social responsibility above profit-
ability. This has meant that public media has been an important provider 
of watchdog journalism (de Burgh 2000b), contrary to what should be 
expected according to the free-market thesis. Market constraints also in-
fluence the media’s role in providing an arena for information and de-
bate, since there are high costs involved in establishing a new outlet of 
the modern news media (Curran 2005). The commercialized press tends 
to prioritize content that maximizes sales, even if this can be said to un-
dermine the freedom of information. In general, human interest and en-
tertainment stories tend to be most marketable, while public affairs ac-
count for only a small part of media coverage. Finally, the importance of 
income derived from advertising in commercial media gives advertisers a 
profound influence on the media’s development. Media that attract a 
wealthy audience also attract more advertisers. It can be argued that this 
contributes to an information gap, where the media for the general public 
is information-poor, and the media consumed by the wealthy contains 
more substantial, investigative journalism. Curran’s main argument is 
that the market undermines the kind of information that is complex and 
nuanced, and that it encourages simplified, decontextualized stories filled 
with stereotypes (Curran 2005).  
The constraints on a free media role represent a critique of liberal the-
ory’s positioning of a free-market media as a precondition for the media’s 
26 Media, power and spaces of representation 
democratic role. On the other hand, Lee (2000) warns against underesti-
mating the value of a media that is independent of the state. In the case of 
Taiwan, the media has been partly private, but the largest private actors 
have been prone to cooptation by and close cooperation with the state. 
The entanglements of state and market interests led to a strengthening of 
state power. Small-scale private media, on the other hand, was subject to 
less state control. It offered an outlet for criticism and debate that was not 
allowed in state organs, and that the dominant private actors avoided. 
When foreign cable TV became popular and increased the challenge to 
the state’s domination of the media, the private, state-loyal media also 
became more likely to deviate from official positions in order to survive 
in the competitive media market. The result has been a diversification of 
media and media content, and a weaker, but still dominating state (Lee 
2000). 
The various limitations on the media’s watchdog role weaken liberal 
theory’s conception of the independent media. However, the media con-
tinues to be of great importance in processes of democratization. The 
media’s role in contexts of domination is less clear. In spite of the as-
sumption of the close relationship between media and democracy, there 
are few attempts to analyse the media’s role in political transitions 
(O’Neil 1998). In the debate that followed in the wake of the transitions in 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, the media was 
hardly mentioned. This absence is due to an elite perspective that has 
dominated approaches to political transitions. Elites play a crucial politi-
cal role in democratic transitions, but the institutional environment must 
be taken into consideration as well. Existing political, cultural and eco-
nomic patterns are likely to influence the course taken during transition; 
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in other words, the path-dependency of political change indicates the 
importance of studying, among other institutions, the mass media 
(O’Neil 1998). How the media contributes to democratic transitions de-
pends upon a range of factors, including ownership status. People’s ac-
cess to media depends on a range of factors including the population’s 
literacy rate, the degree of poverty and their access to electricity. Severe 
state-control might cause extensive circulation of underground publica-
tions, but state-run media may also be more inclined to ignore censorship 
patterns in periods of rapid change (O’Neil 1998). 
The elite perspective on political transitions reflects a narrow concep-
tualization of democracy and democratization, one that emphasises the 
formal characteristics of democracy rather than its substantial aspects. 
The distinction between formal and substantial democracy was intro-
duced by de Tocqueville, and implies that there is no necessary corre-
spondence between the formal institutions of a democracy and the redis-
tribution of power that makes citizens able to influence the decision mak-
ing processes (Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor 2003). Grugel (2002) elabo-
rates on the characteristics of formal and substantive democracy and de-
scribes a formal democracy as a minimalist conceptualization centring on 
the regular holding of fair elections. The competition must be between at 
least two political parties, and there must be an inclusive suffrage. Sub-
stantial democracy is a more inclusive concept and depends on whether 
or not rights have real meaning for people. Democratization is under-
stood as the processes that contribute to this goal, by introducing and 
extending citizenship rights, as well as creating a democratic state. Such 
politics of inclusion contain processes that give citizens a political voice 
and a stake in government. The government’s accountability and respon-
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siveness to the needs and interests of its citizens is crucial, as is the con-
struction of democratic institutions that enable political contestation and 
debate. A successful politics of inclusion will lead to a situation where 
democratization from below is combined with effective governance 
(Luckham et al. 2003).  
In many societies, this goal will seem unattainable, but the concept of 
politics of inclusion is still valuable because it points out processes of de-
mocratization that may occur, even within authoritarian states, without 
necessarily resulting in the constitution of a formal democracy (Luckham 
et al. 2003). Sklar’s (1987) analysis of developmental democracy intro-
duces the phrase “democracy in parts”, meaning that even within au-
thoritarian states, there might be pockets of democracy embedded in in-
stitutions such as the courts, the media or the unions. Authoritarianism is 
not necessarily monolithic, and to the extent that institutions are able to 
create expanded spaces for dissent and debate, they contribute to democ-
ratizing in its substantial sense, while not necessarily resulting in the es-
tablishment of a formal democracy.  
The public recognition of the existence of conflicts and problems 
within a society is of great importance for a democracy (Mouffe 2005). 
This means that the democratizing potential of media practices depends 
in particular on the media’s ability to discuss social and political prob-
lems, mediate grievances, as well as critique power holders. Mouffe 
(2005) understands the political as a sphere where there will always be 
power relations, conflict and irreconcilable interests. At the core of politi-
cal processes is the formation of a ‘we’ in opposition to a ‘they’, and the 
antagonism between different collective identities cannot be resolved. In 
other words, democracy is not about removing such conflicts, but relates 
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to the possibility of articulating conflicts and critique in the open. In 
Mouffe’s thinking, politics, on the other hand, refer to the manifold prac-
tices of politics, which often take as their goal the reduction of the impact 
of conflicts, rather than recognizing them as legitimate expressions 
(Mouffe 2005). This is what happens in liberal democracies characterized 
by political deregulation and emphasis on the capacities of the market.  
Liberalist ideology tends to represent society as complex, but harmo-
nious. Liberal discourse propounds the argument that through a rational 
consensus, every perspective, every interest, every identity can coexist in 
a non-conflictual way. The assumption that conflicts of interest can be 
resolved through market mechanisms reduces the scope of the political 
field. Liberal democracies also tend to replace the historical oppositions 
between left and right by centre-left and centre-right, and the result is 
more blurred positions and less political antagonism. The consequence is 
that conflicts, social problems and criticism are represented as technical 
issues that should be left to experts to resolve, rather than problems that 
must be approached as political issues. This negation of the conflictual 
nature of the political can also be found in the liberal paradigm that ad-
vocates a communicative rather than instrumental rationality. When poli-
tics is conceived as a moral field in which it is possible to reach a rational 
consensus through debate and free discussion, it contributes to a depoli-
ticization of social problems (Mouffe 2005). In a state like China, where 
there is one party that presents itself as the representative of a united 
people, antagonisms tend to be glossed over and suppressed. Such nega-
tion of antagonism and conflict prevents and limits democracy. 
The aim of this discussion is to arrive at an understanding of how, in a 
situation characterized by state control and restrictions, the media can 
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continue to find outlets that contribute to democratization. Mouffe’s ar-
gument that the political must be understood as antagonism is a starting 
point. Politics is about the constitution of we/they oppositions, and to 
her, “politics is not the overcoming of the we/they opposition but the 
different ways in which it is established” (Mouffe 2005:14). Democratic 
politics is about constructing political identities, we/they relations that 
do not turn into friend/enemy relations. Instead, antagonism should be 
constructed in a way that makes conflict compatible with society’s inter-
ests and a legitimate expression for opposition. This requires the recogni-
tion that there exists a common bond between the parties in a conflict, 
which changes the we/they relation from one between enemies to one 
between adversaries. Mouffe names this kind of relation ‘agonism’ and 
argues that democracy’s task is to turn antagonism into agonism. In con-
texts where the media has an ability to influence how social issues should 
be represented, for instance whether or not issues should be represented 
as technical problems to be solved or as legitimate conflicts between ad-
versaries, it endows the media with a central role as a potential democra-
tizing force. To the extent that the media contributes to politicizing social 
issues, it becomes a factor in the democratization process, giving voice to 
interests that might otherwise remain unrecognized. Mouffe states that 
the specificity of modern democracy “lies in the recognition and legitima-
tion of conflict and the refusal to suppress it by imposing an authoritarian 
body” (Mouffe 2005:30). This presupposes a break with the conception of 
society as an organic body in which conflict is interpreted as a threat to its 
very existence. A democratic society must provide institutions that allow 
for the expression of conflicts.  
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THE POWER OF MEDIATION 
It is in matters concerning society’s openness to discussion and debate 
that the media can play an important role in processes of democratiza-
tion. Democratic spaces in society can be expanded through representa-
tions that challenge the authorities’ versions of what society is like, such 
as news items showing grievances among the population, or criticism 
that calls for accountability and transparency. The media’s ability and 
willingness to mediate such representations does not necessarily mirror 
its institutional role. In order to understand how politically restrained 
media can contribute to democracy, it is necessary to analyse the media’s 
discursive practices, and in particular critical media discourse that cen-
tres on social problems such as grievances and suffering. 
Thompson (1995) attempts to explain the connection between narra-
tives of suffering and democracy. Thompson argues that we need a new 
understanding of publicness. Traditionally, public life is seen as depend-
ing on co-presence and face-to-face interaction. This is an unsatisfactory 
understanding of public life today, and the mass media is something else 
than an extension of traditional public life by other means. The mass me-
dia’s ability to gain recognition for people’s concerns is central to democ-
racy, because it compensates for state authorities’ tendency to lose touch 
with the concerns of ordinary individuals. In short, the media can com-
pensate for the lack of responsiveness within the state, but Thompson 
holds that the media also contributes to a democratization of responsibil-
ity. When people are being exposed to narratives about the suffering of 
other people, in other places, it contributes to democracy. Through such 
representations people are being exhorted to be responsible citizens with 
a concern for non-local others. The media politicizes the everyday by 
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making it visible, and extending the space of the visible is likely to bring 
forward more collective action in response to mediated information 
(Thompson 1995). 
The main problem in this analysis is the lack of explanation as to how 
media narratives contribute to a democratization of responsibility. This 
question, on the other hand, is at the core of Chouliaraki’s discussion of 
the power of mediation (Chouliaraki 2006). In her analysis of the specta-
torship of suffering, she analyses how news about people in dire condi-
tions is translated into meaning, and how the expected reaction of the 
spectator is written into media texts. Within media and cultural studies, a 
topic such as distant suffering has been discussed, but often in a way that 
focuses on news as image rather than text. The difference is that while the 
discussion of news as image concentrates on media’s ability to convey 
real suffering and the possible disruptions in the process of mediation, a 
perspective of news as texts opens the way for a semiotic approach. This 
view does not exclude visual images, but asks how they contribute to the 
construction of meaning. Mediation is a technology of discourse that in-
fluences conduct, ethics and identities, and this makes it a technology of 
governmentality. The following discussion addresses the issue of how 
mediation as a technology of discourse can contribute to processes of 
democratization (Chouliaraki 2006). 
The different constraints on media freedom make it difficult to state 
exactly how the media constitutes various forms of political discourse 
and democratic practices on a general basis. Different media genres and 
their mediation of political discourse, media production, reception and 
audiences’ practices in perceiving and interpreting are all decisive mo-
ments influencing the power of mediation. Rather than approaching the 
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power of mediation from a general point of view, Chouliaraki argues for 
an approach that focuses on singular texts and their discursive character-
istics (Chouliaraki 2006). Discourse analysis highlights a perspective on 
language and representation as constitutive, and not only constituted. 
Through articulations, signs are combined in a way that enables some 
particular representations while excluding others (Laclau and Mouffe 
2001). Hence, the approach to media texts that Chouliaraki advocates 
becomes meaningful if singular texts are conceived of as texts generating 
discourse, as well as generated by discourse.  
From the perspective of discourse analysis, mediated political dis-
course is an attempt to establish particular versions of the issues debated, 
by combining signs in a way that appears natural and self-evident (La-
clau and Mouffe 2001). The media wields great power in deciding what is 
going to be presented as news, feature stories or entertainment; and the 
framing of news and feature stories influences the audience’s perceptions. 
To deconstruct the frame is a device for analysing how media stories are 
told as narratives. Journalists animate events and turn them into stories 
with plots and actors, and the storyline assigns responsibility and causal-
ity in relation to the actors. In the media’s representation of politics, po-
litical actors can be represented as if they were driven by external events, 
or as an autonomous force deciding the course of action. Such choices 
convey a particular representation of causality, which make some follow-
up angles more likely than others. Frames are structuring tools and they 
cause particular representations to appear repeatedly in similar versions. 
For instance, media narratives about Africa tend to place poverty, vio-
lence, death, war and famine at the forefront of the narratives, and ignore 
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or all other possible representations of life and politics on this continent 
(Street 2001).  
Framing is the process of selecting and highlighting some features of 
reality, while simultaneously underplaying other aspects. Metaphors, 
verbal depictions and visual images, as well as catchphrases and repre-
sentations of causes and effects, are important means through which 
frames are established. The result is a consistent story which establishes a 
narrative about problems, their causes, the involved responsibilities, im-
plications and solutions. News stories are not different from other media 
genres, in the sense that they are presented in certain ways that exclude 
other possible ways of narrating the same event, and they are read ac-
cording to a set of social codes (Street 2001).  
News discourse produces meaning, not only through communicating 
events that have taken place, but also through its representations of iden-
tities, places and possibilities for change. There is always a construction 
of the imagined audience within the communication practices of the me-
dia. Politically, this is interesting since journalists and editors often claim 
it is their task to reflect the interests, views and concerns of the people. 
Since this is an unattainable goal, the text mediates an imagined audience 
(Street 2001). This is perhaps most obvious in media products directed at 
very specific, targeted audiences, sometimes the imagined reader of a 
magazine is even given a name and an age to exemplify the intended core 
audience. However, every media text bears an imprint of an imagined 
receiver, and the construction of the audience takes place through the 
text’s means of defining that this is a matter of importance to the reader. 
The imagined audience appears through the construction of a ‘we’, a col-
lective identity constructed in relation to ‘them’. In the US media’s repre-
  Media, power and spaces of representation 35 
sentations of crime, ‘they’ have frequently been young, black men who 
are threatening ‘us’ (Street 2001). In the Danish election campaign in 2001, 
the mass media played a central role in defining the relation between the 
Danish ‘we’ in opposition to refugees and immigrants as ‘them’ (Bruun 
2005). The media’s two-way relationship with the people, mediating in-
formation from the state and other authorities, but also reflecting the in-
terests and views of ordinary people, means that ‘the people’ is discur-
sively constituted in media texts (Street 2001). The media’s constitution of 
the people influences the representations of the relationship between the 
people and the state and the people and politics. The ‘we’ of the text is 
different from the ‘they’ who make the political decisions (Street 2001). 
This means that the mass media contributes to constituting the political 
discourse by deciding what the political discourse is and which questions 
are included in the category of the political. 
The choice of space-time is important in the construction of identities 
in the text. When distance and difference are emphasised, the implied 
‘we’ in the text is represented as remote from the human objects de-
scribed. This is a typical characteristic of texts representing distant suffer-
ing in Western media, such as flood victims in Bangladesh or internal 
refugees in Sudan. On the other hand, when suffering is presented in a 
way that accentuates its relevance for ‘all of us’, it changes the relation-
ship between the ‘us’ and ‘them’ of the text and brings them closer to-
gether (Chouliaraki 2006). How a text depicts distance influences how 
agency is conceptualized, both the agency of the audience as well as the 
audience of the people involved in the news. Whether or not the news 
story seems close to the reader influences the creation of feelings such as 
responsibility. 
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When analysing modes of reacting to news that convey suffering, 
Chouliaraki distinguishes between a contemplative mode of spectator-
ship and forms of viewing that bring about identification with sufferers. 
Different discursive representations inspire different ways of viewing, 
but a text can never do more than inspire a certain way of behaving in its 
audience. A contemplative mode of viewing is a more likely reaction to 
discourse that emphasise a neutral way of reporting suffering, such as 
aggregated facts from far-away contexts. Identification, on the other 
hand, depends upon portraits appearing as ‘real people’. This mode of 
viewing can be likened to a theatre, where the viewer engages in a story 
about benefactors and persecutors. These are symbolic figures that organ-
ize the affective potential of their spectators and raise impulses to protect 
and comfort the suffering and to denounce and punish evildoers (Chou-
liaraki 2006). Whether or not a text facilitates such reactions also depends 
upon the degree to which the victims of suffering are inscribed with 
agency. People who are represented as having a voice and an ability to 
act are more likely to evoke pity. 
The media’s potential for contributing to processes of democratization 
depends on its ability to evoke agency. If, as Boltanski (1999) writes, 
agency can be a reader’s silent, internal whisper, how can this soundless 
utterance be of political importance? An affirmative answer to this ques-
tion presupposes a view of discourse as productive. If a media text has 
convinced its reader that a person in question has been treated unfairly, 
or that a group of people has been subject to discrimination, the reader’s 
reaction contributes to a future disposition against similar treatment of 
people in other situations. It is part of shaping the reader’s outlook on 
society. The ethics of media texts about suffering are connected to how 
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particular texts present suffering as a moral cause, and whether or not 
this is something to which the receiver is supposed. In many media texts, 
the expected reaction to the news is incorporated in the text itself, as vari-
ous ‘helpers’ and their reactions are described in the narrative. If a text 
explains how people have been collecting money, given donations or 
written petitions on behalf of the victims, these reactions position the 
objects of suffering as deserving victims and suggest possible ways for 
receivers to act.  
To sum up this discussion, I have argued that a contextual approach is 
needed in order to capture the democratizing potential of media. The first 
part of the chapter dealt with questions of media and democracy, and 
how the media can contribute to processes of democratization within 
authoritarian contexts. This is less obvious, because authoritarian states 
prevent the media from serving as an independent watchdog, or as an 
arena for free, public debate. The chapter argues that the media’s condi-
tional autonomy in an authoritarian context includes a discursive perspec-
tive that enables the media to influence state policies. Even a strongly 
restricted media may have a conditional autonomy, a space of represen-
tation that enables it to contribute to democratizing processes in a context 
characterized by authoritarian rule, state control and lack of press free-
dom. The next part of this chapter aims to explore what kind of power 
the conditional autonomy of media involves, and the relations of domina-
tion and resistance the media engages with. 
 
 Chapter two – part 2 
Containing resistance: Hegemony and 
domination 
In the previous part of the chapter, the topic under discussion was how 
the media can contribute to democratization. The media’s ability to chal-
lenge the authorities through criticism and alternative representations 
makes it a target for control and repression in many parts of the world. In 
authoritarian states, the authorities’ fear of media power frequently sub-
jects journalists and editors to great danger when they cross beyond the 
limits of officially sanctioned discourse. In more open societies, attempts 
to control the media are less direct, but the perceived need among au-
thorities to contain media power is not limited to repressive and authori-
tarian states. The power of words, images and narratives is strong, and 
the following discussion starts by raising the question of how power can 
be conceptualized in order to analyse the fear of discursive opposition 
that characterizes attempts to suppress the media. The chapter then pro-
ceeds to discuss how oppositional power and resistance can be contained 
through political and discursive hegemony, and how such domination 
can be resisted. The final part of the chapter addresses how relations of 
power are situated in, and mediated through, space.  
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POWER  
Power is a theoretically contested concept. The way it is defined within 
various theoretical contributions is often revealing for what it says about 
their general perspectives on questions within the philosophy of science, 
such as the structure/agency debate. Power, as it was conceived in main-
stream social science from the 1950s and on, referred to A’s capacity to 
make B do something he would otherwise not do (Lukes 2005). This un-
derstanding was employed in studies of decision-making, where the ac-
tor who was successful in realizing his own initiatives was judged as 
more powerful than the ones who were defeated (Dahl 1961). In theoreti-
cal debates during the 1960s, this conception of power was criticized for 
its behaviouristic approach, since it did not take into account the influ-
ence of social processes appearing prior to the articulation of interests. 
The argument was that “mobilization of bias” causes some interests to 
emerge as legitimate, while other interests remain unarticulated and do 
not become part of the decision-making process (Lukes 2005:20). The be-
havioural approach to power later became subject to further criticism 
from Marxist approaches which conceived the problem of interest articu-
lation as a consequence of structural processes. If capitalist societies are 
seen as depending upon the false consciousness of the suppressed 
classes, interest articulation does not reveal the real power relations. 
Hence, Marxists regarded the atomistic perspective inherent in the be-
haviouristic concept of power as an inadequate basis for understanding 
how the formation of class consciousness contributes to upholding power 
relations (Lukes 2005).  
Despite such differences, the concepts of power under discussion in 
this period of time were all closely connected to the question of resources. 
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Power was conceived as something which actors could possess. This no-
tion of power as something that can be held is also reflected in contempo-
rary everyday language. Allen (2003) has sought to stir up a debate about 
this relationship between power and resources. He admits that in real life 
there are good reasons to believe that power and resources are insepara-
ble entities. The US president election campaign demands enormous 
amounts of capital, and various resource bases such as money, expert 
knowledge, and social capital all seem to enable people to influence their 
surroundings. However, Allen argues that resources can be used in fool-
ish ways, they can disappear or lose their value and may not generate the 
intended result. There is a danger that if power is thought of as some-
thing an individual or a company possesses, due to its resources, power 
acquires a thing-like quality. This reified image of power is problematic, 
because it does not explain how power comes into being or how it works; 
it only shows that some have it and others do not. Instead, Allen suggests 
a concept of power that emphasises power as “a relational effect of social 
interaction” (Allen 2003:2). An effect is not a thing and cannot be held in 
advance, but it makes things happen. This way, a distinction is estab-
lished between the exercise of power and the resources that are mobilized 
to sustain that exercise.  
Allen’s argument prompts a reflection about an aspect of the concept 
of power that often has been taken for granted. He reminds his readers 
that different modalities of power, of which seduction and domination 
are only two, work in different ways and must be analyzed accordingly. 
However, a literal interpretation of the power/resource argument im-
plies that no sentence should contain words or phrases like ‘power-
holder’, ‘with power to’ and so on. This break between power and re-
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sources induces a fundamental break with everyday language, and while 
it opens for a more dynamic understanding of power relations, it does 
not explain the stability of relations of domination. For the purposes of 
this chapter, the argument could be made that the immateriality of dis-
cursive power is precisely an example of power as an effect rather than 
power as something which depends upon a particular resource base. 
That this argument does not sweep aside other concepts of power is due 
to discursive power being considered to be more powerful when it is 
institutionalized and extensive – when it appears in relation to resources. 
Another possible path to avoid reification of power is outlined in Gid-
dens’s (1984) conceptualization of power. Rather than de-linking re-
sources and power, he suggests a more nuanced understanding of re-
sources. Giddens distinguishes between two categories of resources, allo-
cative and authoritative. Allocative resources refer to control over mate-
rial resources, and have been given priority above the authoritative in 
both Marxist and non-Marxist explanations of society. Authoritative re-
sources are associated with control over people and their activities. Gid-
dens argues that in order to capture the dynamics of social change, it is 
necessary to examine the relationship between allocative and authorita-
tive resources. This means that resources and power are related, but Gid-
dens inserts an important distinction between capability and power. 
People in important positions might control substantial resources, but 
still be unable to secure the outcome they want. Hence, power is not syn-
onymous with resources, but is a transformative capacity. This implies that 
“all forms of rule have their ‘openings’ that can be utilized by those in 
subordinate positions to influence the activities of those who hold power 
over them” (Giddens 1984:11). Social systems are interwoven with rela-
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tionships of autonomy and dependence, and the ability to serve as a cata-
lyst for social change is not reserved to those who control the resources 
available. In an analysis of media power in an authoritarian context, Gid-
dens’ concept of power is useful because it opens for the possibility of the 
dual existence of domination and resistance. Power makes social systems 
durable, and upholds domination. However, power does not only denote 
the ability to bend the will of the weaker (Giddens 1984). Still, for an 
analysis that requires a theoretical foundation of how media power works 
in the contexts of relations between state and society, an account of how 
power is related to communication and language is needed. One such 
may be found in Foucault’s work on power, which has inspired the con-
cept of power employed in discourse theory. 
The question of how human beings are made into subjects constitutes 
the core of Foucault’s work (Sandmo 1999). There are two main ap-
proaches to power in his studies of the processes of subject formations. 
The first approach concerns the close connection between knowledge and 
power, and the second is captured in the metaphor of ‘capillary power’ 
(Lukes 2005). According to Foucault, the power/knowledge connection is 
evident in practices directed towards producing knowledge about certain 
subjects, such as situations where people are subject to observation and 
categorization. Knowledge about someone also facilitates processes for 
gaining control over the observed subjects. Foucault writes that in early 
modernity, power began to be exercised through the provision of social 
services, and this was followed by the development of knowledge-driven 
fields such as demography, public health and fertility. The knowledge 
gained in these areas was a prerequisite for a power that worked on the 
bodies of individuals, one that influenced their attitudes and everyday 
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behaviour (Foucault 1980). In his representation of the history of sexual-
ity, Foucault demonstrates how acquired knowledge about sexuality has 
been a means of achieving control, through discourses that influence the 
self-government of the human body (Foucault 1990). The intimate con-
nection between knowledge and power occurs because knowledge con-
stitutes a basis for developing disciplinary strategies. The design of cate-
gories such as normality and abnormality becomes part of individuals’ 
identity formation and contributes to processes of subject formation. In 
this process, the effect of external repression is substituted by individuals’ 
own consciences, serving as a more efficient and pervasive way of con-
trolling behaviour. 
Foucault aimed to explain how power was exercised, its techniques 
and tactics, in a concrete and detailed way (Foucault 1980). It was out of 
these aspects of his work that the concept of capillary power developed. 
The metaphor of the capillary conjures an image of power as a life-
sustaining force that works upon the human body, and it breaks with the 
notion of power as solely repressive. Foucault argues that if power never 
achieved anything positive and never contributed to anything other than 
repression, it would not be obeyed. What makes power accepted is “sim-
ply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but 
that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowl-
edge, produces discourse” (Foucault 1980:119). In other words, Foucault 
suggests a notion of power as productive; to him, extensive and produc-
tive forms of power are a characteristic of modernity. Pre-modern socie-
ties were characterized by the power that culminates in the ability of one 
person to end another’s life. This power is negative in the sense that its 
strength lies in the capability to refuse, deny and hinder the free will of 
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others. However, it is also a limited mode of power in the sense that its 
brutality only determines certain domains of people’s life. There were 
spaces of freedom that the power of repression could not penetrate 
(Sandmo 1999). In contrast to the repressiveness of pre-modern, absolute 
power, Foucault associates modernity with productive power. This is a 
capillary power characterized by power over life, and its language is not 
the brutality of a present authority. It is carried out as the silent work of 
institutions, discourses and relations which make people who they are. 
This notion of power is fruitful as a tool for understanding why media 
power and discursive opposition represents a threat in authoritarian con-
texts. The media’s ability to influence identities and ways of living is one 
mode of the productive power that makes people become who they are.  
Productive power does not float freely, but is embedded in institu-
tionalized practices. In “Discipline and punish” Foucault uses an analysis 
of the role of penal institutions to illustrate the transition from a limited, 
absolute form of power to productive power . His intention was to show 
modernity’s “technological take-off in the productivity of power” (Fou-
cault 1980:119). As a symbol of this, Foucault used the Panopticon, which 
is a never-realized design of a circular prison where inmates would be 
disciplined through the constant possibility of being observed. Supervi-
sion would replace the raw brutality of previous penal institutions, and 
to Foucault this transition symbolized a new economy of power. He ar-
gued that the disciplinary effect of supervision was not limited to prisons, 
but constituted a fundamental aspect of the work of subject formation 
carried out in schools, asylums and factories.  
Critics of Foucault’s analyses of the characteristics of modern, capil-
lary power have objected to the alleged lack of direct repression, and 
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pointed to the continuation of violent, brutal repression within moder-
nity. For instance Alford (2000) argues that while the Panopticon was 
intended as a prison design, it should not be confused with the practices 
of penology. Studies of maximum security prisons indicate rather the 
opposite of Foucault’s observation: that disciplinary power in penal insti-
tutions is based on a complete control that makes the ‘gaze’ of the Panop-
ticon redundant. As long as a maximum security prison controls its en-
trance and exit, the guards need not observe the inmates. In daily 
‘counts’, the guards ensure that nobody has escaped, and apart from that, 
inmates can be left to themselves. The extensive process of subject forma-
tion described in “Discipline and punish” is absent from such penal insti-
tutions (which in fact have rather a lot in common with pre-modern dun-
geons). Alford’s main point is not only that Foucault was wrong about 
the characteristics of modern prisons, but that he underestimated the 
importance of traditional, pre-modern power in modern societies. Scott 
(1990) adds to this critique in his work on domination and resistance. In 
his studies of contexts in which domination is prominent, such as internal 
relations in highly stratified peasant societies, the techniques of domina-
tion are more direct and less capillary than those described by Foucault. 
This may partly be due to the differences between domination based on 
proximity and domination based on impersonal, technical rules. Perhaps 
it is also that apparently distant, impersonal forms of control are more 
direct and arbitrary than Foucault’s analyses reveal. There might be con-
siderable space for personal revenge and disciplinary acts within a bu-
reaucratic system. The critique forwarded by Alford (2000) and Scott 
(1990) serves as a warning against an uncritical adoption of Foucault’s 
concept of productive power. His critics point to the value of also ap-
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proaching power from a contextual point of view, and they emphasise 
how domination continues to be ensured through all-embracing means of 
control and repression. This does not mean, however, that the concept of 
capillary and productive power is inadequate for explaining the tech-
niques through which power is wielded. For the purposes of understand-
ing the power of the media, productive power turns out to be useful, but 
it needs to be complemented by a recognition of the existence of other, 
more direct, modes of power techniques. 
The concept of discourse is central to this dissertation, and Laclau and 
Mouffe’s (2001) discourse theory is inspired by a Foucauldian concept of 
power. They continue to build on Foucault’s work on how discourse 
transforms the way people describe themselves and their lives, and how 
institutions consolidate discourses and turn them into truth. The power 
of discourse is productive because it creates new forms of living and 
thinking, rather than preventing people from engaging in certain activi-
ties. This power inherent in the production of meaning is the main reason 
why media freedom is limited in authoritarian societies. Through opposi-
tional discourse, humour, and criticism, the media can challenge hege-
monic representations in a way authorities find threatening. Laclau and 
Mouffe emphasise that discursive articulations are always subject to po-
tential change. The meaning attached to social phenomena can always be 
different, they may appear as ‘frozen’, but new articulations will align 
signs in other ways and fill them with different meaning. Within dis-
course theory, the power of discourses to imbue the social with meaning 
is at the core of politics, and this reflects a notion of power as productive 
and always incomplete (Laclau and Mouffe 2001).  
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It is exactly this incompleteness of power and the potential for rupture 
and change that turns freedom of expression into a threat in authoritarian 
societies. As Foucault (1990) describes them, processes of subject forma-
tion are discursive, and the power to influence how people conceive of 
themselves and their surroundings is never neutral. However, as Fou-
cault’s critics point out, severe and violent repression continues to be part 
of every society, restricted to particular institutions in some and apparent 
as a more general trait in others. In this context power must continue to 
be studied in a contextual perspective, where its relation to resources and 
practices remains central. It is concomitantly important to study the 
structures that uphold and reproduce relations of domination and re-
pression: the next part of this discussion therefore focuses on theories on 
hegemony and domination as possible explanatory frameworks. 
HEGEMONY 
Hegemony is one of the concepts within Marxist theory that has inspired 
post-structuralist and post-Marxist approaches within the social sciences. 
Hegemonic power relations are characterized by their stability and ap-
parent lack of opposition. Theories of hegemony explore what it is that 
sets some relations of power apart from others and makes them more 
resistant to change and subversion. The work of Italian Marxist philoso-
pher Gramsci is an influential source of inspiration for later theories of 
hegemony, such as Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory. Gramsci led 
the Italian communist party in the period before Mussolini came to 
power and was imprisoned in 1926. While in jail he wrote texts that fo-
cused on hegemony and the relationship between the state, political soci-
ety and civil society, and these texts later became known as the Prison 
48 Containing resistance: Hegemony and domination 
notebooks (Gramsci 1971). In his writings, Gramsci criticized Marxist 
economism for its tendency to inscribe the economy with explanatory 
power for developments in every other sphere of society, such as politics 
and culture. He was particularly critical of versions of Marxism that see 
capitalism’s development as a predetermined movement towards eco-
nomic crisis and collapse (Simon 1991). Instead, Gramsci turned his atten-
tion towards the question of how consent to capitalist exploitation is se-
cured, in particular in democratic states (Lukes 2005). His concept of he-
gemony was developed as a way of approaching questions about class 
relations and power. In contrast to more orthodox Marxist thinking, 
Gramsci’s work represents a notion of power that is inscribed with a con-
textuality which enables it to adapt to different social situations. This 
emphasis on the contingency of social constellations and the relative 
autonomy of the political has given his work an enduring influence 
within Marxist, post-Marxist and post-structuralist approaches to the 
social sciences. In Gramsci’s work, Laclau and Mouffe found a Marxist 
theory that was less deterministic and that contained a belief in the open-
ness of the social, which they have developed further in their own dis-
course theory.  
Gramsci’s work explained hegemony as a relation between classes 
within a state structure, while discourse theory directs the focus towards 
hegemonies of meaning. For Gramsci, the durability of power relations 
depends on how the dominant class incorporates the divergent interests 
of the subordinated. Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory explains a 
hegemonic discourse as a way of thinking that becomes naturalized, one 
that makes other possible ways of conceptualizing the same questions 
appear to be unlikely and even impossible. A hegemonic discourse is also 
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constructed in relation to what it is not, through mechanisms of inclusion 
and exclusion. Both Gramsci’s and Laclau and Mouffe’s approaches focus 
on the relational nature of power relations, and they respond by focusing 
on how power is established and upheld in relations within society.  
Gramsci sees inter-class relations as the main conflict line in society. 
The power of the dominant class depends upon its ability to become 
hegemonic, but to reach this position it must take into account the inter-
ests of other classes as well. Through alliances with other classes and so-
cial groups, the dominant class incorporates interests that are contrary to 
their own in the short run, in order to uphold its power. Hegemony is the 
result of negotiation between the interests of the ruling class and its sub-
ordinates, as a result of which the dominant class obtains the consent of 
its subordinates to rule. The influence of the subordinated classes on the 
social structure suggests a political field that is something more than a 
pure reflection of the economic field. Gramsci’s non-foundational under-
standing of the political is also expressed in his analysis of the state’s role. 
In contrast to previous Marxist theories of the relationship between state 
and society, Gramsci held that the state was something more than a tool 
to be used purely in the interest of the dominant class. He argued that the 
state’s role is to create a stable environment for capitalist production, and 
this is not possible solely through relations characterized by domination. 
To fulfil its role, the state must become the central institution through 
which disparate class interests can be negotiated. Gramsci states that the 
state reflects a balance of forces, and that this demonstrates how the con-
cept of hegemony captures the connection between politics and economy. 
Ownership of the means of production is not sufficient to establish and 
naturalize the rule of the dominating class (Simon 1991). Hegemony does 
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not imply that the conflicting interests of the classes have an equal impact 
upon the alliances and close relations among other groups within civil 
society, but hegemony does involve compromise and negotiation (Simon 
1991). 
Laclau and Mouffe have used Gramsci’s concept of hegemony in their 
pursuit of a perspective on politics that is embedded in the openness of 
the social. In opposition to deterministic understandings of the social, 
Laclau and Mouffe insist that any relation and any meaning is potentially 
changeable. Within Marxist theory, they find Gramsci’s thinking to be 
most compatible with the notion of the openness of the social. In develop-
ing a discourse theory Laclau and Mouffe have reformulated Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony, transforming it from a theory of class to their dis-
course theory, with the politics of meaning as the focal point. There are 
two aspects in particular that distinguish Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of 
hegemony from the meaning of hegemony within Gramsci’s work: the 
first is the status of social classes and the second is Gramsci’s postulate 
that there is one single hegemonic centre for each social formation. For 
Gramsci, hegemony is a relation between social classes, and Laclau and 
Mouffe characterize his view of hegemonic relations as “syntactic rela-
tions founded upon morphological categories which precede them” (La-
clau and Mouffe 2001:134). They hold that Gramsci’s work acknowledges 
the openness of the social in the sense that the exact nature of hegemonic 
relations is contingent, but the pre-determined categories of social classes 
and society in Gramsci’s theory still retain an essentialist core. Further, 
Laclau and Mouffe argue that an anti-essentialist conception of hegem-
ony excludes the idea of hegemony as the centre and hence the essence of 
the social. Rather, they choose to look upon hegemony as a political type 
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of relation; in contrast to Gramsci, who writes about one hegemony 
within a state, Laclau and Mouffe argue that there may be several hege-
monic discourses within the same social formation (Laclau and Mouffe 
2001).  
Discourse theory focuses on how power relates to the construction of 
meaning. Hegemony can appear in contexts where the relations of power 
are undefined, much in the same way as Gramsci depicts hegemony as 
the result of a process of negotiation between classes. Laclau and Mouffe 
argue that 
The general field of the emergence of hegemony is that of articulatory prac-
tices, that is, a field where the ‘elements’ have not crystallized into ‘moments’. 
In a closed system of relational identities, in which the meaning of each mo-
ment is absolutely fixed, there is no place whatsoever for a hegemonic prac-
tice.  
(Laclau and Mouffe 2001:134) 
Hegemony is achieved when an articulation appears to have succeeded 
in turning the undefined, vague signs, called elements, into fixed rela-
tions with other signs, which make them moments (Laclau and Mouffe 
2001). This is accomplished through processes in which a discourse that 
constitutes and organizes social relations in a particular way confronts 
antagonistic discourses and ends up as the dominant discourse. A discur-
sive hegemony is achieved when a discourse appears as solid, natural 
and fixed, and has succeeded in establishing certain perspectives as nor-
mal and self-evident. In this sense hegemony is defined by its victory 
over other potential understandings of the social, but Laclau and Mouffe 
hold that hegemony is equally defined by the instability of the frontiers 
that separate the hegemonic discourse from the field of alternative and 
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undefined meaning (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). In Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony, the nature of the relationship between the dominant class and 
the subordinate classes is decisive for the political structure. For Laclau 
and Mouffe, it is the relation between the hegemonic discourse, and the 
potential other discourses in the same field, that is decisive. A hegemonic 
discourse does not define itself, just as the dominant class in Gramsci’s 
theory has to take other, divergent interests into account in order to 
achieve power.  
What characterizes the representation of hegemony in the thinking of 
Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe is its ability to appear as natural and 
self-evident. Hegemony prevents opposition, and hegemonic politics are 
practices aimed at reducing the impact of social antagonisms (Mouffe 
2005). For Gramsci, hegemony depends on the ability of the dominant 
class to incorporate the interests of other classes in order to rule. The re-
sult is a balance between social forces that is reflected in the dominant 
ideology. Hegemony brings about the formation of a collective will that 
welds different conceptions of the world into a synthesis of class objec-
tives (Simon 1991). The result is a constantly renewed class compromise 
that reflects the main interests of the dominant class. In states where civil 
society is strong, and the consent from subordinate classes is high, the 
ruling authorities will have strong bonds to different groups (class inter-
ests) in society, in such a way that subordinate classes also feel that their 
particular interests are reflected in the rule of the state. In such situations, 
society can be transformed from the sphere of civil society, through a war 
of position (Simon 1991). In other words, the political sphere represents a 
source of power in its own right. In situations where civil society is weak, 
power must be grasped through other means, what Gramsci calls a war of 
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movement. Hence, hegemony is protected through consent and coercion, 
and the degree of each depends upon the particular social context. As a 
Marxist thinker, Gramsci holds that ideology misrepresents the true rela-
tions between classes, and he thinks that revolutionary politics must seek 
to uncover the true relations between classes. However, Gramsci has a 
twofold understanding of ideology. On the one hand he depicts it as a 
discursive phenomenon, but he also argues that ideology is embedded in 
human practice and has a materiality. The materially embedded ideology 
provides rules and norms that guide people’s practices, and these are not 
necessarily in line with the philosophical, or conscious ideology in which 
people believe. While ideological consciousness can be likened to a false 
consciousness, the embedded ideology that guides people’s practices 
represents a layer of resistance (Simon 1991).  
In their effort to avoid essentialism, Laclau and Mouffe distance them-
selves from any notions of social institutions that in themselves are more 
foundational, true and durable than other social phenomena. Hegemonic 
discourses have an appearance that suggests stability and permanence, 
but they do not conceal any true relations. By treating hegemonic dis-
courses as expressions of power, stability and permanence are politicized, 
but not essentialized (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). However, in addition to 
making the term ideology redundant, Laclau and Mouffe also exclude 
the ambiguity of Gramsci’s understanding of ideology. Gramsci leaves 
open a space for everyday practice and resistance, and this disappears in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony.  
Gramsci’s and Laclau and Mouffe’s theories of hegemony aim to ex-
plain how relations of power are upheld in spite of their repression of 
other classes or other discourses. They explain the ability to remain in 
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power not through the relative strength of particular social actors, but 
through the relations between a dominating class or discourse, and its 
other. What becomes problematic in these explanations is their ability to 
explain social change. In Gramsci’s thinking, in spite of his emphasis on 
the relative autonomy of the political, the emphasis on social classes 
means that economic relations carry greater weight. There is a potential 
for social change attached to his belief in the everyday practice of the op-
pressed, but as long as the political hegemony remains, the conscious 
ideology of the oppressed classes contributes to their subordination. For 
Laclau and Mouffe, the openness of the social means that their belief in 
the possibility of change is axiomatic. Discourse theory explains that 
there may be several hegemonic discourses, and this allows for the possi-
bility of competition and change. However, exactly how people, social 
actors, become able to think and formulate themselves in opposition to 
hegemonic discourses is less clear. In order to understand the conditional 
autonomy of the media in a context of repression, it is necessary to grasp 
how people are able to distance themselves from hegemonic discourses 
and form counter discourses to express and create opposition. For this 
purpose, James Scott’s insights into domination and resistance may prove 
helpful. 
HEGEMONIC STRATEGIES 
The analyses of hegemony developed by Gramsci as well as Laclau and 
Mouffe seek to investigate how relations of domination remain stable. 
Their analyses are rather abstract and they are part of more general po-
litical theories. Scott’s book Domination and the arts of resistance (1990) 
shares their engagement with this question as he discusses how hegem-
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ony, in the form of domination, is executed, sustained and challenged. 
The major difference between Scott’s approach to hegemony and that of 
Gramsci is his denial of the possibility of the fulfilment of hegemonic 
ambitions: the discourse of the dominant never captures the conscious-
ness of the suppressed. Scott claims that in spite of the countless appear-
ances of domination, ranging from violent repression to subtle and indi-
rect attempts to bend other people’s will, there is always conscious resis-
tance. Gramsci was aware that the everyday practice of the subordinate 
classes contained elements of resistance, but his emphasis was on the 
influence of the values of the dominant class (Jørgensen and Phillips 
1999). In contrast, Scott claims that the elements of resistance in everyday 
practice reflect conscious strategies of resistance in a situation where 
people’s freedoms are curbed through domination. In contrast to Laclau 
and Mouffe, the main actors in Scott’s narrative are always people. For 
Laclau and Mouffe, concepts such as ‘man’, ‘people’, ‘society’ are essen-
tialist reductions of the openness of the social (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). 
By dissolving such concepts they arrive at a productive understanding of 
politics as articulatory practice, but the actual implications for social prac-
tice remain less developed. Scott places the social practices of domination 
and resistance at the heart of his analysis.  
If relations of domination are unable to conquer the consciousness of 
the suppressed, hegemony can never be fully achieved. Scott argues that 
previous theories of hegemony have failed to recognize the prevalence of 
conscious resistance among the suppressed. Both far-reaching and more 
limited theories of hegemony have sought to explain why there are so 
few revolts, and there are few examples of subordinates’ movements that 
fight to overturn relations of domination. General, or thick, theories of 
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hegemony convey the argument that the dominant group succeeds in 
making the inferior class believe in values that explain and justify their 
subordination. The subordinate class’s self perception therefore becomes 
a false consciousness, as its members believe that the relations that limit 
their freedom are just, and for their own best. Thin theories of hegemony 
simply state that when the weak in a social system perceive the situation 
as inevitable, they simply make the best of a bad situation and endeavour 
to accept it as their fate. Scott explains this conviction in the abilities of 
hegemony as a delusion that can be avoided by separating between the 
public transcript and the hidden transcript. The public transcript represents 
the hegemonic discourse of the powerful, and its objective is the naturali-
zation of existing power relations. The hidden transcript, on the other 
hand, contains the perspectives of the suppressed and their resistance 
against the prevailing relations of domination. The existence of hidden 
transcripts suggests that although few open struggles by subordinate 
groups have been ideologically radical, this has nothing to do with a lack 
of critical consciousness. The subordinate are fully capable of imagining a 
world where the power relations between dominant and subordinate are 
reversed, but the relations of domination require that the hidden tran-
script can only be revealed among one’s peers. The belief that the passiv-
ity of the subordinate stems from their convictions about hegemony ac-
tually reflects the content of the public transcript, rather than the hidden 
transcript of the subordinate.  
Rather than answering the question of how relations of domination 
remain stable through the concept of hegemony, Scott attempts to show 
how the concepts of public and hidden transcripts capture the regulated 
nature of domination. The open interaction between subordinates and 
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those who dominate follows a procedure in which each actor knows his 
part. The public transcript provides directions and connects representa-
tions of superiority with signs that communicate servility and subordina-
tion. The transcript represents the behaviour of the suppressed as a re-
flection of a natural respect for those in authority: “It is designed to be 
impressive, to affirm and naturalize the power of dominant elites, and to 
conceal or euphemize the dirty linen of their rule” (Scott 1990:18). Within 
the public transcript, the mere existence of a hidden transcript is denied, 
because the relations between subordinates are exempt from the hege-
monic discourse. The subordinates are categorised according to their rela-
tions to the dominant, and congregations of subordinates are construed 
as dangerous and potentially disruptive. Autonomous gatherings of the 
weak indicate the existence of a hidden transcript, and in the eyes of the 
powerful, this threatens stability.  
In their interaction, it is important for both the dominant and the sup-
pressed to behave in such a way that their inner feelings remain un-
known to their counterpart. They both have hidden transcripts. Among 
the suppressed, the aggression, hatred and contempt people feel when 
their integrity is ignored and distorted are revealed within the hidden 
transcript. This hidden transcript also contains elements that make it pos-
sible to survive as an oppressed individual, such as information on how 
to survive and escape the violence of those who dominate. Physical pos-
ture, movements, facial expressions and verbal sensitivity are required to 
avoid negative or dangerous attention, and this behaviour is represented 
as a necessary means of survival for the subordinate in their interactions 
with the dominant. Ridicule, humour, and caricatures of oppressors are 
ubiquitous everywhere people suffer oppression, often without being 
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visible to those who dominate. There may be occasions where the public 
transcript breaks down and the hidden becomes visible, but in the day to 
day regulation of relations of domination, the hidden transcript is re-
stricted to people who are likely to share the experience of oppression or 
domination. Among those who dominate, there will also be a hidden 
transcript, revealing their internal difficulties and their weaknesses as a 
group, but given their position a large share of their interests can simply 
be revealed within the public transcript. Both groups have an interest in 
keeping their transcripts hidden, and it is the directions within the public 
transcript that regulate the interplay between those who dominate and 
the oppressed (Scott 1990). 
THE SYMBOLIC REALM OF DOMINATION 
Scott distinguishes between practices of domination and the symbolic 
realm in contexts of domination, but states that changes in the balance of 
power within the symbolic realm have material consequences.  
A good part of the maintenance work consists of the symbolization of domi-
nation by demonstrations and enactments of power. Every visible, outward 
use of power – each command, each act of deference, each list and ranking, 
each ceremonial order, each public punishment, each use of an honorific or a 
term of derogation – is a symbolic gesture of domination that serves to mani-
fest and reinforce a hierarchical order.  
(Scott 1990:45) 
Deference is a necessary aspect of domination, and can be expressed in 
gestures or words. Any pattern of stratification will indicate who gives 
orders and who receives them, and those at each level defer to those 
higher up. Small physical movements, or the way a statement is phrased 
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can work as signs that confirm and uphold relations of domination. The 
importance of the daily routines of deference means that small ceremo-
nies, such as the peasant who removes his cap in the presence of the land-
lord, are as important as the big parades of National Day celebrations. 
Everyday practices such as companies’ constant monitoring of industrial 
employees, substantiate the relations of domination and contribute to 
confirming and reconstituting relations of rank and power (Scott 1990). In 
authoritarian states, the media’s day-to-day favourable portrayals of po-
litical leaders contribute to a similar process: the naturalization of the 
political status quo. 
In Scott’s analyses symbols of domination play a role that can be lik-
ened to the role of ideology in Gramsci’s work: they normalize patterns 
of domination that keep people oppressed. Scott’s examples and analyses 
deal mostly with situations characterized by face-to-face interaction be-
tween oppressors and the dominated. However, due to Scott’s emphasis 
on the symbolic realm of domination, there are many aspects of his work 
that can contribute to an understanding of practices of domination within 
an authoritarian state. The role of unanimity is one example of the regula-
tion of domination that is present both in direct, interpersonal relations 
and in the more structural regulation of domination within a state. Una-
nimity is important for groups in power because any indication of dis-
putes and conflicts within the dominating group can be exploited by the 
oppressed. This means that the elite must be represented as a unified 
group, but the effect of unanimity is even stronger if it includes subordi-
nates as well. This is similar to Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony, 
where the elite gains its strength through the partial inclusion of the in-
terests of the dominated classes, thereby creating an impression of politi-
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cal unanimity (Simon 1991). Representations of unanimity impose the 
need to handle conflicts carefully. For instance, a landowner who is chal-
lenged by his tenants would rather meet with his tenants individually 
than in a group, in order to avoid displaying an open conflict. The land-
owner fears the infectiousness of open conflicts, because insubordination 
by some tenants might inspire revolt among others (Scott 1990). Within 
an authoritarian state, resistance that remain unknown to the general 
public does not necessarily represent a threat to the relations of domina-
tion. This makes control of and through the media decisive for the state’s 
attempt at legitimacy. The media is also of vital importance in situations 
where practical resistance has come out in the open. In such cases it is 
crucial for the dominant part that there be a public response to restore the 
balance of power (Scott 1990).  
Representations of unanimity can be more important than actual una-
nimity, because the discursive aspects of domination are vital for uphold-
ing the relations of domination. The oppressed groups in society have to 
judge the strength of the dominant part on the basis of the public tran-
script. This means that it is in the interest of the dominant part to ensure 
that the public transcript represents them in a manner that prevent sub-
ordinates from escalating their resistance. Signs of weakness and vulner-
ability must be removed from the transcript, but as long as the pattern of 
domination is not openly threatened, substantial changes in social prac-
tice can be accommodated. This means that there will be situations where 
the symbolic realm does not correspond to changes in social practice, but 
rituals of subordination do not necessarily rely on their ability to con-
vince their audiences of their veracity. Subordinates’ participation in the 
spectacles designed by the dominant part does not have to be sincere to 
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have an impact, because their lack of consent does not prevent the rituals 
of domination from demonstrating that the system is stable and that 
there are no likely alternatives. Scott uses the fake cooperatives in the 
agricultural sector in Laos as an example. Farmers and the lower echelons 
of the cadres knew they were fantasy, but their lack of belief did not rep-
resent a threat as long as the spectacle worked independent of its verac-
ity. Ideologically, parades, propaganda, and fake cooperatives can be 
very successful because they contain a vision of how things ought to be, 
and contribute to the construction of a cohesive ideology. Another aspect 
of a spectacle directed by the elite is the legitimizing effect it has within 
the group. The display of the public transcript is a reassurance of their 
position. Public signs of dissent within the elite, or the dominating group, 
represent a risk, because they threaten the naturalization of power on 
which their domination depends on.  
A central question then becomes how symbolic expressions that 
counter the balance of power are to be interpreted. For the media in au-
thoritarian states, this is what happens when unfavourable aspects of 
state and society are exposed in spite of restrictions on the freedom of 
expression. Historically, fairytales, humour and art are forms of expres-
sion in which the oppressed have expressed their longing for an altered 
balance of power. Visions of a reversal of the relations of domination are 
also enacted in festivals such as Carnival. Carnival represents an inter-
mediate upheaval of everyday life that allows people to feel what their 
world could be like if the pattern of domination was changed. It is a short 
period of upheaval of the relations of domination which is followed by 
their re-establishment. Carnival does not lead to a fundamental change in 
the relations of domination, and this is why carnival is often interpreted 
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as a safety valve instigated by the elite as a controlled action, with the aim 
of letting off steam. Scott (1990) refers to this as the hydraulic metaphor: 
the pressure that builds up under injustice is likened to the steam that 
would finally cause an explosion were it not for the safety valve. A simi-
lar interpretation of critical media practices in an authoritarian context 
would be that the state allowed a certain amount of critical exposure with 
the purpose of avoiding more severe resistance.  
The safety valve interpretation is a rather functionalist reading of a 
complex social event. It is problematic because it ascribes agency only to 
one side, the elite. For instance, if the dominant part set up Carnival to 
allow their subordinates to play and pretend, it would make sense. This 
is contradicted by the actual history of Carnival, which is a story of social 
conflict where the agency of the suppressed has been decisive for the 
development of Carnival. To be able to let off steam does not render peo-
ple meek and passive; if that were the case, elites would encourage Car-
nival or similar festivals in situations of conflict, when the elite wish peo-
ple would calm down.  
Rather, Carnival and other expressions of the subordinates’ longing for 
the overthrow of the relations of domination can better be understood as 
sites for various forms of conflicts expressed through rituals and symbolic 
manipulation. The aggression displayed is more likely to function as 
preparation for open displays of resistance. In this sense, Carnival is a po-
litical message in disguise. In contexts of domination, subordinates’ politi-
cal messages must be cryptic or concealed in order to prevent punishment 
(Scott 1990). In repressive regimes, the media’s critical practice is more 
likely to be an expression of a power that is wrested from the repressive 
state, than a safety valve instigated by the political elite to let out steam.  
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Strategic use of language is a key element of expressing resistance. 
Public representations in conflict situations are strategic and they must be 
formulated in a manner that prevents them from being blocked. One 
common example of strategic use of language is when the suppressed use 
the hegemonic language of the dominating elite. By referring to hege-
monic values, the dominant is more likely to be obliged to listen: “The 
conflict will accordingly take a dialogic form in which the language of the 
dialogue will invariably borrow heavily from the terms of the dominant 
ideology prevailing in the public transcript” (Scott 1990:102). In feudal 
societies subordinates’ approach to their masters made use of a language 
filled with formulations stressing the receiver’s benevolence and great-
ness. A parallel situation occurs in capitalist enterprises when employees 
argue for a raise and point to their efficiency, loyalty and contributions to 
the firm as arguments. Slaves used the paternalist discourse of their own-
ers to enhance better living conditions (Scott 1990). Similarly, a state’s 
discourse about human rights can be used by human rights organizations 
to achieve their goals (Sasaoka 2004). Strategic use of language does not 
tell us what the subordinate are thinking. The conflict of interests may be 
urgent, but the power relations involved make it necessary for the subor-
dinate to engage in a dialogue with the dominant. By making appeals 
that remain within the hegemonic language, the danger of being pun-
ished for them might be lessened. The strategic use of language is the 
subordinate’s creative utilization of the public transcript and is a neces-
sary form of risk-aversion. Careful use of language, use of stock formulas 
and careful formulations to avoid offending authorities in a direct man-
ner are all discursive techniques employed in practices of resistance 
(Scott 1990). 
64 Containing resistance: Hegemony and domination 
Scott’s concepts of the public and the hidden transcripts contradict 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, since the existence of the hidden tran-
script means that the values of the dominant never conquer the con-
sciousness of the subordinate. If the behaviour of the subordinate indi-
cates the opposite, it is due to the requirements written into the public 
transcript. The concept of the hidden transcript points towards the capac-
ity for social agency among subordinates, and their will to rewrite the 
relations of domination. The hidden transcript means that subordinates 
are capable of imagining a reversal of the pattern of domination. 
The above discussion of the concepts of power, hegemony and domi-
nation has aimed to illustrate their contributions to an analysis of the 
politics of meaning and the possibilities of political agency in contexts of 
domination. This discussion shows that power used to be understood as 
an instrumental concept denoting individual actors’ ability to decide the 
outcome of conflicts. However, for the purpose of analysing the condi-
tional autonomy of the media in a context of domination, power needs to 
be conceptualized in a way that includes the power of discourse in shap-
ing people’s outlook on the world. This does not necessarily exclude a 
conception of power as something that is related to material resources. In 
a similar way, hegemony is a concept that has travelled from a Marxist 
context, expressing a particular relationship between classes, to a post-
structuralist framework, where it denotes discourses that achieve a posi-
tion as natural or as representing common sense. For the concepts of 
power and hegemony, this means that they have each incorporated a 
discursive meaning that has redefined their original, materialist content. 
This does not imply that discursive power is necessarily more indirect 
and less violent than other hegemonic strategies. Relations of domination 
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are conducted through various means, but they acquire their meaning 
from the threat of violent repression.  
DOMINATING SPACE 
As previously discussed, conceptions of discursive and material practices 
of domination and resistance both have their weaknesses. Discursive 
approaches can be criticized for advocating a perspective that seems de-
void of social actors, while more materialist perspectives often lose sight 
of the power of language and mediation. In the final pages of this chap-
ter, I suggest that discussing domination and resistance in relation to spa-
tiality better enables us to keep both the discursive and the material as-
pects of domination and resistance in mind.  
Spatial discourses construe a particular vision upon the social world. 
Through our spatial vocabularies we divide space into centres and pe-
ripheries, into local and global, and we attach meaning to these signs. The 
way we talk and think about space has material consequences. Spatial 
discourses facilitate some acts, and make others less likely, but spatial 
materiality also shapes our discourses. Borders are a pre-eminent exam-
ple of the reciprocity between spatial discourses and practices. Borders 
are material lines of division in the landscape, they regulate the move-
ment of people, and they are also important signifiers shaping social 
identities of belonging (Paasi 1999).  
Processes of domination and resistance are always underway some-
where, and they are embedded in a social, economic and political context. 
Their contextuality affects the meaning of signs in both discursive and 
material practices. Every sign acquires meaning in relation to what it is 
not, so the contextuality of social processes means that identical acts or 
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statements carry different meaning in different places. The word context 
carries connotations of interwoven threads, of the material surrounding 
the textual, and of the information that is necessary in order to under-
stand something else. Contextuality is spatial in the sense that it locates 
the surrounding phenomena of a text. This has consequences for how 
particular political phenomena can be analysed, and how they can be 
changed. Without contextual knowledge, it is hard to contribute to social 
change, because outsiders do not fully recognize the particular meaning 
of signs or actions. Analysing contextuality in spatial terms is also a way 
of acknowledging the partiality of every perspective. According to 
Haraway (1996), this will contribute to more responsible and accountable 
research practices. Admitting the situatedness and partiality of every 
perspective is the opposite of representations of the world where the vi-
sion is portrayed as unrestricted and unmarked by particularities. This is 
highly relevant when the issue at stake is understanding and advocating 
democratizing social and political practices (Slater 2001). 
Domination and repression are spatial practices. Borders and bounda-
ries are integrated in practices of inclusion and exclusion, and the organi-
zation of state power is a pre-eminent example of the spatiality of power. 
States’ spatial practices of mapping and planning are central for acquir-
ing the knowledge about society that is necessary to establish control 
with the population. For Lefebvre, processes of modernization have been 
incited by more refined spatial practices (Lefebvre 1991). A central aspect 
of modernity has been the bureaucratization of space and through space. 
This means that concrete space is being compartmentalized, divided into 
units that facilitate surveillance and discipline. The result is that everyday 
life is colonized through the bureaucratization and commodification of 
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space. Lefebvre identifies the state as the central actor in establishing 
domination of space. 
Society is subjected to state power through the state’s political prac-
tices, and Lefebvre asks rhetorically whether “(i)t is conceivable that the 
exercise of hegemony might leave space untouched? Could space be 
nothing more than the passive locus of social relations (...)?” (Lefebvre 
1991:11). He answers negatively, claiming that space serves hegemony, 
and that with the help of knowledge and technology, space plays a cen-
tral, operational role in the constitution of social systems. Massey (1993) 
shows how space often discursively is represented as passive. Space be-
comes the opposite of politics, and this common understanding is a pow-
erful resource for states’ rule of their societies. In the same way that a 
hegemonic discourse gains its power from appearing natural, legitimate 
and simply representing common sense, the domination of space draws 
its power from the status of the spatial as the passive background for 
social processes. Lefebvre’s aims to reveal this, for instance through his 
demonstration of the political nature of planning as a social practice. The 
1960s discourse of planning conceived of space as given. City planners 
construed planned space as objective and pure, and they ascribed to it a 
scientific status which meant that it was also conceived of as neutral and 
apolitical (Lefebvre 1978).  
In these works [by urban planners], urban space, which was formerly dis-
cussed in connection with land utilization or the overall community culture, 
was isolated from the contexts; it appeared as a given, as a specific dimension 
of decision-making and only secondarily with social needs which were con-
sidered localized.  
(Lefebvre 1978:340) 
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To Lefebvre, planning and building are intrinsically political, and the 
built and the landscape are sediments of different periods and different 
political regimes. Modernity is characterized by a decorporealization of 
space and time, resulting in a particular spatiality. Modernist urban 
planners see the city from above, employing what Haraway (1996) calls 
the god-eye, a vision from above that stands in stark contrast to embod-
ied community practices. The view from above is a defining feature of 
modernity, manifested in the practices of city planners, cartographers, 
economists and politicians who see society as spatial patterns or num-
bers. Through this vision, abstract space is imposed on everyday life, and 
takes the form of technologies of power which are used to produce useful 
and passive bodies (Gregory 1994). 
Scott’s book “Seeing like a state” (1998) investigates the spatial strate-
gies states employ in establishing control over their populace. He argues 
that the legibility of society is crucial for the purpose of effectively im-
plementing state power. Similar to Lefebvre, Scott identifies control over 
space as a foundation of modernity. While Lefebvre discusses this within 
the frames of the production of space in a capitalist economy, Scott high-
lights the question of vision as decisive for the domination of space. The 
modern state’s vision can be likened to the god’s eye, the unrestricted 
view from above, and this is the vision reproduced in practices of map-
ping. Oversight and control are closely connected, and the production of 
legible representations of the world is followed by strategies to make 
society more orderly and easily accessible from the outside. As an exam-
ple, Scott contrasts the aerial perspective of the city layout of towns con-
structed in the Middle Ages with the view of modern cities such as Chi-
cago. Seen from above, the former will give a chaotic and disorderly im-
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pression, while Chicago’s ground plan is easily legible. Its streets have 
straight lines and right angles, and this makes services and acts such as 
transportation, identifying and finding felons hiding in the city, provid-
ing water pipes and sewers much easier than in the tortuous, winding 
streets of the Middle Age town. An important point in this process is that 
legibility in itself becomes a question about point of view, because what 
seems chaotic from above can be perfectly legible to a local person on the 
ground. The question of vision and legibility is connected to the modern 
state’s ambition to be able to transform the everyday life of its population 
from the outside. The planning of cities such as Chicago was motivated 
by ambitions to make the city a modern, clean and well-functioning place 
to live, thereby fostering social and economic development.  
People who for different reasons have not easily adapted to the regu-
lations laid down by the state, have often found themselves targets of 
state repression. Typically travelling people, such as nomads without 
fixed addresses, are categorized as a problem when they refuse to corre-
spond to the spatial schema established by the state. States’ efforts to 
make mobile people settle at permanent addresses are also part of the 
state’s attempts at making society legible. The extended powers of mod-
ern states depend on oversight and access in order to rule, so conquering 
the power of spatiality has been at the heart of the state’s modernizing 
project. 
Some of the gravest examples of states’ attempts at dominating space 
in order to control the population can be found within “authoritarian 
high modernism” (Scott 1998:87). According to Scott, four factors in com-
bination are responsible for historical catastrophes, such as the Great 
Leap forward in China. First, there must be an administrative organiza-
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tion of nature and society, employing the means of modern statecraft. 
Second, it requires a high modernist ideology, with a strong belief in sci-
entific and technical progress. Third, an authoritarian state is needed to 
implement such grand schema; the fourth factor is a prostrate civil soci-
ety that is incapable of resisting the state’s policies. The Great Leap for-
ward was launched in 1958 and involved the establishing of self-
sufficient people’s communes throughout rural China. This policy con-
tributed to mass starvation and economic collapse in the countryside 
(Lieberthal 1995). It is important to keep in mind that projects such as the 
Great Leap forward were designed to bring society forward, to help peo-
ple by spurring economic growth. When they go so fatally wrong, it is 
because they are instigated and implemented by elites who have no 
commitment to democracy and therefore are willing to use unbridled 
state power to achieve the goals they believe necessary (Scott 1998).  
Lefebvre’s view of state power has much in common with Scott’s 
analysis of the high modernist schemes of authoritarian states. Lefebvre 
sees the state as a piece of heavy machinery, flattening everything under-
neath it, using rationality, knowledge and technology as its means (Le-
febvre 1991). However, both Lefebvre and Scott are aware of the potential 
of resistance against the state’s domination of space.  
SPACES OF REPRESENTATION 
Practices of resistance and practices of domination both contribute to the 
production of space. To capture the different layers of the meaning of the 
spatial, Lefebvre constructed a conceptual triad of social space. The two 
first components of the triad are the spatial practice and the representations 
of space. These are central for the domination of space conducted by the 
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state and the capitalist economy. The potential for resistance against the 
domination of space is located within the third part of the triad, which is 
the spaces of representation. The spatial practice is the source of a society’s 
space, and is constituted by the everyday routines of the members of so-
ciety. This dimension is characterised as the perceived space and includes 
the built environment and infrastructure that enable the everyday reality 
of that society (Lefebvre 1991). The spatial practice is a stabilising and 
conserving aspect of human practice, something that is reflected in its 
status as the common-sense understanding of space (Simonsen 2005). 
The representations of space form the conceptualized space, the dis-
cursive domain, where scientists, planners and social engineers develop 
their language of space as a system of verbal signs (Lefebvre 1991). Em-
ploying Scott’s terminology, the representations of space make up part of 
the public transcript, describing relations of domination as just and nec-
essary (Scott 1990). The particular representations developed by planners 
and social engineers advocate solutions intended to improve living con-
ditions through the built environment, but in doing so they impose a cer-
tain order, and rule out or reduce the diversity of forms of life. In discur-
sive terms, the representations of space function as the hegemonic dis-
course, the naturalized and politically powerful representation of how 
things “really are”. Through representations of space, the commodifica-
tion and bureaucratization of concrete space appear as natural.  
The spaces of representation are the spaces that are directly lived, 
through which the dominated space is appropriated by its subjects (Le-
febvre 1991). Simonsen (2005) explains Lefebvre’s notion of the spaces of 
representation as a terrain in which people struggle to realise themselves 
as total persons by conceptualizing alternative imaginations of space. In 
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other words, the spaces of representation challenge the hegemonic repre-
sentations of space, but according to Lefebvre, they do so in a non-verbal 
way. It is through the lived experience that the dominated space is al-
tered and reclaimed. In a sense it seems that the resistance that is played 
out within the spaces of representation is an unintentional form of resis-
tance, as he writes that this is the space of those “such as a few writers 
and philosophers, who describe and aspire to do no more than describe” 
(Lefebvre 1991:39, emphasis in original). In Lefebvre’s thinking, the rep-
resentational spaces are not primarily a discursive domain, as it is the 
experience of directly lived space that appropriates space. This notion of 
resistance is similar to Gramsci’s understanding of resistance as the un-
conscious, non-conforming behaviour of the oppressed classes (Lukes 
2005). While their consciousness is dominated by the hegemonic dis-
courses, their bodily, everyday behaviour still contains elements of resis-
tance. Lefebvre continues this distinction through a separation of verbal 
and non-verbal symbols and signs, where the domination of space is 
conducted through verbal signs (the representation of space) and resis-
tance is limited to the realm of the non-verbal, within the spaces of repre-
sentation. This is in line with Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and resis-
tance, and it makes Scott’s critique of Gramsci also relevant to Lefebvre’s 
understanding of resistance. Scott argues that there is no such thing as a 
false consciousness which renders people silent. People do recognize that 
they are being dominated, and they are able to express their resistance 
consciously, in verbal as well as non-verbal signs. However, vocal protest 
and resistance is often limited to the hidden transcript, to avoid the high 
costs connected to voicing resistance in the open (Scott 1990).  
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Lefebvre’s focus on the lived spatiality, the body and the production 
of space is an important addition to the theoretical perspectives em-
ployed in this dissertation. Post-structural and post-Marxist theories, 
such as discourse theory, provide valuable insight into the construction 
and changes of the social world. These theories, however, still have more 
to say about structures than they do about actors. Through his concept of 
the spaces of representation Lefebvre’s conceptual triad places an emphasis 
on how the lived reality can offer the potential for social change. If Le-
febvre’s concept of the spaces of representation is extended also to in-
clude the verbal resistance and counter discourses that challenge the 
hegemonic representation of space, it may extend our understanding of 
how resistance occurs in contexts of domination.  
To see how resistance against the domination of space takes place, it is 
important to understand how people who suffer under domination use 
space and spatial strategies in order to counter the restrictions imposed 
on their agency. Bhabha suggests that the two concepts of signification 
and institutionalization can be of use in identifying such resistance 
(Bhabha 1992). Signification is the process of inscribing signs with mean-
ing. It is a contextual practice, depending on social and linguistic codes 
established between people. Institutionalization is the process whereby 
language use is embedded in material practices. When the processes of 
signification and institutionalization are analysed together, this incorpo-
rates both the discursive and the material aspects of resistance. 
One strategy of resistance discussed in the work of Lefebvre (1991) as 
well as by Scott (1998) is the upholding of diversity in the face of state 
power. Lefebvre argues that resistance against the domination of space 
can be found in the everyday practices of social actors, practices that 
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counter the homogenizing tendencies of modernity. To Bhabha (1992), 
the marginal experiences of people whose identities do not fit into one of 
the major categories constitute a rich source for investigations into poten-
tial resistance against homogenizing spatial strategies. When dominated 
people express their lived experience, they produce discourses that 
counter the hegemonic representations advocated by the state and other 
authorities.  
Within the hidden transcript, discursive representations of space may 
also serve more instrumental purposes. Scott (1990) describes how slaves 
have utilized the paternalist discourse of their owners to improve their 
living conditions. Similar strategies can be employed in spatial discourse. 
For instance, when the hegemonic discourse of space employs the binary 
opposition centre/periphery, and attaches connotations such as 
strong/weak, powerful/insignificant to this opposition, this can be used 
for purposes of political mobilization. In Keith and Piles’s formulation 
“discourses ostentatiously marked with their spatiality are convention-
ally assumed to be narrow-minded, bounded – coming complete with a 
self-confessed specificity that, it is frequently assumed, restricts their 
relevance” (Keith and Pile 1993:16). These hegemonic understandings of 
space can be co-opted by social actors in an authoritarian state, who con-
sciously frame their requests in a way that make them appear as local, 
limited and therefore less threatening. Such strategies involve a political 
and strategic use of scale. 
Scale is understood as the spatial levels that constitute the hierarchy of 
space, such as urban, regional, national and global (Howitt 2003). 
Whereas most of the literature about the social production of scale is po-
sitioned within the political economy tradition, Jones (1998) represents an 
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attempt to understand scale as a representational practice. In her analysis, 
she employs a case study originally described by Cox (1998). In Chack-
more, an English village, there was a land use conflict where the national 
need for the local mineral resources made local resistance difficult. How-
ever, the local opposition group finally won the case by transferring the 
case from an economic and industrial discourse to an alternative dis-
course of national heritage which focused on a unique, local landscape. 
They re-represented the question at issue, and won the conflict. In this 
case, both representations of the conflict aligned it with the national scale, 
underscoring how scale is a complex concept that cannot be reduced to 
geographic level.  
Spatial politics such as the conflict in Chackmore have often been ana-
lysed as a question about jumping between scales. Since the local is usu-
ally construed as less powerful than the national level, it is not surprising 
that jumping between scales usually is seen as a political powerful strat-
egy if the questions in case can be upscaled. Upscaling and downscaling 
as political processes have frequently been discussed within regulation 
theory, where a common argument is that globalization causes a hollow-
ing out of the state (Cox 2002). However, when questions of scale are ex-
tended outside the political economy framework, it is evident that jump-
ing scales does not necessarily involve upscaling (Jones 1998), but rather 
a conscious utilization of the discursive connotations attached to various 
spatial scales. For instance, the representation of the local as powerless 
and particular can be used by political actors who want their case to ap-
pear innocent and of lesser importance.  
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Summing up 
This chapter has addressed the question of how political processes of 
resistance can take place in contexts of domination. The first part of the 
chapter asks what the potential democratizing role of the media in au-
thoritarian states is. In liberal democracies, the media’s role as a watch-
dog is thought to protect civil society against the abuse of power by the 
state and to keep government and other authorities in check. In authori-
tarian states, the media’s role is often assumed to be of little importance 
since it is being part of a repressive state apparatus. The argument put 
forward in this chapter is that this scenario is too simple to capture the 
democratizing potential of media in China. It suggests that the media’s 
conditional autonomy must be analysed through the context’s social and 
discursive media practices. A discursive perspective that focuses on me-
dia content sheds light on how the media can create new spaces of repre-
sentation that contribute to processes of democratization. 
The importance of discursive strategies is decisive for understanding 
how critical journalists within the Chinese media are able to put forward 
other perspectives than the ones favoured by the party-state authorities. 
This raises the question of what characterizes the power of the media in a 
context of domination. In this discussion, a range of theoretical concep-
tions of power and hegemony are key. The conceptualizations under dis-
cussion incorporate a theoretical turn from materialist theories of social 
science to more discursive approaches that take the power of language 
and signs into consideration. Hegemonic strategies and resistance are 
conducted in a discursive field as well as materially. In contexts of domi-
nation, resistance often takes forms other than political mass mobiliza-
tion, and investigating spatial practices and discourses can show how 
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political agency takes place, in spite of repressive state policies. Space is 
often represented as the neutral background of politics, but in order to 
analyse critical press in China, it is necessary to see that critical journalists 
have carved out a new political role, employing spatial strategies that 
help them create new spaces of representation. 
 Chapter three  
Meaning, materiality and the research process 
The objective of this project about the conditional autonomy of the critical 
press in China is to gain an understanding of how critical journalism, as a 
social and discursive practice, works within the discursive order of the 
Chinese media. The dissertation’s research questions are directed at ex-
plaining how journalists’ production of discourse is structured, and how 
journalists actively work to increase their freedom of action through dis-
cursive and social practices. To study this, I have conducted interviews 
with journalists, editors and researchers who are in some way connected 
to the field of critical journalism, and have analysed critical media dis-
course through newspaper articles.  
The interviews focus on the context of critical journalism in China, in-
volving power relations, the economy and working conditions. They ex-
plain how journalists experience the regulation of critical journalism, how 
they counter repression through practices of resistance and “toeing the 
line”. The discourse analysis of newspaper articles shows how the critical 
media discourse on social problems in China accommodates different 
voices and discursive elements. Through this discourse analysis, I have 
approached the newspaper articles not as the sovereign products of jour-
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nalists and editors, but as a discourse constituted by certain conditions of 
possibility.  
In this project, the combination of interviews and discourse analysis 
incorporates a tension between the structuralist legacy of discourse the-
ory and analysis and the more agency-oriented study of social practices. 
This chapter investigates the methodological implications of combining 
analysis of discourse and social practice. In the discussion below I first 
address critical realism and discourse theory as two approaches that em-
phasise materiality and meaning, respectively, before continuing on to 
examine some of the central concepts in semiotic and discursive ap-
proaches to meaning and representations. In the final part of the chapter I 
discuss the research process for this study, in particular fieldwork and 
the process of becoming familiar with foreign codes. 
‘THE REAL’ AND DISCOURSE 
Over the last twenty years human geographers have engaged with the 
philosophy of critical realism in a serious way. Sayer (1992, Sayer 2000) 
has played a decisive role in developing a particular understanding of 
critical realism, inspired by the work of the philosopher Bhaskar (Mäki 
and Oinas 2004). For my work, critical realism has played a role as a de-
fining ‘other’ that has inspired reflection on the theoretical relation be-
tween meaning and materiality and the methodological implications of 
emphasising meaning. 
Critical realism has a strong ontology and a weak epistemology. It 
asks how the world is, rather than asking how knowledge about the 
world can be acquired (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen and Karlsson 
1997). The theoretical foundation of critical realism is that there is a real 
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world existing independently of our notions of it. The critical realist on-
tology is layered and consists of the empirical, the actual and the real or 
deep (Sayer 1992). The appeal of critical realism within the field of human 
geography has been due in part to its post-positivist stance, which dis-
tances it from a naïve empiricism. The major strength of critical realism is 
that it outlines a post-Marxist approach that is more open towards the 
political and less biased towards economic reductionism, while retaining 
an emphasis on the structuring of the social. 
The importance of ontology within critical realism suggests an en-
gagement with materiality rather than meaning. Sayer argues that in or-
der to understand the material, real world, researchers must do more 
than simply demonstrate statistical relationships. They must ask qualita-
tive questions and investigate why things happen. Language and ideas 
play a part in explaining why people act as they do, and social structures 
include conventions, rules and systems of meaning. In effect, meaning is 
included as a causal factor within the realist ontology (Sayer 1992). This 
reduces the incompatibility of the critical realist philosophy of science 
and discursive approaches. Critical discourse analysis, as Fairclough 
(1995) outlines it, and the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (2001), 
are both post-Marxist approaches that see the world as discursively struc-
tured. Sayer subscribes to their view of discourse as central when he 
states that “there is no contradiction involved in accepting both that there 
is a world existing independently of our thoughts and that we can only 
know what it is like from within discourse” (Sayer 2000:41). The implica-
tions of this view, however, are understood differently from the perspec-
tive of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory than in critical realism. 
Within discourse theory, the presumption that our access to the world 
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occurs through language means there is no privileged position that is 
outside discourse, from which the social world can be analysed and 
measured. Sayer, on the other hand, argues for a more limited view of 
discourse. He argues that since knowledge is fallible, the power of lan-
guage does not undermine the realist stance: “the common experience of 
making empirical errors, of mistaking the nature of the world, supports 
rather than undermines realism” (Sayer 1992:67). Nevertheless, discourse 
theory and critical realism both share the underlying assumption of a 
material world existing independently of our knowledge of it, and both 
assume that the only way we can grasp this world independent of us is 
through language. 
During the process of doing fieldwork and analysis for this study, it 
has become clear that a more nuanced perspective on human practices is 
missing from both critical realist and discursive approaches to social sci-
ence. As post-Marxist approaches, they share an emphasis on structure, 
meaning that their understanding of subject positions is more developed 
than their perspectives on people’s capacities to influence the structures 
around them. Hence it is possible to overcome the theoretical challenge of 
combining theoretical approaches accentuating either meaning or materi-
ality, but this combined approach will have a bias towards structure, at 
the expense of a more profound understanding of practice.  
Within discourse analysis, however, the focus on the use of language 
provides an opening towards more nuanced perspectives on practice. 
Simonsen (2001) argues that Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language also 
is a philosophy of practice, in that Wittgenstein sees language as a me-
dium for social practice and as a precondition for the constitution of sub-
jectivity. This view of language as constitutive for the social is incorpo-
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rated into phenomenological approaches to the social, where it is com-
bined with a view of social practice as bodily. Within the field of human 
geography, this strand of social theory has been particularly important 
for research on the practices of daily life, but geographical discussions of 
the relationship between the body and space have led towards a more 
general insight into the situated and contextual nature of social practice 
(Simonsen 2001).  
REPRESENTATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF MEANING 
This study of the conditional autonomy of the critical press in China is 
concerned with the politics of representation. At the centre stand the dis-
cursive politics which relate to the way Chinese journalists represent so-
cial problems. The section below deals with concepts from theories of 
representation and semiotics that have influenced theories of discourse 
and shaped my understanding of the construction of meaning.  
Theories of representation can be divided into three groups: the reflec-
tive, the intentional and the constructionist approaches. The reflective ap-
proach is sometimes termed ‘mimetic’; it holds that meaning is in the 
object and that language only serves as a mirror (Hall 1997). This is a per-
spective on representation and language that has been connected to posi-
tivist approaches to science. Logical positivists aimed at purifying the 
scientific language of inaccuracies through meticulous and correct formu-
lation of statements (Smith 1998). Intentional approaches to representation 
are based on the observation that in most cases communication works 
quite well. This observation is taken to mean that words and statements 
in general reflect the intentions of the sender. Constructionist theories of 
representation defy the possibility of a pure and scientific language, and 
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sees language as constitutive of meaning itself. The stability of linguistic 
systems and meaning is explained through the social codes that regulate 
the relation between signs and their meaning (Hall 1997). 
The concept of the sign is central to constructionist theories of repre-
sentation. The recognition of the role of signs in communication has 
meant that not only verbal language, but also body language, fashion, 
photography and other forms of expression can be read as signs. The 
approach which reads such various expressions as signs connected by a 
social code has developed out of the work of Saussure (1986). His major 
interest was in the foundational problems of linguistics, and he devel-
oped a theory based on a view of language as a system of signs. Saus-
sure’s groundbreaking insight was that the sign consists of two parts: 
there is the form, that can be a written word, a photo or a sound, and 
there is the corresponding concept. Saussure term the form the signifier 
and the corresponding concept the signified (Hall 1997). Both elements are 
necessary in order to produce meaning. The relation between the signifier 
and the signified is arbitrary, meaning that any form can be combined 
with any concept (Hall 1997). The difference between the denotation of 
concepts in different languages shows this clearly: in Norwegian ‘dog’ is 
hund, in Chinese people say gou. The sign in itself does not possess a fixed 
meaning; it acquires its meaning through a system of difference. The col-
our white acquires its meaning from being different from black and other 
colours, and being a teenager signalizes difference from adults, children 
and the old. Signs are members of a system, and are defined through 
their relations to other members of that system (Culler 1976). When Saus-
sure’s thoughts are reproduced in a dissertation in human geography a 
hundred years after they were launched in a course for his students, it is 
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because modified versions of his ideas constitute some of the corner-
stones in later post-structural theories about language and politics. Saus-
sure himself was a structuralist whose ambition was to discover the sci-
entific laws behind linguistic practices. His work deals with language as a 
system. To him, the realization of language through speech acts only con-
stitutes the surface of language, and is not suited for systematic analysis. 
In contrast post-structural approaches to representation focus on the dy-
namic and changing aspects of language revealed in speech acts, aban-
doning Saussure’s ambition to uncover the scientific laws of language 
(Hall 1997).  
Saussure’s view of language as a system of difference and his insights 
into the nature of the sign have been developed within the field of semi-
otics, the study of signs. Within semiotics, there is an emphasis on how 
the understanding of signs depends on an underlying code (Hall 1997). A 
red traffic light is a sign, which people in general understand to mean 
stop. This is because we share a common code where the colour red 
means stop, while green says go. Many social codes are less universal 
and stable than the codes for traffic lights. In Mythologies, Barthes (1991) 
shows how features of everyday life, such as soap powder commercials, 
wine and bloody steaks, are not only things in themselves, but also func-
tion as signs that activate a chain of connotations within a particular cul-
tural code. Connotations can mould the sign to the extent that it becomes 
an empty signifier that is able to assume new meanings (Smith 1998). 
Material practices as well as linguistic practices bear meaning, and mean-
ing changes as signs are connected in new ways through different social 
codes. These processes are at the centre of the discourse theory and 
analysis which is applied in this study of the critical press in China. 
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POST-STRUCTURALIST DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
Semiotics was developed as a structuralist approach to language and 
meaning. In Saussure’s view, that the rules of language are embedded in 
social codes and shared understandings within a culture made it clear 
that language could not be an individual matter. His interest was the 
study of the language system, langue, and not the actual use of language, 
parole, which he conceived as too influenced by the whims and idiosyn-
crasies of individuals (Hall 1997). Within post-structuralism, more atten-
tion has subsequently been transferred from the language system to lan-
guage use (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). The structuralist notion of the 
language system as a closed totality has been criticized and the post-
structuralist trend has been to investigate how identities are subject to 
change, and how all structural arrangements contain elements of radical 
undecidability (Laclau 1993). Laclau summarizes this as the study of the 
“permanent slide of the signified under the signifier” (Laclau 1993:432). 
Formulated in more vernacular language, it means meaning is unstable. 
Discourse analysis is a method for identifying and analysing the con-
tingency of meaning. In this dissertation, I use elements from three dif-
ferent approaches to discourse analysis. These are Foucault’s discourse 
analysis (Foucault 1995, 1999), Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory (La-
clau and Mouffe 2001) and the critical discourse analysis developed in the 
work of Fairclough (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, Fairclough 1992, 
1995). Foucault’s work has been formative for the development of post-
structuralist discourse analysis. His work shows how fundamental 
changes in social practices can be traced back to discursive breaks, such 
as the establishment of asylums for the insane. Foucault describes a dis-
course as “a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same dis-
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cursive formation (...) it is made up of a limited number of statements for 
which a group of conditions of existence can be defined (Foucault 
1972:117)”. This description emphasises that discourses are established 
through rules of exclusion, such as the division between the legal and the 
prohibited, between reason and folly, true and false. When they separate 
relevant from irrelevant and true from false, discursive boundaries estab-
lish a set of conditions of existence (Foucault 1972). Within this perspec-
tive, truth and knowledge become relative and dependent on discursive 
paradigms. This is an aspect of post-structuralist discourse analysis that 
often provokes reactions because it breaks with the correspondence crite-
rion for truth, and opponents tend to point out that you will be hurt if 
you run out in front of a car, no matter what discourse you use (Sayer 
2000). The objective of Foucault’s work is not to propound a belief in the 
magic of language, but to acquire an understanding of how discourse 
works within the social world. In society, discourses are embedded in 
material structures. The conception of madness developed along with the 
asylum, the discourse on crime is embedded in the physical structure of 
prisons and courts (Simons 1995). This makes discursive paradigms quite 
resistant to change. 
Foucault’s notion of discourse is connected to historical eras, while La-
clau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is an attempt to understand politics 
and power through an analysis of how our conception of the social is 
constructed (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). They “…will call articulation any 
practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is 
modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality 
resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call discourse” (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001). The sign is the basic element in Laclau and Mouffe’s con-
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cept of discourse. The sign acquires its meaning in relation to other signs; 
through articulations, signs are linked together in ways which establish 
their meaning. For instance, the concept of ‘childhood’ is woven together 
with signs such as ‘education’, ‘care’ and ‘playtime’, and through a par-
ticular articulation, these signs together constitute a discourse on children 
and childhood. The signs within a discourse are placed in a relational 
system, and this system is never closed. When new elements are incorpo-
rated into a discourse, the particular articulation is destabilized, and new 
relations appear between signs. Discursive changes alter the meaning 
inscribed in the social, and this contingency of meaning is at the core of 
Laclau and Mouffe’s understanding of politics. The formation of a new 
discourse on media is what is taking place within the media field in 
China today. Market reform has destabilized the previous media dis-
course and new elements, such as critical journalism, are changing the 
prevailing understanding of what the media is and does. 
The third approach to discourse used in this dissertation is critical dis-
course analysis (CDA). This approach has been developed mainly 
through the work of Fairclough (1992, 1995, (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 
1999). The term critical signals an engagement with critical theory and an 
ambition to uncover relations of power (Fairclough 1995). In contrast to 
Foucault’s and Laclau and Mouffe’s contributions to post-structural dis-
course analysis, CDA holds open the possibility that there exists a posi-
tion outside of the prevailing discourse from which repressive discourses 
can be detected. Fairclough (1995) distinguishes between discourse and 
materiality, and describes the discursive as a sphere containing texts and 
other semiotic expressions, and the production and consumption of dis-
courses. The social context, on the other hand, cannot be analysed in the 
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same way as texts, such that discourse analysis must be supplemented 
with social theory. CDA conceives of discourse as the semiotic elements 
of social practices, constituting a powerful force that shapes and influ-
ences the social and engaging in a dialectical relation with the field of 
social practices.  
CDA’s distinction between discourse and social processes differs from 
Laclau and Mouffe’s conceptualization of discourse, which advocates an 
understanding of discourse and materiality as similar in the sense that 
both embody meaning. Social practices as well as discourse consist of 
signs; since our interaction with the world occurs via language, we ‘read’ 
both discourse and materiality (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). I find Laclau 
and Mouffe’s position very convincing evaluated from the perspective of 
the philosophy of science. Practices become meaningful to us through the 
signs they communicate, and this makes discourse relevant for much 
more than texts. Still, in this dissertation I generally distinguish between 
discursive and social processes. Intuitively, it makes a difference whether 
something is said or done, and hence text and practice remain two catego-
ries in practice. Although it is clear to me that social practices are discur-
sive in the sense that they communicate meaning, in this dissertation I 
write as if there is a distinction between discursive and social practices. 
Although the absence of a theoretical distinction between discourse 
and materiality is convincing in an abstract analysis, it is more problem-
atic when it comes to empirical research. One reason is that it makes it 
very hard to explain agency. The question of social agency does not oc-
cupy any central position within the work of either Foucault (1999) or in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) discourse theory. The most obvious explana-
tion as to why agency is under-theorized in post-structuralist discourse 
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analysis is that it is “a type of analysis primarily addressed not to facts but 
to their conditions of possibility” (Laclau 1993:431, emphasis in original). 
Discourse theory holds that thought and action depend on the structur-
ing of meaning, that discursive structures are unstable and open to 
change, but it does not strive to explain how social actors can instigate 
such processes of change. Since this dissertation is an empirical study, it 
became important to question the extent to which the different post-
structuralist approaches to discourse open the way for a conceptualiza-
tion of social agency understood as something other than a realization of 
discursive structures. This depends on how the various approaches to 
post-structuralist discourse analysis understand social subjects, and how 
they explain social change. 
Foucault’s discourse analysis upholds the structuralist conception of 
the individual as subject to historical and social conditions. He sees the 
subject as decentred, and not as an autonomous and independent unity. 
This conception of individual agency was inspired by Althusser, who 
originated the idea that people are interpellated into subject positions in 
such a way that pre-existing social structures are reproduced (Jørgensen 
and Phillips 1999). Interpellation describes individuals’ process of becom-
ing who they are through entering various categories or subject positions 
such as ‘mother’, ‘son’, ‘student’ or ‘professor’. The concept of interpella-
tion was part of a theory arguing that capitalist ideology was the ruling 
force of society. The ideological state apparatus mediated capitalist ideol-
ogy to the people, and through the process of interpellation, people were 
made to believe that the system was right (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). 
Althusser’s concept of interpellation and his view upon social subjects 
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must be interpreted as part of an explanation of how power relations are 
upheld, rather than how they can be resisted and changed. 
A weakness in Althusser’s theory is the idea that a message will be 
understood as its sender meant it to be understood. This idea contributes 
to minimizing the importance of social agency. Hall criticized this con-
ception in his seminal essay “Encoding/decoding”, where he argues that 
there is no necessary symmetry between the production and the recep-
tion of a message (Hall 2001). People are able to decode messages accord-
ing to codes other than the one intended by the sender, which allows for 
the possibility of a discursive agency based on interpretation and the co-
existence of different and opposing codes or discourses.  
Laclau and Mouffe have incorporated the notion of counter discourses 
into their discourse theory (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). They argue that no 
discourse can ever be completely closed, and that there is always a poten-
tial for new articulations that challenge the existing notions of a discur-
sive field. In acknowledging the possibility of creating opposing and al-
ternative discourses, discourse theory suggests that subjects are capable 
of instigating social change. The problem is that Laclau and Mouffe do 
not present any explanation of how it is possible for subjects to break 
with existing subject positions and create new positions that enable dif-
ferent social practices. 
Due to its distinction between discursive and social practices, critical 
discourse analysis, on the other hand, goes further towards explaining 
agency. According to CDA, subjects are active agents who are able to 
form independent discourses and who can resist relations of domination 
(1999, Fairclough 1992, Fairclough 1995). There are two main sources of 
social agency within CDA: the first is social practices such as political 
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mobilization and resistance against relations of domination. Within the 
CDA framework, these practices are better analyzed using social theories 
than as objects of discourse analysis.  
The second source of agency is interdiscursivity. When language users 
introduce elements from one order of discourse into another, ways of 
conceptualizing the world are transferred. For instance, the introduction 
of market economic discourse into discourses on education and the 
health system have contributed to fundamental changes in the social 
practices of these institutions. Scholars now discuss how their university 
courses can become more marketable, and doctors discuss cost-efficiency 
of various treatments. Metaphors from the stock market even appear 
when people talk about their love relationships. A sentence such as “I’ve 
invested so much in this relationship” indicates that there is an expected 
surplus to be gained or lost. Interdiscursivity creates hybridity, and this 
opens for social change (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). A similar ap-
proach to discourse and agency can be found in Bakhtin’s analyses of the 
polyphony of literature and his dialectical theory of language (Tønnesson 
2001). Polyphony is an expression of the inclusion of different voices in a 
text, and to construct texts that are polyphonic expressions can serve as a 
strategy for opposing and challenging a hegemonic discourse. Bakhtin’s 
work exemplifies how discourse is both constituted by and constitutes 
language structures: discourse is shaped by language structures, but si-
multaneously works them, transforms them and reproduces them (Chou-
liaraki and Fairclough 1999).  
The main topic under discussion in the present study is how a new 
discursive practice can bring about social change. In the analysis which 
follows the discursive strategies employed by Chinese journalists are 
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interpreted as an expression of the journalist’s agency. I write about dis-
cursive and social practices as if they are distinguished in the same way 
as in critical discourse analysis. However, at a higher level of abstraction 
both social and discursive practices become meaningful through their 
communication of signs, which means that I also subscribe to Laclau and 
Mouffe’s view of the relation between discourse and materiality. 
FIELDWORK AND ANALYSIS 
To do fieldwork is to engage with both meaning and materiality. 
Bourdieu’s theory of social fields presents a notion of the field as consist-
ing of networks of relations between social positions. These networks are 
structured, but can be changed and reshaped by social actors. Bourdieu 
argues that thinking in terms of fields means approaching the social 
world in a relational manner (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1993). Bourdieu’s 
concept of the field corresponds to Chouliaraki and Fairclough’s idea of 
orders of discourse that is a “socially structured articulation of discursive 
practices which constitute the discursive facet of the social order of a so-
cial field, such as politics, media or education” (Chouliaraki and Fair-
clough 1999:114). In my fieldwork I have conceived of Chinese media as 
both a social field and a discursive order. Critical media discourse is a 
counter-discourse within this field, as it challenges the hegemonic under-
standing of what the media discourse should deal with. The journalists, 
editors and news media that produce the critical discourse constitute a 
sub-field within the Chinese media as a whole. Fields and discursive or-
ders are ontologically contestable, but as Chouliaraki and Fairclough ar-
gue, they are heuristic concepts and can be modified in response to the 
particular analytic process at hand (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999).  
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I approached the field of critical journalism in China through inter-
views and by studying critical media discourse. In the section below I 
discuss the research process which has lead to the analysis presented in 
this dissertation. This process from research design through fieldwork, 
analysis and writing has not been an example of linear and smooth pro-
gress and I subscribe to Alasuutari’s view when he says that “it is diffi-
cult to relate to textbook descriptions of the research process; somehow 
they seem to be far removed from my own experiences” (Alasuutari 
1995:158). Alasuutari is a rare voice when he claims that many research 
projects have histories of failures and problems that are seldom expressed 
in the final texts. I argue that what I experienced as problems during my 
fieldwork in China actually contributed substantially to my learning 
process (Sæther 2006) and I describe how I developed an insight into the 
field of critical journalism in China through this non-linear process. 
The fieldwork was conducted from July to December 2002, the same 
autumn as the 16th Party Congress was convened. Beginning in the mid 
1990s, the development within the Chinese media field has been charac-
terized by more critical and problem-oriented journalism, but during the 
autumn of 2002 the working environment was more constrained due to 
the Party congress.  
I had chosen to settle in Shanghai during my fieldwork so that my 
husband could attend the University of Oslo’s exchange program for 
students in Chinese at Shanghai’s Fudan University. Many interviews, 
however, were conducted in other cities, mainly because I discovered 
that there was less critical and investigative journalism going on in the 
Shanghainese media than in other major Chinese cities. The difficulties in 
identifying critical journalists in Shanghai was one reason why I experi-
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enced the first part of the fieldwork process as a failure, since my expecta-
tions of how it ought to be were not met. According to my research de-
sign, I should have been conducting interviews mainly with newspaper 
journalists, but when I arrived in Shanghai, the people I had trusted to 
help me to gain access to critical newspaper journalists were not immedi-
ately available, for various reasons. After a few weeks, I became rather 
desperate and started making a list of everyone I knew in China who 
might know someone within the field of critical journalism. I abandoned 
the idea of only interviewing newspaper journalists and decided to in-
clude others such as academics and activists who had a connection to the 
field. This was a more productive approach, and from then on my selec-
tion of interviewees followed the snowballing method; through several 
“snowballs” I ended up interviewing some of the people who had been 
crucial for the development of more critical journalism in China. Alto-
gether, I did twenty interviews, divided between academics (4), activists 
(2) and journalists (14). The academics were relevant interviewees be-
cause their research dealt with developments within the media field, and 
the activists I interviewed both worked through media to raise con-
sciousness of issues such as domestic violence and workers’ rights. The 
journalists were situated in different news organizations in Shanghai, 
Beijing, Hong Kong and Guangzhou, and the interviews focused on their 
own experiences as investigative journalists and editors. There was a 
concentration of journalists with previous or present connections to the 
paper Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo). This paper has been at the 
centre of the development of critical and investigative journalism in 
China. It is not representative for the media field in general, but it is re-
vealing for the practice of critical journalism that was the core focus of 
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this fieldwork. Even though the process of selecting interviewees was 
more messy than I had expected, the final selection corresponds to what 
Thagaard (2003) calls a strategic selection, where the information pro-
vided by the interviewees corresponds to the field of interest indicated in 
the research question.  
The heterogeneity of this group served as a resource for the research 
process because it stimulated my awareness of the range of different sub-
ject positions within the Chinese media field. Even the one interview that 
offered least information about critical journalism taught me something 
about the conditionality of critical press in China. This was a journalist 
based in Guangzhou, and when I met him it turned out that he did noth-
ing that could be characterized as critical and investigative journalism. 
He worked as an editor of international news, and within this field, the 
regulation was very strict. He listed the taboos involved in the coverage 
of international news, and explained how his job was restricted to con-
veying officially endorsed information. In the group of interviewees, 
there is a division between those who have provided me with back-
ground knowledge and insight in the history and mechanisms of the me-
dia field, and those who have more hands-on experience with conducting 
investigative and critical journalism. The latter group occupies the fore-
ground in the analysis, but it is important to emphasise that I would not 
have been able to understand and represent their narratives without the 
background information.  
Of the journalists I contacted, all except one responded to my e-mails 
or phone-calls. The one who never replied had previously lost his job 
after being interviewed by a foreign journalist, and one of the other in-
formants thought it most likely that he did not want to speak to any for-
96 Meaning, materiality and the research process 
eigner about his work. I had worried a lot about whether or not critical 
journalists would think of being interviewed about their work as a risk, 
but this was the only occasion where it became a decisive factor. How-
ever, risk was an aspect when my door-opener to the journalists based in 
Guangzhou asked me to come after the 16th party congress had convened 
in Beijing in November, because the increased media control in the pre-
vious months had made the atmosphere tense. It became evident that 
among the journalists I interviewed, the degree of pressure they were 
subject to in their work varied substantially. This was reflected in the way 
they responded to questions. For instance, I asked some of the interview-
ees why several people had simultaneously left the paper Southern Week-
end in 2002. The interviewees subject to the most pressure were very hesi-
tant in answering this, while others explained it as a political protest. A 
new leadership for the paper had been appointed and the journalists re-
garded them as representatives of the propaganda authorities. The vari-
ous subject positions represented by the interviewees clarified the 
boundaries of critical journalism as a field, and this was also a precondi-
tion for understanding the boundaries of critical media discourse.  
During the fieldwork, I had four different approaches for becoming 
familiar with the discourses within the field of critical journalism in 
China. First, I asked the interviewees to send me articles as examples of 
their work. In one case I had read articles I found interesting and con-
tacted the journalist afterwards. The second approach was to read articles 
in Chinese or in translation through various websites. The third was to 
buy newspapers and using the library to browse through articles that 
dealt with social problems. The fourth approach consisted in asking my 
research assistants to search for articles about particular topics, such as 
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mining accidents, environmental problems or AIDS. I used topics as 
metonyms, as signs signifying a general approach. AIDS, mining acci-
dents and corruption are topics more likely to appear within critical dis-
course than elsewhere within Chinese media. When I searched for texts, I 
was looking for the framing of problems, how they were situated in rela-
tion to state and society, which actors were represented as responsible 
and how causal explanations were outlined. The articles I selected for the 
discourse analysis in chapter 6 all come from Southern Weekend. As men-
tioned, this paper has been at the forefront of critical journalism in China, 
and the texts analyzed here have typical characteristics of Chinese critical 
and investigative journalism. I presented my analysis of these texts at a 
workshop where a journalist in the Southern group was present. She 
spontaneously responded: “that is what we call the Southern style”. This 
comment indicated to me that I was on the right track in understanding 
how social problems are framed and presented in Chinese critical jour-
nalism, which is an objective of my analysis. 
Embedding interpretation: contextual analysis 
The interviews and newspaper articles I studied during the fieldwork 
convey two different kinds of representations. During interviews, the 
informants convey spoken representations of their own practices and 
perspectives within the field, while the newspaper articles are written 
representations of various social problems in Chinese society. The previ-
ous discussion about representation expressed that the meaning of signs 
depends on the social code. With this in mind, it is evident that represen-
tations have to be read contextually, and fieldwork is a way to become 
familiar with foreign codes. Social codes separate insiders from outsiders, 
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and in the fieldwork tradition, participant observation has been impor-
tant for gaining access to different social codes (Fangen 2004). Participant 
observation is not a method that I have employed in this work, but for 
this dissertation, my everyday activities in China were significant for the 
learning process that offered insight into the social codes operating in 
relation to Chinese media (Sæther 2006). 
Codes can be mastered at many levels, and in my work, Chinese lan-
guage was the most challenging, semantic code system that I needed ac-
cess to. It was obvious to me that the better my language skills were, the 
more I would understand of what was going on in the field. Before em-
barking on this project I had spent one and a half years studying Chinese: 
one year at Peking University during my master’s degree, and one se-
mester at Fudan University in Shanghai during my PhD. Not surpris-
ingly, high scores on beginners’ exams did not correspond to functional 
language skills as an interviewer, nor for analyzing complex newspaper 
articles. For me, cooperating with other people has been a coping strategy 
and a key factor partly compensating for my insufficient language skills. I 
worked together with two students, one of them a friend I knew from my 
first stay in Shanghai in 1999, the other the cousin of a sociology graduate 
I had met at a workshop. When I was preparing the interviews, I would 
consult with them on how to best formulate my questions, and on some 
occasions, one of them also took part in the interview. She assisted me 
when I struggled with the formulation of follow-up questions or did not 
grasp a particular point in the interviewees’ narrative. The most impor-
tant contribution was that we could discuss the interview afterwards. The 
interviews that were conducted in Chinese were transcribed by the re-
search assistant. This way I could read the text and sort out the things I 
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missed during the interview, in addition to the advantages of having 
transcriptions to hand when analysing the interviews. 
The assistants also played an important role in the process of studying 
Chinese critical media discourse. We read newspaper articles together, 
discussed their content and related issues. These discussions have con-
tributed to contextualizing my understanding of the texts and the inter-
views. My assistants’ understandings and opinions about issues such as 
death penalty, school fees, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the 
religious Falungong movement, and their explanations of common ar-
guments, helped me to identify different discourses present in television 
and print media. The work I did together with the two assistants was 
significant for helping me to contextualize my findings and make the 
social codes became more transparent. 
To contextualize is part of the validation process that goes on during 
fieldwork, and in my work the interview situation became an important 
arena for testing whether or not my interpretations made sense to people 
within the field. I would present my understanding of arguments people 
had made in previous interviews or in articles, and ask the person I was 
talking to for comments. The responses were indicative of the status of 
my insight, from a relaxed response telling me that this is something eve-
rybody ought to know, to careful acknowledgement when I had captured 
the background behind a certain incident. Kvale (1997) includes this as a 
kind of communicative validation and Fangen (2004) concludes that the 
feedback from interviewees and informants is significant, but that it can-
not be decisive. The researcher’s interpretations will sometimes be con-
trary to the conceptions of the interviewees. In my work there was one 
argument in particular with which none of the journalists I interviewed 
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agreed. That was the assertion that media’s relative freedom to criticize 
authorities at the local level, while remaining silent about the higher lev-
els of the state, meant that journalists also acted as a kind of government 
watchdogs. This was clearly not in line with the journalists’ self-
conception, but it was recognized by the academics I interviewed. I con-
tinue to think that a consequence of the conditional autonomy of critical 
press in China could be that journalists also served as government 
watchdogs; however, this is not necessarily an intended consequence, 
and the journalists do not see themselves as such. As Fangen (2004) ar-
gues, validation by informants themselves cannot necessarily be taken at 
face value, but their validation gives important clues as to how problems 
and ideas are conceived within the field. 
Presenting arguments and knowledge about the field in the interview 
situation was also an aspect of constructing myself as partly an insider 
and partly an outsider in the field. The interview was a dialogue where 
difference and sameness played equally important roles (Sæther 2006). 
Difference was my reason for asking for the interviewees’ time. Many 
interviewees started by introducing me to the development in the Chi-
nese media field in general before going on to discuss their own experi-
ences. Sameness is crucial for communication because it is related to un-
derstanding. In the interviews, sameness could be constructed in several 
ways, such as shared attitudes. For instance, I made it clear that I ac-
knowledged the constraints journalists were working under, while also 
recognizing that important things were being done despite the limita-
tions in place. Humour and daily life observations were other ways of 
connecting and creating a feeling of sameness in the dialogue. Sameness 
and difference were also connected to my role as a foreign guest meeting 
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with interviewees. I think my guest status was the reason why I was of-
ten asked out for lunch or dinner after the interview. This was an oppor-
tunity to continue the conversation, and for the interviewee to ask ques-
tions about the Norwegian media and my own work. For me, the prob-
lem with these continued conversations was that I was quite exhausted 
from two hours of intense listening and talking in Chinese and not able to 
make as much out of it as I otherwise could have done. 
As I became more familiar with the social codes in the field of critical 
journalism, my own subject position as a researcher changed. I began as a 
complete outsider, defined in relation to China scholars and to people in 
the field. At the outset of the project I perceived my position as inscribed 
with inferiority. My Chinese skills were inadequate, my contact persons 
in the field were few, I was not brave enough or persistent enough, in 
short, I perceived myself to be lacking in most of the necessary require-
ments for conducting successful fieldwork. This rather tragic emotional 
state made me seriously fear that I would end up without the information 
I depended on to write a dissertation. During the first, critical period of 
the fieldwork, this fear gradually eased. The process of interviewing peo-
ple, reading newspapers and working with my assistants brought me 
closer to an understanding of how things worked within the field of criti-
cal journalism. This also changed my self-perception in the field of myself 
as someone who was lacking in every important aspect, to that of a per-
son with knowledge about the practices of critical journalism in China. 
The combination of conducting interviews and discourse analysis has 
provided me with a rich collection of materials for analysing the condi-
tional autonomy of the critical press in China. I have employed different 
analytic strategies in the interpretation of the interviews and the newspa-
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per articles. In relation to the texts I have used a discursive approach fo-
cusing on how reality is construed and constructed, while the interviews 
are analysed with an emphasis on what journalists are dealing with and 
why they act as they do. Hence, I have treated interviews and newspaper 
articles as two different kinds of texts. The interviews involve several 
authors: the interviewee through his or her narrative, my own voice 
through questions and verbal and non-verbal responses, and the tran-
scription conducted by a research assistant or myself, as the written rep-
resentation of a taped conversation. The distinction I have made between 
interviews and newspaper articles does not mean that interview-texts are 
biased and contaminated by the researcher, while the other texts can be 
analysed in an objective and neutral way. Different kinds of texts offer 
insights into different processes: in this study the interviews are revealing 
for what they say about the practices of critical journalists, while the 
newspaper articles illustrate the formation of critical media discourse. 
The people I have interviewed for this dissertation were promised 
anonymity. Most of them were not concerned about this, as long as I was 
not a journalist myself and would employ their information only for the 
purposes of research. Critical journalists in China face a situation where 
their work can result in sanctions ranging from limited disciplinary acts 
such as self-criticisms to prison sentences. I have tried to ensure that no-
one is caused any additional difficulties as a result of their willingness to 
share information and insights with me. Therefore, the names of the in-
terviewees in the next chapters are all fictitious, mostly constructed by 
combining family names and given names from the reference lists of 
various articles on my desk. I apply two strategies in order to avoid pro-
viding too much information about particular individuals. In one case, I 
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have given one informant two different names; I fear that otherwise the 
sum of this persons’ interests and achievements would make it possible 
to trace him. The other strategy is not referring to particular interviews in 
places where I otherwise would have, because this would attach too 
much information to a single name. The need for ambiguity also explains 
why I do not always clarify whether an interviewee is a journalist or an 
editor.  
Summing up 
The aim of this chapter has been to investigate the methodological impli-
cations of conducting a study which combines an interest in the practices 
of Chinese critical journalists with an analysis of critical media discourse. 
Towards the final stage of the research process it became clear to me that 
the biggest challenge was not to combine an interest in meaning and ma-
teriality, but rather how to do this while recognizing the importance of 
people’s agency. I have argued that discourse analysis in general has paid 
little attention to the role of agency, and that it is critical discourse analy-
sis (CDA) that has the most to offer when it comes to incorporating an 
understanding of agency. In this study, the emphasis is on the structuring 
of critical journalists’ working environment, the conditions of possibility 
that regulate their work and the discursive agency of critical journalists in 
China. A consequence of my theoretical and methodological choices 
made during the analytical process is that I have less to say about the 
bodily and concrete practices through which journalists work to modify 
and change repressive structures. Through this critical evaluation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the methodological framework, I wish to 
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make my work open to its readers and to contribute to further develop-
ment of the theories that have inspired this work.  
However, the outcome of an empirical research process does not de-
pend on the choice of theoretical and methodological approaches alone. 
In the second half of the chapter, I have discussed the fieldwork and de-
scribed how the knowledge production was a multifaceted process in 
which my understanding of the field developed through dialogue with 
other people. I argue that contextual knowledge of Chinese society is a 
precondition for understanding the political role of critical journalism. 
The combination of fieldwork and discourse analysis provides two dif-
ferent angles from which the changes taking place within Chinese media 
may be analysed. The interviews conducted with critical journalists re-
veal their conscious strategies for reporting on problematic issues in Chi-
nese society, while the discourse analysis demonstrates how different 
voices are built into the texts to make them less provocative and to nor-
malize critique. Taken together, this material illustrates how political 
change occurs within the context of an authoritarian state. 
 Chapter four 
State-society relations in China 
The institutional context within which Chinese media operates is very 
different from the institutional structure which faces the mass media in 
liberal democracies. China is a one-party system without privately 
owned media, and Chinese journalists are subject to severe restrictions in 
their work. The aim of this chapter is to outline the institutional back-
ground for the processes of change that are taking place within the Chi-
nese media. One decisive legacy from Maoist China is the absence of a 
clear division between state and society. The institutional structure of the 
Chinese media was moulded in an era when journalists were propa-
ganda workers, and the various practices of Chinese journalism today are 
still embedded in an institutional structure geared towards propaganda. 
The organization of political power, the geographical power structure, 
and the organization of propaganda work represent the conditions Chi-
nese journalists face in their daily work. While this institutional set-up 
has proved resilient in the current of social and economic changes which 
has occurred in China during the last decades, its practices are changing. 
In this chapter, the emphasis is on the structures as they were established 
in the Mao period, while the following chapters discuss how new institu-
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tional practices within the media are influencing the relations between 
state and society. State and society in China are not the clearly bounded 
entities reflected in the academic literature on state-society relations. This 
makes ‘civil society’ a problematic concept in the Chinese context (Keane 
2001). In the Chinese party-state under Mao, society was integrated into 
the state organization, and this heritage continues to affect the practices 
of the Chinese media today. 
ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL POWER 
The main characteristic of China’s political system is the dominance of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). There are nine other nominal par-
ties, but these are not to be regarded as opposition parties. They are 
aligned with the CCP through a united front, so in reality the state is a 
one-party system (Mackerras 2001). The Chinese political system includes 
a complex and far-reaching bureaucracy, but the polity has not devel-
oped institutional procedures that ensure democratic accountability. No 
stable means of political participation have developed, and at the top 
level of the party, the actions of the leadership are primarily restricted by 
the presence of the other members of the top group, and not by laws and 
regulations (Lieberthal 1995). However, this does not mean that Chinese 
politics should be conceptualized as a centralized dictatorship emanating 
from Beijing. The Chinese political system is increasingly decentralized; 
throughout the process of economic reform, the local state has gradually 
gained in importance (Montinola, Qian and Weingast 1995). 
The present Chinese political system was established after the 1949 
revolution. The inspiration came from different sources, among them the 
institutions the CCP built during its war against the Nationalists before 
  State-society relations in China 107 
1949. Traditional Chinese governance was also important to Mao 
Zedong, but equally so was the socialist system in the Soviet Union. To-
day, the formal structure of the state is very similar to the one that was 
established after the revolution, even though the subsequent periods of 
upheaval and chaos have left their mark (Lieberthal 1995). Now, as in the 
Mao era this formal structure should serve only as a starting point for 
understanding the allocation of substantial power in China. Since 1949, 
,the Chinese political system has been characterised by a mismatch be-
tween the formal, institutional power structure and the substantial, real 
decision-making power. In the Western Weberian bureaucratic proce-
dure, policy is formulated as rules and laws which prevent bureaucrats 
from bending implementation according to their own whims and will. In 
contrast, political communication in China is characterized by documents 
that are often vague and open to interpretation (Keane 2001). This means 
that Chinese decision-making processes must be traced through net-
works of personal power, connections and flexible institutions. During 
the last two decades, however, the political development in China has 
moved towards a more accountable system, where formal power more 
closely corresponds to substantial power. One sign of this is the acknowl-
edgement of disagreement and conflicting interest in bodies such as the 
national party congress (NPC), which used to function more as an orna-
mental institution than a political organ (O’Brien 1994). 
There are two columns carrying the Chinese political system: the party 
organisation and the government system. They are known to overlap, 
and one of the objectives of political reform in China since 1979 has been 
the creation of a clearer separation between party and government.  
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PARTY AND GOVERNMENT 
At the top of the formal CCP party structure is the National Party Con-
gress. The party congress convenes infrequently; since 1970 it has met 
eight times, with the most recent session being the 17th party congress in 
October 2007. The party congress appoints the top party leadership and 
representatives to the Central Committee. This is formally the highest au-
thority within the CCP in the periods between party congresses, and it 
meets once or twice a year. The Central Commission of Discipline Inspec-
tion is part of the central committee and constitutes a surveillance chan-
nel that gives people an opportunity to report misdeeds and injustice. 
Within the Chinese polity, the Central Commission of Discipline Inspec-
tion, the People’s Congress, the judicial system and the media all consti-
tute possible surveillance channels (interview, Feng Junjiu). Many official 
positions, such as that of party head in important cities like Shanghai, 
automatically bring with them membership of the central committee. 
Formally it is the party congress which appoints members to the central 
committee, but in reality the Politburo has the power to make these deci-
sions (Lieberthal 1995). 
The members of the Politburo constitute the top power elite in China, 
and the number varies between 14-24 members.3 Normally several of 
these members serve in full-time positions in places other than Beijing; 
they might be province leaders or occupy other important positions, and 
hence will not attend all meetings. The 5-9 core members of the Politburo 
constitute the Standing Committee of the Politburo, which is headed by the 
general secretary of the CCP. The general secretary is also the formal 
 
3 http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/17th+Party+Congress 
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head of the Secretariat that provides staff support for the Politburo and 
the Central Committee. Several specialized departments are positioned 
under the Central Committee. In theory the importance of the body is 
reflected in its size, while in reality it is the other way around. The 
smaller units are the most powerful, which means that the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo is the most important unit within the party 
system.  
The government equivalent of the National Party Congress is the Na-
tional People’s Congress (NPC) that performs the role of the legislature 
within the Chinese political system. Under Mao, the NPC was only a 
rubber-stamp legislature at best, but during the post-1979 reform period 
it has gradually strengthened its position. It now takes a more active role 
in drafting major policies, but it is still far from an independent legisla-
ture (Lieberthal 1995). The State Council is the other major government 
body. It is led by the premier, and in theory its members are elected by 
the NPC. The State Council is the cabinet of the Chinese political system, 
and a number of commissions and ministries are subordinate to the State 
Council. The ministries and commissions are at the top of the vertical 
hierarchies reaching from the central state to the local territorial levels of 
administration (Lieberthal 1995).  
GEOGRAPHICAL LEVELS OF THE PARTY-STATE 
Chinese citizens’ interaction with the state can take place on many levels. 
A typical newspaper article begins by listing the geographical scales: “ In 
Jiangxi province, Wanzai county, Taibu city, Fangzun village there was 
an explosion in a school” (Xinhua net, undated). The major state and 
party bureaucracy is found on five levels: central, province, county, city 
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and the local unit. The relations between these levels are open to negotia-
tion and the division of power is not constitutionally fixed (Lieberthal 
1995). The province level is equal to the rank of ministry in the central 
government. At this level, most units are called provinces, but there are 
also five so-called autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang, 
Ningxia and Guangxi) and four cities that have this rank (Beijing, Shang-
hai, Tianjin and Chongqing). The autonomous regions have large minor-
ity populations which give them a different status. The provinces are 
large entities and are crucial in administering China’s huge population. 
The party and government institutions at the central level are largely 
mirrored at the provincial level, which plays an important role in the 
implementation of all major projects initiated by the central state (Lieber-
thal 1995). Regional economic inequality has increased in the wake of the 
economic reforms which began in the late 1970s, and the difference be-
tween rich and poor provinces is now regarded as a major problem in 
China. Provincial leaders have a substantial degree of autonomy, and 
although they have to implement decisions made at the central level, 
there is great leeway for less specific policymaking at this level.  
The county level is the next rank in the national political administrative 
hierarchy. Government and party institutions are also fully represented 
at this level, and they deal with their counterpart bodies at the province 
level. County-level departments are responsible for implementing and 
adjusting national policies, and during the economic reform period they 
have also been given more freedom to pursue local economic develop-
ment. Cities (the municipal level) differ from counties and provinces be-
cause they assume a variety of different ranks in the political administra-
tive hierarchy. Metropolises such as Beijing and Shanghai have the same 
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rank as provinces. Many cities have the rank of county or higher, and 
hence are placed directly below the province level. These cities have the 
same party and government organs which the province and county level 
have.  
The local level in China has been organized in different ways during 
the post-1949 period. The urban population has been organized into 
neighbourhoods headed by a residents’ committee, and into work units 
(danwei). Peasants were organized into communes until these were abol-
ished at the outset of the economic reforms. Today the lowest level of 
government is the township (xiang or zhen). They have an average popu-
lation of 18,000 and there are several offices below this level, such as an 
economic affairs office, an office of industry and commerce, a tax office, 
an office for civil affairs, for education and health, etc (Edin 2000).  
All Chinese media have linkages to party or government institutions 
at one of the aforementioned levels. The decentralized nature of Chinese 
decision-making and implementations means that the institutional prac-
tice varies from place to place, so Chinese media do not face a unified, 
monolithic state, but a multifaceted structure of different scales and insti-
tutional actors. 
In consequence, the functioning of the party and government system 
is a lot more complex than its organizational chart would seem to indi-
cate. The relations within the system are governed by two principles of 
management: horizontal and vertical relations. These relations permeate 
the pillars of government and party rule. Vertical linkages imply that each 
government agency at the local level is under dual leadership. For exam-
ple an office of industry and commerce will be subordinate to the county 
level department of industry and commerce, but also to the township 
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government. These two controlling bodies have the same bureaucratic 
rank (Edin 2000). The horizontal linkages emanate from the territorial 
principle in the Chinese demarcation of administrative tasks. In contrast 
to the Soviet system, which organized administrative tasks across geo-
graphical borders, the Chinese bureaucracy gives local authorities control 
over various economic sectors within their geographic region. Local gov-
ernment agencies are under the professional leadership of their vertical 
superior institution, but also simultaneously under the political leader-
ship of their local government, which again is subordinated to the next 
level in the vertical party hierarchy (Edin 2000).  
The overlap between party and government institutions is a key char-
acteristic of the Chinese party-state. There are supra-bureaucracies, also 
called leading groups (xitong), that integrate party and state organiza-
tions and thus create relations between the two hierarchies (Brady 2008, 
Lieberthal 1995). These are groupings of bureaucracies that deal with the 
same area of responsibility. Important xitong include Party Affairs, Gov-
ernment Work, State Security and Foreign Affairs. The Propaganda and 
Education xitong is a sub-group under Party Affairs (Lieberthal 1995). 
Each of the xitong include executive agencies from the top to the bottom 
of the system, creating vertical relations within major spheres of domestic 
governance (Lieberthal 1995). The xitong networks stretch from the 
workplace, through the local, provincial and central levels of the state. 
The borders between the xitong are porous, and the battles between top 
leaders have been reflected in the changing scope of authority of the 
various xitong. Organizations can shift from one xitong to another and 
each leader has tried to extend the scope of his and his allies’ xitong. Dur-
ing the cultural revolution, the Propaganda/Education and the Military 
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xitong expanded as a consequence of Mao’s campaign to weaken his ad-
versaries who headed the Party Affairs and other xitong (Lieberthal 1995). 
The flexibility of an adaptable institutional structure such as the xitong 
represents a strength for the party leadership, but it does not favour ac-
countability and transparency. 
THE INTERVENTIONIST STATE 
After the revolution in 1949 the Chinese party-state made redistribution 
of material wealth, services and opportunities its central ambition. The 
CCP’s social and political discourse was disseminated and embedded 
through the construction of a new redistributive apparatus. This process 
provides an illustrative example of the close link between discourse and 
material practices. The state’s formulation and interpretation of needs 
among the population, and its definition of criteria for allocating re-
sources, opened a new space for techniques of discipline and normaliza-
tion (Yang 1989). Factories assigned housing according to marital status, 
and singled out particular individuals as model workers; together with 
workers whose spouses served in the armed forces, the needs of these 
workers were prioritised over those of other workers (Yang 2002). This 
preferential treatment in turn encouraged other people to marry when 
they became old enough (the party decided when men and woman were 
ready to marry), and it stimulated people to behave like model workers, 
and to respect and admire the army. Unmarried women were often un-
able to obtain housing and had to remain in dormitories at the work unit. 
This was a negative sanction for deviating from the life stages the party-
state established as normal. 
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Up until 1979 almost all urban jobs were allocated by the state, and 
there was no labour market. The work unit (danwei) was the lowest level 
of the state in urban areas and included functions from production to 
welfare, reproduction and surveillance (Yang 1989). If an employee 
wanted to apply for a loan, the decision was up to the danwei. People 
had to apply to be allowed to marry, and decisions about pregnancy and 
childbirth were also not left to individuals. Family disputes were re-
solved through the danwei, and if a couple decided to have a divorce, 
they needed a permit. The danwei’s decision would depend on whether 
the divorce rate in the population was rising or falling, and the state’s 
concern over the negative impact of divorces on society. In addition to 
such external factors, the decision was based on an evaluation of the in-
dividual applicant’s performance as a worker, and the applicant’s ideo-
logical and political profile would also be taken into consideration. The 
political, practical and personal information about the involved couple 
was available in an individual personal dossier held for every individual 
in the work unit. This information would not be available to the em-
ployee, and if a person was transferred from one danwei to another, the 
file followed (Yang 1989).  
Perhaps the most striking example of the interventionist state is the 
one-child policy. This policy was implemented after 1979, during the 
same period as the beginning of the economic reforms. It demonstrates 
how post-Mao China continues to consider individuals’ freedom to make 
their own decisions to be subordinate to the government’s judgement. 
The one-child policy has allowed state representatives such as doctors, 
nurses, planned-birth committees, labour unions and the women’s fed-
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erations to monitor women’s bodies, menstrual cycles, sexual conduct, 
and relationships with husbands, parents and in-laws.  
The close regulation and disciplinary practices of the Chinese state can 
be seen as part of a high modernist state project in which every aspect of 
human activity has been a possible object of the benefits of scientific and 
technical progress (Scott 1998). The Chinese state has conducted its high 
modernist project through a wide range of strategies. Allocation of mate-
rial resources provided has brought the state very close to the personal 
lives of individuals, but the state’s discursive strategies have also seen as 
a powerful means for constructing the new China. In this context media 
policy has been another tool in the state’s modernization project, aimed at 
raising the morals and qualifications of the population. 
THE ORGANIZATION OF PROPAGANDA WORK 
In China, propaganda constitutes a mediating sphere between state and 
society. It is an area of ‘thought work’ (sixiang gongzuo), where the state 
communicates to the people what the correct ideological positions are. 
Cheek (1989) emphasises that researchers need to understand what 
propaganda means to different groups, as it carries different meanings to 
the top leaders who guide it, the journalists who produce it and the me-
dia audiences who consume it. Foreign researchers who approach this 
field in China meet with an understanding of propaganda that differs 
from the entirely negative connotations the term has in English. The Ox-
ford Dictionary defines it as “information, especially of a biased or mis-
leading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view”. 
Propaganda carries connotations such as brain-washing, suppression and 
indoctrination. In contrast, to understand the Chinese meaning of propa-
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ganda, we have to swap the words “biased” and “misleading” with “cor-
rect” and “guiding”. Propaganda communicates ratified political dis-
course, through which the audience can learn what the party-state deems 
legitimate public issues to be. Propaganda further introduces the legiti-
mate vocabulary of the political discourse. Cheek (1989) cites a Chinese 
media survey conveying truthfulness and credibility as keys to good 
propaganda. Here, truthfulness and credibility presumably refer to the 
politically true and politically credible; whether or not the propaganda 
corresponds to an external truth criterion would seem to be less impor-
tant.  
This understanding of propaganda reflects a particular view of the 
state. Within the Confucian tradition the relationship between ruler and 
ruled is seen as analogous to the relationship between father and son. As 
a result of his heavenly mandate and superior moral character, the be-
nevolent ruler is qualified to judge what is good for his subjects (Lee 
1990). A Confucian belief holds that people receive their good nature 
from heaven, and the education that completes it from the king (Nathan 
1985). The communists intended to overthrow the Confucian hierarchy, 
but many of the social norms associated with Confucianism, such as chil-
dren’s responsibility for their parents (filial piety) were also continued 
under Communist rule (Tang 2005). The Confucian educational perspec-
tive on the relationship between ruler and subject was compatible with 
the Marxist notion of the party as the vanguard of the proletariat. Pater-
nalistic politics that emphasise group interests rather than individual 
rights have roots in both Marxist ideology and Confucian values. The 
educational perspective on the relationship between the state and its sub-
jects was sustained in the CCP’s propaganda work. In contrast to the lib-
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eral idea of the media as society’s watchdog in relation to the state, the 
Chinese media’s propaganda work was based on the assumption that the 
natural condition of state-society relations was one of harmony and 
common interest. The public was imagined as unitary entity, and the 
public interest was therefore understood to lie in the upholding of moral-
ity and obligation rather than individual rights (Keane 2001). The ulti-
mate purpose of propaganda was to change people’s minds, to influence 
their way of thinking and acting; the message about the advantages of 
communism was communicated through carefully guided education, 
campaigns, theatre, literature and sports.  
In their ambition to engineer a new culture for China in the years after 
1949, the leaders of the CCP viewed ideology as one of the key tools for 
transforming Chinese society. In this context, creating a system for dis-
seminating information to the whole country was essential (Chang 1997). 
The CCP’s leaders drew inspiration from the Soviet Union and its propa-
ganda system, as well as from their own experiences in maintaining a 
communication network during decades of persecution and then civil 
war. The party designed the propaganda system to include literature, art, 
music, education, publishing, scientific research, public health, sports, 
museums and more (Nathan 1985). Formally, the propaganda system 
was placed under the supervision of the State Council, the top govern-
ment body (as discussed above) (Lieberthal 1995).  
In practice, the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP has al-
ways been in charge of the ideology and propaganda system. Thus, deci-
sion-making power over propaganda lies in reality with the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CCP. The 
main party newspaper, The People’s Daily, along with other important 
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media and cultural institutions, are controlled by the party secretariat, 
which belongs to the Politburo (Cheek 1989). The Propaganda xitong has 
organized the day-to-day propaganda work in China since 1949. At its 
head is a group consisting of approximately six members: a Politburo 
member, a leading secretary at the central level, and representatives of 
the leading propaganda organs, such as the Propaganda Department and 
People’s Daily. In response to new challenges posed by the economic re-
forms, a new leading group was established in 1997 in order to exercise 
power over broadcasting and journalism for the higher purpose of main-
taining the Chinese socialist spiritual civilization. Members include 
propaganda officials, members of the politburo, the director of the central 
television channel (CCTV) and two vice-ministers (Keane 2001).  
The main task of the Propaganda xitong has been to shape the values 
and perspectives of the population (Cheek 1989). Within this conception 
of state-society relations, the value of information depends on its pur-
pose, as the public’s access to information is not seen as being of value in 
itself. Because of this, the Chinese propaganda system has distributed 
information on a need-to-know basis. Beginning in 1949, the Chinese 
media was divided into two channels, one open channel to communicate 
to the public, and one internal channel directed at party cadres. The in-
ternal publications included both domestic and foreign news, as well as 
scientific journals, works in translation and restricted-circulation films. 
The open media consisted of radio and newspapers and magazines that 
were distributed through the postal system and subscribed to by work 
units. The post office had catalogues of the different publications where 
some could normally not be subscribed to outside of special areas, and 
others could only be bought if the person had a certificate or letter from 
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their work unit, explaining the need. Most publications, such as local 
periodicals, specialized journals and in-house media organs were not 
mentioned in the catalogue, so unless a person belonged to the targeted 
audience, (s)he would not know of its existence (Nathan 1985). A well 
equipped work unit’s reading room could offer a broad variety of news-
papers and magazines, including all provincial papers, because the 
workers came from all over the country. Ordinary work units probably 
had less variety, but a subscription to the People’s Daily was a minimum. 
In the countryside, rural communes and production brigades normally 
subscribed to one or more publications. Because of this system, the num-
ber of readers was several times higher than the actual number of sub-
scriptions. Individual subscriptions were not common (Nathan 1985). 
The propaganda system not only controlled access to information, it 
was also heavily involved in the mediation and perception of propa-
ganda. Party-state authorities organized urban citizens into political 
study groups. Most groups were organized by their respective work 
unit(s), but retired workers joined groups in their residence unit (Lieber-
thal 1995). The study groups met for an hour, one to six times a week. 
The study material was mainly newspapers. A typical session focused on 
an article that was read aloud and then discussed in small groups (Na-
than 1985). The study group system, and the reading rooms in the units, 
provided an infrastructure for the propaganda that ensured that the 
views of the CCP reached the whole population. Today, a substantial 
percentage of subscriptions to the People’s Daily still come from state insti-
tutions (He 2004). Propaganda was an integrated part of a system for 
mass mobilization that incorporated society into the party organization 
itself. Walder’s (1986) seminal analysis of work and authority in Chinese 
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industry describes how rewards such as bonuses and promotion were 
linked to the individual’s performance in the study groups. Activists who 
took a leading part in organizing meetings, writing posters and perform-
ing self-criticism were more likely to move upwards in the system. The 
close integration between party-state and society meant that propaganda 
was consumed in closely monitored circumstances. People’s reactions, 
their abilities to interpret and reproduce propaganda in an approved 
manner were linked to economic and material benefits.  
Nathan (1985) divides the recipients of Chinese propaganda into three 
groups based on their attitudes towards information: the acceptors, the 
sceptics and the decipherers. The acceptors often belonged to work units 
with poor media facilities. They received the news in an indifferent man-
ner, not believing that it had to be true, but their doubt did not lead them 
to question the information in itself. They simply believed that the news 
was the information the Party wanted them to have, and getting by in the 
study sessions was enough for them. The sceptics, on the other hand, dis-
trusted the news and took a critical position towards the propaganda. 
They cared more about identifying the truth, and as they felt alienated 
from the official media, they did not believe that the truth could be ex-
tracted from it. They viewed the news as an element in a political strat-
egy, for instance that the news had been selected to show that commu-
nism was good. Some emphasised the distance between their own ex-
periences and the propaganda they received. When the newspapers re-
ported on another great harvest, it simply did not match the experience 
of worsening living conditions. Others uncovered the reality behind the 
system of model units when they experienced that their unit became a 
celebrated model unit, not because of its unique achievements, but be-
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cause of support from higher central officials. When the propaganda ma-
terials insisted on a certain opinion, it made the sceptics critical because 
they assumed there was a hidden agenda covering up the spectre of al-
ternative opinions. The third group of media receivers doubted the truth-
value of propaganda, and then went further, actively searching for alter-
native explanations. The decipherers normally had access to more varied 
media resources. They attempted to decode the official propaganda, and 
in so doing they consulted other available sources such as foreign radio, 
internal media and rumours. Voice of America, BBC, Radio Moscow and 
other foreign radio stations were available in China on short wave radio, 
and they provided news about China as well as foreign news. Rumours 
and jokes helped to fill in the holes in the official narratives. Stories about 
the political leadership were interpreted into traditional folk culture, such 
as the story-telling tradition and the Chinese operas. In addition the deci-
pherers used interpretative techniques quite similar to those of the West-
ern Pekingologist, such as looking for missing standard phrases, and 
looking for changes in photographs. Other revealing signs could be de-
tails in the reports, for example when the media mentioned premier 
Zhou Enlai’s 16-hour working day, this worked as a denial of rumours 
that he was sick. Nathan (1985) found that the decipherers did not neces-
sarily oppose the strictly controlled media situation. They sometimes 
accepted what they saw as the state’s need to control information, while 
continuing to look for the stories behind the propaganda. 
The propaganda work was most intense during the mass political 
campaigns and one of Nathan’s (1985) interviewees explains that he stud-
ied the news most intensely when a political movement was gearing up. 
In interviews with Chinese emigrants Nathan asked a question that was 
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meant to indicate a possible connection between the habit of reading 
newspapers and a sense of social responsibility. The question was: Some 
people say that even if a person is not very interested in politics, he or she still 
has an obligation to pay attention or get involved. What do you think? (Nathan 
1985:170). The Chinese interviewees interpreted this question in a sur-
prising way and their answers showed that not staying informed was 
associated with danger. It was dangerous because you could say some-
thing wrong, so staying informed was not a way of involving yourself in 
politics, but a way of keeping out of politics. 
Today, there are no longer compulsory study groups in the workplace, 
and the marketization of the Chinese media has caused profound 
changes in media production, distribution and consumption (de Burgh 
2003b, Lee 1994, Lee 2000, Tang 2005, Zhao 1998). Newspapers are partly 
financed by advertisements, they are sold at newsstands and read in pri-
vate homes. However, the dominating institutions of the propaganda 
infrastructure still remain, and information continues to be distributed on 
a need-to-know basis. The changes that are occurring in the Chinese me-
dia, and in the relations between state and society, are developing in rela-
tion to the existing propaganda system. Importantly, this means that 
these changes must be negotiated in relation to a hegemonic discourse 
which states that information should serve the state’s interests, since only 
the state is able to take the greater good of the population into considera-
tion (Keane 2001). The propaganda discourse is still built on the notion 
that information needs to be controlled to protect the stability and well-
being of the country.  
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THE CHANGING POLITICAL ROLES OF THE CHINESE MEDIA 
Analyses of state-society relations have often been conducted in opposi-
tional terms, where a strong state presupposes a weak society and vice 
versa. Popular Western representations of state-society relations in China 
tend to portray the Chinese state as omnipotent, as a totalitarian state 
versus a powerless society. This discourse peaked during the Cold War, 
when individual freedom was seen as non-existent in China. During the 
1980s, new approaches to Chinese politics began to emphasise the poten-
tial of civil society. The civil society debate conveys a normative separa-
tion between state and society, and the existence of civil society within 
authoritarian states is conceptualized as a sign indicating the transition to 
democracy is underway (Keane 2001). In the debate on the emergence of 
a civil society, the notion of China as totalitarian was challenged, but due 
to its normative limitations, this literature did not manage to capture 
complexity of Chinese state-society relations (Gries and Rosen 2004). The 
applied concepts were exported from Western liberal democratic contexts 
and from the eastern European transition experiences, where the cultural 
activities of civil organizations were crucial for the popular mobilization 
against authoritarian regimes (Keane 2001). A general problem of analy-
ses of the relations between state and society is a tendency to conceptual-
ize the state as monolithic, and this is particularly so in authoritarian con-
texts. A more productive approach to state-society relations can be 
achieved through an analysis of how people in different contexts meet 
quite different versions of the state (Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava and 
Véron 2005). The Chinese state has many faces, and in the years since 
Mao’s death in 1976 state-society relations have undergone a transforma-
tion. The most fundamental change is probably the decrease in the state’s 
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presence in people’s everyday lives, but institutional reforms have also 
had a profound influence on state-society relations. 
Since 1976, there has also been a fundamental reorientation within 
Chinese politics. Representations of this reform process often start out 
with the observed changes within the economy, and focus on the paradox 
that China has managed to reform its economy without changing its po-
litical system. The inherent assumption is that economic liberalization is 
to be followed by political liberalization. Lagerkvist (2006) also identifies 
this tendency in scholarly work on China. Within the media field, it is 
reflected in the argument that the Chinese media is in a transitional stage, 
on its way to a more independent status. Contrary to this expectation 
Lagerkvist (2006) finds that increased control and increased freedom 
seem to go hand in hand in the regulation of the internet in China. In 
other words, the Chinese context does not live up to the expectations of 
the civil society perspective, but does this imply that there has been no 
substantial political development during the period of economic reform 
which began in the late 1970s?  
The tendency to underrate changes within the Chinese political sphere 
may be due to Western observers’ application of an overly narrow defini-
tion of political reform. Montinola et al. (1995) argue that China has gone 
quite far in a process of political decentralization, and characterize the 
result as a Chinese-style federalism. This process has provided the eco-
nomic infrastructure that has been necessary to move away from the 
planned economy, and to sustain high economic growth since the begin-
ning of the 1980s. The decentralization process has transferred political 
power from the central state to the local levels of the state. Parallel to this 
process, there has also been an ideological shift towards a pragmatic 
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market-oriented discourse, and the economy has opened up towards the 
international markets. All in all, this makes it difficult for the central state 
to reverse the process of political decentralization. While offering a valu-
able contribution which establishes that political changes in China are 
indeed for real, Montinola et al.’s solution of labelling these changes as 
being ‘Chinese-style’ can be problematic. Explanations of social phenom-
ena that emphasise ‘Chinese characteristics’ do not really delve into the 
power relations and processes that characterize these phenomena, but 
only label them as different from their Western counterparts (Keane 
2001). As in every case, political processes in China have to be ap-
proached as contextual; for this purpose, a more nuanced vocabulary is 
needed. 
The reform process initiated under Deng Xiaoping has changed the re-
lations between state and society in China. In the 1980s, the legitimacy of 
the state was no longer sufficiently anchored, as Maoist ideology was 
challenged by the economic reforms. New sources of legitimacy had to be 
found. Some observers of Chinese politics have pointed to nationalism or 
patriotism as the replacement for Maoism (Bøckman 1997, Unger and 
Barmé 1996), while others have emphasised the Chinese state’s ability to 
‘deliver’ economic growth as the major source of state legitimacy versus 
society. However, since decentralization has allocated power away from 
the central authorities and the responsibility for the economy is more 
dispersed, Shue (2004) argues that the central state cannot claim direct 
credit for economic growth. Instead, Shue suggests that continued social 
stability serves as the main source of state legitimacy in China today. Sta-
bility is perceived as a key factor in the maintenance of the conditions 
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necessary to provide economic growth and development, and to provide 
this stability is the pre-eminent role of the state.  
When the basis of the state’s legitimacy changes, it influences the rela-
tions between state and society, creating a new opportunity structure for 
existing state institutions. For instance, O’Brien (1994) shows how depu-
ties to the Chinese People’s Congresses have increasingly taken on new 
roles compared to their previous practices. They used to be restricted to 
communicating the main state policies to their local constituencies, but 
over the course of the reform period they have begun to act as advocates 
for local interests and have become more susceptible to local views. 
O’Brien’s work shows how the established institutional set-up may as-
sume new roles and contribute to changes in the existing power relations. 
This is the broad context within which the three following chapters are 
placed. They address changes in Chinese media practices that involve a 
new institutional role for Chinese journalists which transcends the limits 
of the previous propaganda role.  
Summing up 
This chapter has provided an outline of main aspects of China’s institu-
tional structure and the position of the propaganda apparatus within it. 
The Chinese party-state was originally constructed as an interventionist 
state that encompasses most aspects of society. During the period of eco-
nomic reform, there has been a roll-back of the state, but the absence of 
clear boundaries between state and society remains a characteristic of the 
party-state. The propaganda system illustrates how the party-state regu-
lates society through institutions on every geographical level. Propa-
ganda does not have the same negative connotations in Chinese usage as 
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in English, and party-state authorities conceive of propaganda as means 
of guiding and educating the population. Since readers actively interpret 
perceived messages, this intention is not always mirrored in people’s 
perception of propaganda. During the last three decades, state-society 
relations in China have undergone profound changes, first and foremost 
in the economic sphere, but also politically. In the next chapter, these 
processes of reform will be addressed through an examination of changes 
within the media field. 
 Chapter 5: 
Diversifying media practices: the changing 
political roles of Chinese journalists 
In established democracies, the media constitutes a sphere which links 
state and society. Media discourses shape audiences’ perceptions of a 
broad range of topics, ranging from mundane, everyday problems to 
election campaigns and governments’ performance (Curran 2005). An 
independent media is conceptualized as a precondition for a functioning 
democracy, because it serves as a check on government, ensures open-
ness, and channels information between different parts of society (O’Neil 
1998). A consequence of the emphasis on independence is that ownership 
becomes the main indicator of the media’s potential as a democratizing 
force in the state-society relation. It follows from this that the political role 
of media in authoritarian states is understood as depending upon its 
autonomy. This chapter seeks to nuance this understanding of the me-
dia’s role within an authoritarian one-party state. As argued in chapter 2, 
the media’s discursive and social practices are important in evaluating 
the media’s political role in society. In China, state ownership has not 
prevented the media’s role from changing during the process of eco-
nomic reforms underway since the beginning of the 1980s. The objective 
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of this chapter is to delve into the question of the media’s practices and 
their political implications within the Chinese context. In order to do so it 
addresses the following question: What are the political roles of the Chinese 
media? The Chinese media has not abandoned the political role assigned 
to it during the Mao era (1949-1976). Instead, it has accumulated addi-
tional roles during the post-Mao economic reform process. The result is a 
situation marked by tensions and paradoxical practices. The Chinese 
mass media simultaneously acts as a mouthpiece of the party-state, a 
market economic media business and a critical, investigative social actor. 
Each of these practices has political implications. This approach opens the 
way for answers that are more ambiguous, essential for capturing the 
complexities which characterize the media’s role in authoritarian states. 
The first part of the chapter analyses the foundation for the media’s 
role that was established in the Mao era, and how the transition to a more 
market-oriented economy changed media practices. The second part 
deals with the emergence of a more critical, investigative journalism 
within the Chinese media field. The central questions discussed in this 
part of the chapter are how critical journalists establish themselves as a 
natural part of Chinese media, whether critical journalists take a role as 
independent watchdogs, or if they rather continue to serve the govern-
ment, albeit in new ways. Finally, the new discursive practices of critical 
journalists are analysed to show how they both relate to the established, 
hegemonic role of Chinese media and yet strive to change it. 
FROM MOUTHPIECE TO MARKET: THE INSTRUMENTAL ROLE OF THE MEDIA 
The Chinese media has undergone profound changes during the period 
of economic reform, but its institutional structure retains many of the 
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characteristics from the political role assigned to the media in the Mao 
era. During the formation of the People’s Republic of China, the media 
was moulded into the party-state structure (Chang 1997, Cheek 1989, 
Lynch 1999, Nathan 1985) as part of the CCP’s propaganda system. The 
main task assigned to the media by the CCP was to propagandize party 
policies and assist in the rectification of the party (Cheek 1989). In order 
to succeed in its revolutionary project, the party needed to understand 
the views of the people, and it depended on the media to help it obtain 
this oversight (Liebman 2005). This meant that media served a particular 
function within the party, as well as mediating between the CCP and the 
people.  
The 1950s were the first time in the history of China that every indi-
vidual could be reached through the media network. The media was a 
bridge between the new state and its citizens, and it had a central posi-
tion in conducting ‘thought work’ (sixiang gongzuo) (Liebman 2005, Na-
than 1985). Controlling information flows and structuring the symbolic 
environment were the central components of thought work (Lynch 1999). 
For this purpose, propaganda was necessary. As mentioned in chapter 4, 
CCP discourse defined propaganda in positive terms, as politically cor-
rect information. The party took responsibility for protecting people 
against wrong and misleading information, and for providing people 
with the necessary political skills through educational journalism (Cheek 
1989). Within this paternalistic discourse, newspapers were construed as 
essential in the process of constructing the nation. This made an instru-
mentalist conception of the political role of the media predominant. In a 
speech to the editorial staff of a party paper in 1948, Mao stated that the 
“role and power of newspapers consists in their ability to bring the party 
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program, the party line, the party’s general and specific policies, its tasks 
and methods of work before the masses in the quickest and most exten-
sive way” (Nathan 1985:154).  
As in most countries, Chinese media policy was framed in a discourse 
about the public interest (Keane 2001). The Maoist idea of the public was 
connected to an image of society as a totality in which all relationships 
were changeable. Within this totality, culture was a means to be utilized 
in the education of the public, and public interest was “recognized as the 
maintenance of collective morality and obligation rather than an individ-
ual’s constitutional rights” (Keane 2001:789). In principle, the Chinese 
media was not intended to be an oppressive, top-down propaganda 
channel. Maoist ideology considered the party to be the representative of 
the people’s government, so the party’s mouthpiece could simultane-
ously be the mouthpiece of the people (Lee 1990). This harmony-oriented 
conceptualization of the state-society relation assumes that the members 
of the proletariat have a common interest, and that the party is the articu-
lation of the interest of the people. In this context the media’s role is to 
ensure this unity between the party and the people. 
The instrumental notion of the media’s role meant that media content 
was evaluated according to its potential function in the construction of a 
new society. The problem was that the central tasks outlined by Mao could 
easily contradict one another. The first task, communicating party poli-
cies, was conducted through the distribution of propaganda, but the sec-
ond task assigned the media a role in the rectification of the party. This 
established the media as one of several supervisory channels that could 
receive complaints and grievances from the people (Liebman 2005): the 
media should serve the people, not only through propaganda, but also by 
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keeping them informed and exposing abuses of power. This resulted in a 
two-faced role where in addition to the media’s propaganda function the 
media was conceived as an arena for criticism and self-criticism through-
out the party. The critical function was considered to be necessary in or-
der to avoid bureaucratism and to secure democracy (Nathan 1985). The 
CCP encouraged reporters to write what they saw, because the party was 
relying on this information. The media’s investigations could serve as a 
check on tendencies among lower level officials to overrate positive re-
sults and underestimate local problems (Liebman 2005).  
In theory, journalists were expected to combine their role as propa-
gandists with critical, investigative reporting. Service to political authori-
ties and service to the public were conceived as two sides of the same 
coin, something that could be recited in the same breath (Polumbaum 
1990). In practice, the two aspects of media’s role were not equally val-
ued, and the critical, investigative practice was strictly restrained. CCP 
leadership decided that critical reports should only be published if they 
were of immediate benefit to the party’s interests (Nathan 1985). General 
secretary Liu Shaoqi stated that “to report everything is objectivism” and 
hence opposed to Marxism (Nathan 1985:155). Rather than contributing 
to the rectification of the party, reports exposing flaws and malpractice 
were considered potentially harmful, and held back from the public. In-
stead, the CCP wanted a focus on positive news and educational content 
that would contribute to their overall political project. The party estab-
lished a guideline stating that the amount of critical, or negative, news 
should not exceed 20% of the media content (Lee 1990). News was not 
evaluated according to its perceived importance, but according to its po-
tential effect. The mouthpiece conception of the media’s role and the dis-
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tinction between positive and negative news are legacies that still shape 
the working conditions of Chinese media (Interview, Xu Feng). 
The solution to the inherent conflict between the propagandist role 
and the investigative role was to establish two different channels to sepa-
rate them. In addition to the open media directed at the public, there was 
an internal media channel through which negative reports were pub-
lished. For journalists, the parallel media channels involved two main 
assignments: producing propaganda, and doing investigative work such 
as revealing the masses’ reactions to party policies and reporting on local 
mismanagement and corruption (Hsiao and Cheek 1995). The dual sys-
tem was a solution with roots stretching back to the period in which CCP 
was fighting a civil war against the Nationalist Government. In 1931, the 
communists established the Red China News Agency, which was later 
changed to Xinhua (New China) News Agency. The agency established a 
twofold practice, under which it transmitted CCP news to the outside 
world, and used army radio to collect information from outside. These 
became known as Reference News (Cankao xiaoxi), and were distributed 
to party leaders (Zhao 1998).  
Under Mao, the internal channel made it possible to utilize journalists’ 
role as providers of information, without risking tarnishing the image of 
the party in the population. The internal media provided the authorities 
with reliable information about the situation of the masses, their attitudes 
and problems, as well as constituting a channel for political feedback 
depicting the results of CCP policies (Hsiao and Cheek 1995). Hood 
(1994) states that notwithstanding the belief that totalitarian regimes are 
indifferent to public opinion, Chinese leaders have been particularly sen-
sitive to grievances and complaints among the population, due to the lack 
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of a stable institutional outlet for their frustrations. Journalists’ accounts 
were deemed as being more reliable than intra-party reports and investi-
gations conducted by the party leadership. The internal channel also of-
fered a possibility for receiving news from abroad that was judged to be 
incongruous with party-state interests. For instance, the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union was a topic that was carefully covered in the internal 
channel, while the general public received little information (Hood 1994).  
In Chinese the term for internal news is neibu cankao, often only 
called by its abbreviation neican. In English this is translated as ‘internal 
reference material’. The term ‘reference’ indicates that the material has 
not been subjected to ideological control, which means that nobody has 
to take personal responsibility for presenting the news (Nathan 1985). In 
the Soviet media, there was a parallel practice where newspaper articles 
consisted of two parts. The first part contained the ideologically ap-
proved representation followed by the word odnako (however) that sig-
nalled the introduction of new content that had not yet been adjusted in 
relation to the ideologically correct news representation (Neumann 2001). 
In China, internal reports are graded according to their content and dis-
tributed on a need-to-know basis (Hood 1994). The most classified re-
ports are produced by Xinhua and are only circulated among the top 
leadership (Liebman 2005). In today’s China, the internal channel contin-
ues to be important and internal reference news are published by all the 
top media. In general, journalists are said to spend around 30% of their 
time on internal reports (de Burgh 2003b). The maintenance of the two-
channel system means that information continues to be distributed ac-
cording to an individual’s place in the party-state hierarchy, contributing 
to an information gap between the general public and its leadership. 
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Despite the two-channel structure that separated propaganda from 
investigative and critical reports, the tension between the media’s role as 
a top-down propaganda channel and its role as a channel for public su-
pervision has remained latent in Chinese politics. Since Mao’s death in 
1976, there have been several periods where the mouthpiece function has 
been challenged by more extensive critical reports being published 
within the open media for a time. This tension was evident in the early 
1980s when the main party mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, published 
new and ground-breaking investigative journalism. Deng Xiaoping had 
appointed Hu Jiwei, a respected party member, as editor in chief for the 
People’s Daily in 1978. Hu firmly believed that an editorial policy that 
excluded the voice of the people was mistaken (Jernow 1999). His ambi-
tion was to create a newspaper that presented diverse views, including 
the negative aspects of the Chinese society. Therefore in 1980, eight 
months after the oil rig in the Bohai Bay had sunk, killing 72 people, Hu 
decided to publish a report (de Burgh 2003b). Up until that time, acci-
dents in general were only reported in the internal media. The People’s 
Daily also exposed the real situation behind some of the state propa-
ganda, such as model people’s communes that turned out to be less ideal 
than the propaganda representations had depicted (Jernow 1999). Such 
reports suggested a new kind of political accountability, where the party-
state was openly confronted with its weaknesses. The paper’s exposure of 
the Bohai accident led to the resignation of the minister of petroleum, and 
pointed towards the political power of critical journalism (de Burgh 
2003b). 
The 1980s was characterized by power struggles within the CCP lead-
ership and conflicts between reformers pushing for more openness and 
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conservatives resisting it (Hamrin 1994). When the conservative faction 
gained power, Hu Jiwei’s views came to be considered as dissident and 
threatening and he was forced to resign during the Anti-Spiritual Pollu-
tion campaign in 1983. During his time as editor, the People’s Daily had 
increased its circulation to a height of 7 million, proving that the change 
of editorial policy was popular (Liu 1990). After Hu Jiwei was removed 
from this position, he continued to be a central voice in the debate about 
media’s role in China.  
A new upsurge in investigative reporting came in the late 1980s. At 
the forefront was the World Economic Herald which became known for 
articles written by critical intellectuals on politics and the economic de-
velopment. The paper was innovative, using interviews – which was a 
relatively new genre in Chinese media in the 1980s (Li and White 1991) – 
and it expanded the scope of the issues that were being debated in the 
open media. The World Economic Herald had close connections with the 
reformist faction within the CCP leadership, and was supported by Gen-
eral Secretary Zhao Ziyang. The paper’s editor in chief, Qin Benli, was an 
experienced journalist who knew how to argue with propaganda offi-
cials; this ability, combined with Zhao Ziyang’s political backing, ensured 
the paper a relatively free position (Zhao 1998). It has been debated how 
it was possible that such a critical paper was allowed to continue its pub-
lication. For several years, a group of leading Chinese intellectuals were 
allowed to speak their mind within the public sphere. The most likely 
interpretation as to why this was allowed draws on a notion of the Chi-
nese state as non-monolithic: the reformist faction of the CCP leadership 
found the World Economic Herald useful in propounding the reformists’ 
views of the policy decisions to be made for China’s future (Zhao 1998). 
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This means that the World Economic Herald was not tolerated due to the 
reformist faction’s wish for press freedom, but because the paper was 
continuing to fulfil the instrumental role the CCP ascribed to Chinese 
media, albeit for novel ends. This points to a more general pattern within 
the CCP leadership: although there have been people in high positions 
within the CCP who favour more press freedom, the reformist leaders 
have shared the traditional Maoist notion of the media’s mouthpiece role 
(Lee 1990). Besides, the criticism forwarded by Chinese intellectuals in 
this paper was balanced by their technocratic approach to economics and 
politics. This meant that the World Economic Herald never challenged 
the right of the elite to rule, and this position kept them in line with the 
views of the reformist faction of the CCP (Li and White 1991).  
Nonetheless the World Economic Herald was shut down in 1989. In 
the aftermath of the crackdown on the democracy movement on 4 June, 
1989, the media was object to severe criticism and rectification from the 
CCP leadership. Journalists had taken part in the demonstrations under a 
banner stating “Don’t believe us – we tell lies” (Hood 1994:41), and Gen-
eral Secretary Jiang Zemin considered the media to be an important ex-
planatory factor behind the “turmoil and rebellion” (Hood 1994:39). To 
the CCP leadership, the demonstrations proved that something had gone 
wrong with the media and its propaganda work, and the authorities 
needed to re-establish control.  
The mouthpiece role reflects the Chinese media’s position as an insti-
tution that is built into the party-state. Since the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949, the media’s predominant assignment has been 
to contribute to the ‘thought work’ of the nation, by spreading politically 
correct information. In addition to their role as propaganda producers, 
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journalists have also been required to provide the party-state with infor-
mation about the real conditions of the country. This double assignment 
has caused an inherent tension in the media’s political role, which the 
CCP has sought to resolve by through directing propaganda and more 
investigative news through separate channels. In spite of all the limita-
tions on the media’s practices inherent in the mouthpiece conception of 
the media, the notion that journalists have a responsibility to report to the 
political leadership about social problems and abuse of power is signifi-
cant for explaining the position critical journalism has acquired among 
Chinese media workers in recent years. 
ECONOMIC REFORM AND MARKET JOURNALISM 
The Chinese media’s integration into the party-state structure has been 
changed as a result of the economic reform process. Subsidies have been 
reduced, and market incentives now partly fill the space previously oc-
cupied by propaganda purposes (Huang 2001, Lee 1994, Lee, He and 
Huang 2006, Zhao 1998).When asked about their work, the journalists 
interviewed position their experiences within an over-arching narrative 
of transition: 
Before, our media was top-down, but during the few years there has been a 
great change that has taken place following the opening and reform of the 
country. The transformation has been the Chinese media’s movement to-
wards a market economy (…) the development of newspapers depends on 
catering to the readers’ demands, as the market economy does not request the 
flattering of anything, instead it wants to achieve the identification between 
newspapers and its readers.  
(Interview, Fan Yihong) 
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In almost every interview, this story was told as the explanatory back-
ground for the new content and practices within the Chinese media. This 
narrative of the media’s reform is structured around the meaning of 
‘now’ as opposed to the meaning of ‘the past’. The past/present distinc-
tion aligns media reforms with modernity, openness and the market 
economy, while the past is represented as backwards, without any ‘real’ 
journalism. In Fan Yihong’s narrative, the great changes within Chinese 
media are construed as a process of adaptation. The media has not 
changed its practices as a consequence of a new media policy, but be-
cause they needed to adjust to the introduction of a market economy fol-
lowing the opening and reform of China (gaige kaifang) which began after 
Mao’s death. The changes in the media’s practices in the direction of in-
creased sensitivity towards the audience’s interests have implications for 
the political role of the media. In Fan Yihong’s understanding, this re-
definition of what the purpose of media ought to be does not reflect a 
new assignment by the party-state authorities, but is the result of media 
adapting to new economic circumstances. 
Xu Feng, another experienced journalist, explains what he sees as the 
improvement of the media in China in recent years. He emphasises 
changes in ideas about the media’s role, changes in the financing of the 
media and new information technology as important factors . In his ver-
sion of the narrative of transition, he compares the transition to a more 
economic independent position for the media to a child’s gradually in-
creasing independence. The reduction in state subsidies is likened to 
weaning, and the requirement that media organizations earn their own 
money is compared to finding one’s own food to eat. The parent/child 
metaphor conveys an image of closeness, which makes media’s increased 
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financial independence analogous to the self-reliance of a child over 
whom the parents retain the final decision-making power. The par-
ent/child metaphor is also applied to other aspects of the development of 
Chinese media, such as the relation between mother-papers and their 
offspring. When the organic nearness of the parent/child relation is 
transferred to the media/state relationship, it positions the power of the 
state over the media as natural. 
When the journalists interviewed choose to frame their own experi-
ences within the greater narrative of the Chinese media’s transition from 
a planned economy to a market-oriented one, it is because these proc-
esses of change have been both extensive and fundamental. China’s eco-
nomic reform process has been characterized by a partial “roll-back” of 
the state and its replacement by the market. This caused a cut-back in 
state subsidies during the 1980s; media organizations were expected to 
generate their own income and in return were allowed to retain their 
own profits (Ma 2000). The reduction in state subsidies were unevenly 
conducted: the central party-press organs were protected, while media 
positioned on lower levels of the party-state were forced to cover their 
own expenses. However, the transition is not as clear-cut as it is often 
represented as being. Subsidies in the form of preferential taxation, land 
grants, free housing and occasional economic transfers have continued, 
and so does the practice of state office subscriptions (Lee et al. 2006). Un-
til the 1980s, newspapers were distributed through work units, and 
newspapers did not depend on circulation numbers at all. After the tran-
sition to the market, the central party papers, such as the People’s Daily 
and the provincial party papers, have continued to depend on subsidies 
and state office subscriptions (Lee et al. 2006). Other media have had to 
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search for new means of continuing publication after the source of state 
funding was cut off. This situation has contributed to a differentiation of 
Chinese media.  
In the market economy, individual subscriptions and circulation 
numbers became crucial for attracting advertisements, and this required 
saleability. Before the reforms began, newspapers for public consumption 
were four sheets of black and white print repeating well-known propa-
ganda phrases. But as Fan Yihong emphasises, the flattering of govern-
ment officials did not appeal to the new audience of individual media 
consumers, and the media was forced to begin to take into consideration 
what might make media products marketable. When journalists tell the 
story of changing media practices as part of a greater narrative of transi-
tion, it is also due to the enormous social changes which have been taking 
place during the same period. A more affluent middle class began to 
emerge, resulting in a growing demand for new media services (Zhao 
1998). The rise of a new labour market changed the media’s recruitment 
practices. In 1994, the internet was introduced in China, and the media 
has changed as it has adapted to this overall process of transition. 
The media’s new dependency on readers and advertisers had a pro-
found influence on the form and content of newspapers and other media. 
Appealing layout and colours fronted the print publications, and to 
achieve what Fan Yihong (Interview) called the identification of readers, 
newspapers and other media included topics they perceived as being 
relevant to their audience’s lives. On the radio, call-in-shows dealing with 
everyday life problems became common. In newspapers, columns dis-
cussing questions such as “how to raise your child” signalled a new sen-
sitivity towards readers’ interests. This also made the media more sus-
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ceptible to people’s grievances as well as making it appear as less of a 
top-down information channel. Entertainment journalism was another 
new feature, and news about movie stars and famous people became 
widespread (Huang 2001, Lee 1994, Li 1998, Zhao 1998). The necessity of 
appealing to readers also affected the evaluation of news. Under the 
mouthpiece role of the media, the timeliness of news was of less impor-
tance, since news too was evaluated according to its instrumental value 
in raising the moral and political level of the people. After the creation of 
a media market, news became one of the decisive factors in determining 
the outcome of the competition between media outlets. Old news did not 
sell papers, nor did long propaganda texts. The media adapted: journal-
ists started to write shorter pieces, and employed presentation techniques 
from the international media. 
The commercialization of the Chinese media led to an enormous ex-
pansion in the number of media outlets, from less than two hundred 
newspapers in the late 1970s to more than two thousand in 1997. In addi-
tion came the increase in TV and radio stations (Li 1998). This expansion 
was conducted through a diversification of the Chinese media, where 
new media outlets catered to specific segments of the audience, rather 
than to the people in general. The main party newspapers such as the 
People’s Daily and the provincial party papers continued to rely on state 
subsidies and remained party mouthpieces. However, they lost out to the 
privately funded newspapers in the competition for advertising funding, 
so to compensate for their inability to raise income, they established so-
called offspring papers. This enabled the party papers to retain the 
mouthpiece function, while the offspring papers could cater to readers’ 
interests, and offer softer and more marketable content. In the process the 
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media became “more attuned to business pressure and political de-
mands” (Lee et al. 2006:584, italics in original). This was the first step to-
wards the media conglomerates that dominate the Chinese media market 
today. Within the print media, conglomerates have been constructed 
around major party newspapers. The party-state’s aim in fostering the 
process of media conglomeration has been to bolster the national media 
in relation to foreign competition, and to retain control in the expanding 
media market. 
It is obvious that the transition from planned to market economy 
within the Chinese media sector was not a complete shift. While journal-
ists in the new media outlets focus less on politics and more on enter-
tainment and consumer-related information, they have not become po-
litically independent. Market-based publications have had to take politi-
cal interests into consideration, and the party-state’s mouthpiece organs 
have developed more profitable media products. This complex situation 
has led to a wide array of media practices, of which many are hybrid 
forms incorporating presumably contradictory elements. One example of 
this is the common practice of paid journalism within Chinese media. 
During the 1980s, it became commonplace for journalists to receive 
money for participating in press conferences and for publishing stories 
that reflected the interests of commercial actors (Zhao 1998). Advertisers 
often bought editorial space and presented their products in a manner 
that simulated the editorial content of the publication. When the distinc-
tion between advertisements and editorial content is removed, the result is 
advertorials (Erjavec 2004). Advertorials are attractive to advertisers be-
cause they believe that the editorial format lends more authority to the 
message conveyed than simple advertisements. The increased reliance on 
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the market rather than the party-state enabled the media to cater to the 
audience’s interests in a new way, but the phenomenon of paid journal-
ism points to a continuation of the role of journalists as advocates for in-
terests of those other than their audience. The mouthpiece role of the me-
dia presupposes political advocacy journalism, while under the more 
market-oriented economy, paid journalism made journalists advocates of 
commercial products and interests. The political mouthpiece role made 
media unable to be watchdogs over the political authorities, and paid 
journalism impeded their ability to be critical of business interests (Zhao 
1998).  
CRITICAL JOURNALISM  
The introduction of market incentives in the Chinese media challenged 
the mouthpiece role, because propaganda journalism was unable to com-
pete for the attention of buyers and advertisers. The creation of a media 
market led to more diversified media content, and entertainment and 
consumer information became central areas of interest. Among Chinese 
journalists, some considered entertainment to be the media’s most impor-
tant task (de Burgh 2003b). The media’s emphasis on entertainment and 
lifestyle information stimulated consumption by the emerging middle 
class, and supported the party-state’s economic policies. To be able to 
compete within this new media environment, the party mouthpieces es-
tablished offspring publications that could be bought by individuals, not 
only subscribed to by work units. For instance, in Shenzhen, the mouth-
piece organ of the special economic zone launched publications such as 
Hot Travel and Autonews (Lee et al. 2006). However, within the new 
media market, readers did not only yearn for entertainment, but also for 
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fresh news that was believable, and that represented reality in a different 
way than propaganda journalism did. This has been the basis of success 
for the Guangzhou-based newspaper Southern Weekend (Nanfang 
Zhoumo). 
Southern Weekend is part of a media conglomerate structured around 
the Guangdong Province Party Committee’s mouthpiece, the Southern 
Daily (Nanfang Ribao). The weekend paper was established in 1984, to 
cater to the taste of readers and to strengthen the party paper’s financial 
situation (Sun 2001). During the first ten years of its existence, Southern 
Weekend remained a local paper with limited circulation outside Guang-
dong province. Beginning in 1994 its circulation increased and it became 
a paper with national distribution and very high circulation. It became 
popular among educated middle class readers, mainly because Southern 
Weekend provided its readers with a new kind of investigative journalism 
that challenged the limits of Chinese media discourse. Investigative jour-
nalism (diaocha xinwen) is defined by its problem-oriented nature and is 
connected to media’s scrutinizing ability (jiandu nengli) (de Burgh 2003a, 
Zhao 1998). This was possible because the Guangdong province authori-
ties accepted Southern Weekend’s journalistic style. Guangdong’s provin-
cial Propaganda Department has been less strict than many others, and 
its leader from 1993 to 2000, Yu Youjun, became famous for easing re-
strictions on local media (South China Morning Post 17.03.06). Guang-
dong was among the first provinces to embark on the process of eco-
nomic reform, and the province authorities’ tolerance had been primed 
by the access to Hong Kong radio and TV for the Cantonese-speaking 
population in the province (Latham 2000). This had exposed both jour-
nalists and local government to a freer media.  
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After 1994, Southern Weekend became known for bringing new topics 
into public discourse and it gained its status as a ‘courageous’ newspa-
per. Its institutional culture made it stand out, and the paper employed 
editors and journalists who saw themselves as critical and investigative, 
and who wanted to break loose from the confines of propaganda journal-
ism. They adopted a watchdog conception of their own role as journal-
ists, and this critical approach to authorities, official truth and propa-
ganda interests brought the paper a great deal of grief. Its critical editors 
were subsequently replaced by former propaganda department employ-
ees, and after 2002, Southern Weekend no longer constituted the vanguard 
of the critical press in China (Interviews, Xu Feng, Ai Hongwen). Many of 
the journalists have moved on to new papers; some of them continue to 
work within the Southern Group, while others have taken up positions in 
national TV (CCTV) or other print organs. Nevertheless, the importance 
of Southern Weekend’s work remains undeniable, in that it has contributed 
to a new role for Chinese media, and it has been central in the articulation 
of new media discourse. This makes the journalists and discursive prac-
tices of Southern Weekend of particular importance to this study of condi-
tional autonomy of the critical press in China. 
REDEFINING JOURNALISTS’ ROLE 
The introduction of more entertainment journalism made the Chinese 
media field more complex, but it did not call into question the right of the 
party-state authorities to define what people should or should not know 
about. This challenge, on the other hand, has come from more critically 
inclined journalists who decline to be propaganda workers. Within the 
hegemonic Chinese media discourse, the mouthpiece role of the media 
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has been undisputed; it has defined propaganda as the normal, com-
monplace kind of journalism. Hegemonic discourses appear as natural 
and self-evident (Laclau and Mouffe 2001), and when new discourses 
challenge a hegemonic discourse, they are easily depicted as irrelevant, as 
being contrary to the public good or simply as subversive. A resistance 
strategy within a field dominated by a hegemonic discourse is to estab-
lish the counter-discourse as natural too. Critical journalists in China 
have chosen to make use of existing discursive elements and rearticulate 
the media discourse, in order to construe their own practice as legitimate 
and as conducive to the public good. 
When critical journalists have challenged the hegemonic understand-
ing of the media as the mouthpiece of the party, they have done so by 
establishing their own practice as professional. They represent themselves 
as loyal to the fundamental task of media outlined in the hegemonic 
mouthpiece discourse and do not construe critical and investigative jour-
nalism as an oppositional practice. Critical journalists align themselves to 
the basic conception of the mouthpiece role, which is to contribute to the 
interest of society; what they challenge is the notion of how this should be 
done. By focusing on social problems, journalists activate the media’s role 
as a channel for public supervision. This was an aspect of the media’s 
assigned task within the mouthpiece role, but became subordinate to the 
media’s propaganda mission. In their ambition to change Chinese jour-
nalism, critical journalists use aspects of the hegemonic discourse to rep-
resent their choices as legitimate. Simultaneously they make the mouth-
piece role of the media appear to be illegitimate, because it is a top-down 
channel that excludes the voice of the people. 
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For the journalists who worked for Southern Weekend, the wish to serve 
the public rather than the government is a defining characteristic. This 
identity reverses the top-down character of mouthpiece journalism, and 
critical journalists describe their own practice as real journalism, in con-
trast to propaganda. Their emphasis on serving the people changes how 
they see the relationship between journalists and government, and this in 
turn influences the critical journalists’ relation to the internal channel. 
Within the mouthpiece role of the media, investigative reports revealing 
social problems have always been communicated directly to the leader-
ship through the internal channel (de Burgh 2003b, Hsiao and Cheek 
1995). This excludes the general public, which the critical journalists see 
as their audience. Several of the journalists interviewed felt that writing 
stories that reach fewer readers, the better they are, is contrary to the 
whole idea of what journalism is about (Interview, Xu Feng, Zhao San-
peng, Ai Hongwen). To these journalists, their relation to the public de-
fines their profession, and they argue that their capacity to influence goes 
via the public’s knowledge and reactions. The media’s influence does not 
depend on a direct relationship between journalists and the state, but 
rather on the media’s relation to its public audience.  
The propaganda role of the media has meant that journalists in China 
have evaluated news according to how well it communicates politically 
correct messages on behalf of the party-state. This instrumental concep-
tion of news value is something critical journalists do not acknowledge. 
One interviewee explained that he looks upon journalism as a reflection. 
He thinks the journalist simply ought to describe what he sees for the 
public (Interview, Ai Hongwen). Another informant used a truck as a 
metaphor, saying that he looks upon himself as the truck that loads the 
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news and transports them to the public (Interview, Xu Feng). The idea 
conveyed by these two journalists is that the journalist is a neutral con-
ductor between incidents and the audience. They see the journalist as 
objective rather than as an actor that actively shapes attitudes. Within the 
mouthpiece conception of the media, objectivity has been a politicized 
term regarded as synonymous with reporting everything. This was un-
derstood to be in opposition to Marxism, because it undermined the 
propaganda function of the media (Nathan 1985). In international media 
discourse, objectivity is a defining characteristic for the professional iden-
tity of journalists. However, being objective is generally described as im-
possible within the academic research literature (Curran 2005, de Burgh 
2000c). Although academics view journalists as situated social actors re-
flecting the particularities of class, education, interests and dominating 
discourses, the notion of the journalist as a neutral and objective actor is a 
useful discursive means for critical journalists in China. It facilitates a 
representation of the professional identity of critical journalists as incom-
patible with the instrumental role the journalist is assigned within the 
mouthpiece role. It also distinguishes critical journalists from the practi-
tioners of other forms of advocacy journalism, such as paid journalism. 
When journalists construe professionalism in a manner that excludes 
mouthpiece journalism, they state that journalists taking bribes, or work-
ing for mouthpiece organs such as the People’s Daily, are not real journal-
ists (Interview, Xu Feng). This makes critical journalism stand out as 
more legitimate, and the only form of journalism that meets professional 
standards. 
When critical, investigative journalists express how being objective is 
fundamental to their work, it is not only articulated as an opposition to 
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propaganda, but also as the opposite of being subjective and biased (In-
terview, Shi Youli, Xu Feng). They represent subjectiveness as a common 
problem in Chinese media discourse. Chinese journalists often refer to 
anonymous sources, and not infrequently these represent the journalists’ 
own views in disguise. This is an inheritance from propaganda journal-
ism, for which the instrumental utility of the news story defines its im-
portance. Objectivity is also seen as connected to working methods, since 
listening to and reporting from both sides of a conflict make articles less 
biased and more objective (Interview, Xu Feng). Within propaganda 
journalism, there is never any doubt about right and wrong, nor any call 
for interpretation, since the general aim is to provide the public with po-
litically pre-approved information.  
Ideas about objectivity and truth are central in Western media dis-
course (de Burgh 2003b). When critical journalists transfer these ideas to 
the Chinese context, they confront an authoritarian one-party state that 
forbids independent media. Journalists choose discursive strategies that 
give concepts such as objectivity, truth and public service a content that is 
compatible with the context within which the journalists work. For in-
stance, Shi Youli says that as long as there are people willing to talk, criti-
cal journalists try to get as close as possible to the truth, but without vio-
lating rules and regulations. There is a discursive convergence with for-
eign conceptions of journalism among the critical journalists, but the dis-
course is modified and contextualized in order to fit into the existing 
framework. 
Within the hegemonic Chinese media discourse, the main reason for 
information control is the need to protect social stability (Lagerkvist 2006, 
Shue 2004). In the same way that critical journalists co-opt the notion of 
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serving the public by making it a defining trait of their own identity, they 
also take the hegemonic argument about protecting social stability and 
use it to carve out their own identity. Critical journalists argue that social 
stability can be threatened by ignoring people’s right to know. When 
accidents happen and information is withheld, rumours and panic are 
often the result (Interview Zhao Sanpeng, Xu Feng). This argument does 
not question the importance of social stability, only the means for achiev-
ing it. In a controlled political environment, it is not possible to openly 
challenge the hegemonic discourse on social stability. Stability is con-
ceived of as a main source of legitimacy for the Chinese party-state; to 
avoid negative consequences, journalists must accept social stability as a 
premise.  
While critical journalists do not challenge the idea that social stability 
must be protected, they emphasise violations of people’s right to know as a 
key source of public unrest and dissatisfaction. Human rights discourse is 
controversial in China, and is often represented as a cover for the imperi-
alist ambitions of the Western world (Sæther 2000). Using the phrase 
‘right to know’ (zhiqing quan), rather than freedom of expression, signifies 
a distance from international human rights discourse. Strategically, it is 
important that people’s right to know appears as a collective right, 
whereas freedom of expression can more easily be brushed aside as a 
liberal, individual right that must be subordinated to the need for social 
stability. The focus on people’s right to know can also be understood as a 
market discourse where people’s demand for information must be satis-
fied by the supply side, which is the media. The discourse of the market-
oriented economy is less politically sensitive than the human rights dis-
course, and is better suited for convincing the authorities to ease their 
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control over media content. Nevertheless, arguing for people’s right to 
know challenges the mouthpiece conception of media. For instance, criti-
cal journalists argue that the channelling of news through the internal 
channel is a violation of people’s right to know, as is the continuing me-
dia censorship of important incidents and problems. 
A central component of media censorship in China has been the divi-
sion between negative and positive news. The media has been required 
to restrict the amount of ‘negative’ news to maximum 20%, with the re-
maining content to consist of ‘positive’ news. Critical journalists perceive 
the positive/negative dichotomy as a means for media control, but they 
oppose it on the grounds that it is useless for the purpose of evaluating 
news value (Interview, Ai Hongwen). According to Xu Feng: 
The things that are newsworthy, and can be called news in China, are catego-
rized as negative news (…) That a public security official or a tax office do 
their job in a good manner, that is only normal, regular, and that cannot count 
as news. Dereliction of duty, crimes, that is news.  
(Interview, Xu Feng) 
The insistence on judging the importance of news on an independent 
basis brings critical journalists in China more in line with Western con-
ceptions of the media’s role. Western journalists in general believe 
strongly in their own objectiveness and autonomy and look upon them-
selves as tellers of the truth (de Burgh 2003b). In China, the media is pre-
vented from being independent from the party-state, but critical journal-
ists still emphasise their awareness of independence from other influen-
tial actors. In general, the Chinese media is part of an economy where 
corruption is an extensive problem, and journalists are frequently offered 
bribes. These so-called ‘red envelopes’ (hong bao, named after the enve-
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lopes used for wrapping money for children’s New Year’s gifts) can con-
tain up to tens of thousands of yuan on some occasions (Interview, Ai 
Hongwen). To critical journalists, refusing bribes protects their inde-
pendence. However, several journalists explained that on some occa-
sions, refusing a bribe cannot be done without ruining the entire story, 
but in those cases the bribes should be handed over to the newspaper 
(Interview, Ai Hongwen, Xu Feng, Fan Yihong). These ideas about inde-
pendence are adapted to the particular context critical journalists in 
China work within, but the refusal to accept bribes is still a signifying 
aspect of being a real journalist. For the newspaper Southern Weekend, the 
refusal to publish advertorials and to accept bribes has been a central 
aspect of establishing an identity as a newspaper that serves the public. A 
former editor was offered 300,000 yuan in advertisements in the early 
1990s if the paper would withdraw a critical investigation about a to-
bacco factory. The editor refused, and this act was then turned into a 
proverb: “Never think about money, think about the paper” (Interview, 
Fan Yihong). This sentence acquired a symbolic value for the journalists 
working for the paper.  
Critical journalists or newspapers such as Southern Weekend cannot 
claim to be autonomous. Their strategies to establish themselves as a 
natural part of Chinese media are characterized by partial opposition and 
partial loyalty to the mouthpiece role. Critical journalists relate to funda-
mental aspects of the mouthpiece conception of the media’s role, such as 
‘serving the public’, and ‘protecting social stability’, but modify these 
aspects through the formation of a new critical identity. Within this iden-
tity, people’s right to know, objectivity and independence are central dis-
cursive moments, and measured against these milestones, mouthpiece 
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journalists fall short. Critical journalists diagnose mouthpiece workers 
with split professional identities as partly government officials and only 
partly journalists. This is associated with the old-fashioned, closed society 
that China used to be. Critical journalism, on the other hand, is modern, 
and more in line with ideas of journalism abroad (Interview, Wu Yunlu). 
To critical journalists, professionalism is incompatible with cooptation as 
government officials. A central question then becomes whether or not 
critical journalists are able to be the independent watchdogs they identify 
themselves as being. 
GOVERNMENT MISSION OR INDEPENDENT WATCHDOGS? 
Given the critical journalists’ opposition to the hegemonic mouthpiece 
conception of the media’s role, one may wonder what has made the Chi-
nese party-state tolerate the development of critical journalism. As long 
as journalists stay within the rules that regulate their professional activi-
ties, are they really independent watchdogs? It is evident that critical 
journalists’ emphasis on serving the public does not make them equal to 
dissidents. The Chinese party-state accepts ‘public supervision’ (yulun 
jiandu). This “means acting like a watchdog, keeping an eye upon society 
and drawing attention to what the authorities may have missed” (de 
Burgh 2000d, de Burgh 2003b:111). On the other hand, the party-state 
does not allow independent media; but within Chinese political dis-
course, public supervision does not necessarily imply impartiality. It can 
be conducted on behalf of the state, and it can enhance the legitimacy of 
the state, because it makes it appear to be more responsive to the griev-
ances of the population. However, when critical journalists state that their 
loyalty lies with ordinary people (laobaixing) and not the state, they at-
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tempt to create freedom of movement for a role that exceeds the limita-
tions placed upon a government watchdog. The discussion below ad-
dresses this tension between critical journalism as a government-inspired 
mission and as an independent watchdog role by investigating the objec-
tives of critical journalistic practices. 
Zhang Ping is a senior journalist who has been engaged in investiga-
tive journalism since the 1980s. He has published several books, and has 
been particularly interested in rural China. When asked about his work 
and his motivation, he tells about a case he investigated that dealt with a 
woman in Shaanxi province who had her face destroyed by her husband. 
She had been forced to marry a man she disliked through an arranged 
marriage. Her husband was beating and mistreating her, and one day she 
ran away from home. He discovered where she was and forced her to 
return home. The next day the husband and two of his family members 
attacked her and poured acid over her head and body. She survived, her 
husband and his brother and sister-in-law were arrested, but they were 
released after only two days. It was the absence of a court case after an 
attempted murder that caught the journalist’s interest, and he went to the 
village to investigate the story. The story was confirmed, and he found 
out that the husband’s father had been a national model worker in the 
1950s, and he was still very respected and held a position as municipal 
vice major. This background protected the members of his family to the 
extent that they could even get away with attempted murder. 
To the journalist the story was interesting because it illustrated the 
more general problem of the absence of an independent judiciary. In this 
locality the judicial system was secondary to the political institutions, and 
this protected the criminals and resulted in injustice. Zhang Ping wanted 
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to show how this woman had been victimized in several ways. As a 
woman she was forced into a marriage where she was abused and her 
basic human rights violated. As a farmer she was poor and without the 
necessary connections to further her case. She had wanted to sue the hus-
band, but had not been able to make anything happen. As a citizen in a 
country where the judicial system is subordinate to the political system, 
her offenders could get away without being punished.  
This case of the disfigured woman falls within the category of critical 
journalism in China that is directed at exposing power abuse. Journalists 
assume a watchdog role when they publish such stories in the open 
press, but typically, cases such as the injured women in Shaanxi are lim-
ited to exposing singular instances of abuse of power at the local level of 
the state. In this case, investigative journalism caused a reaction and the 
culprits were punished. This can be interpreted as the journalist’s gov-
ernment-inspired mission: he conducted public supervision on behalf of 
the central state, and addressed a concrete problem that was later recti-
fied. However, as the journalist emphasises, there are many women like 
this victim. They are vulnerable as a result of systemic injustice, and al-
most powerless when the judiciary is corrupt and undermined by per-
sonal and political interests. The concrete, local case has a more systemic 
context dealing with social injustice and the failings of the judiciary sys-
tem; investigating this challenges the party-state’s legitimacy. 
From the late 1990s, cases of corruption and criminal behaviour 
among officials have regularly been disclosed (Interview, Xu Feng, Wang 
Yi, Fan Yihong). The journalist Ai Hongwen has investigated many such 
cases and says that his goal is to help the victims of corruption and abuse 
of power as best he can. He focuses on the individual victims of abuse of 
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power, and tries to use his own knowledge of law to compensate for vic-
tims’ lack of resources and fight back. He is motivated by his sense of 
justice and this inspires him to take risks and to ‘ferret out’ the hard-to-
find evidence in corruption cases. His hope is that his reports may influ-
ence higher levels of government to investigate and prosecute the crimi-
nals involved. Ai Hongwen portrays himself as playing an active role in 
revealing how public officials abuse their positions. There is a discussion 
among Chinese journalists as to how far they should take this role. One 
of the informants from a more heavily controlled news organization 
stressed that media should not act as the police or be a judge, and that 
other institutions are responsible for bringing forward evidence of crimi-
nal behaviour. This journalist confines the media’s role to reporting on 
cases after they are revealed (Interview, Feng Lihong). The difference of 
opinion between these two interviewees can be represented as one of 
degree rather than as a complete opposition. They both believe to some 
extent in the central party-state’s ability to deal with crime and injustice. 
Neither of them explicitly criticizes the systemic level. However, the will-
ingness actively to scrutinize abuses of power makes Ai Hongwen less 
likely to restrict his investigations to topics and circumstances approved 
by the party-state.  
In critical journalists’ accounts of their work, they place little trust in 
the authorities’ accounts of how and why things happen. Local govern-
ment officials in particular have an interest in protecting a positive image 
of the locality. The tendency of local officials to underestimate problems 
and exaggerate qualities of the locality was acknowledged as a problem 
during the Mao era, and has continued to the present day. This makes it 
less sensitive for journalists to approach problems at the local scale of the 
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state. Nevertheless, central authorities often support the local authorities’ 
version of reality, rather than protecting journalists’ investigations in lo-
cal matters. When local authorities refuse journalists permission to inves-
tigate an accident, they receive support from the central Propaganda De-
partment which communicates the message to all news organizations. To 
the extent that critical journalists limit themselves to investigating con-
crete problems at the local scale of the state, they can be seen as govern-
ment watchdogs. But local incidents also reveal systemic problems, and 
may therefore be seen as jeopardising national interests. That is why 
Southern Weekend journalist Xu Feng tries to act as quickly as possible 
when he decides to investigate a case. He talks to people and tries to find 
out what really happened. Even when the case he is working on is closed 
by the Propaganda Department, he believes in the importance of being 
present. To him it is important to know, even though he will not be able 
to publish a story. Perhaps, at a later stage, when the political climate has 
changed, he will be able to explain what really happened. Xu Feng’s be-
lief in the importance of being present is also indicative of his idealist 
convictions, in that he believes that his own journalistic practices can con-
tribute to a more just society.  
One story Xu Feng has not yet been able to tell concerns an explosion 
in a school in Jiangxi province in March 2001 where 42 children were 
killed. This was the beginning of a case that illustrated the importance of 
journalists’ presence on the scene of an attempt to cover up an incident, 
the tendency of local authorities to underreport problems and central 
authorities’ protection of local authorities in such circumstances. After the 
explosion, Xu Feng was one of several journalists to come. He soon dis-
covered that materials for making firecrackers had been stored inside the 
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school and had caused the explosion. He conducted interviews with local 
people, took photos of the deceased children in their homes, and in the 
place where their small, wooden coffins were made. People told him the 
children were making firecrackers for one hour every day that to make 
money for the school. It was being said that children’s small fingers were 
especially suited to this work and that a child could fasten a fuse in a fire-
cracker twice as fast as a grown-up. A local newspaper published a short 
report about the explosion, which mentioned the number of deceased, 
and stated that the reason was the production of firecrackers.  
From then on other interests decided the news coverage. The provin-
cial media reported the explosion, but said nothing about the cause apart 
from the fact that the circumstances were under investigation. As usual 
after major accidents, a local investigation committee was set up and was 
entitled to regulate journalists’ access to the area. It denied journalists 
further access, and the Propaganda Department spread the message that 
nothing was to be written about the case. Only the official news bureau, 
Xinhua, was allowed to publish news items about the accident. In the 
Xinhua report, the entire story was changed and the explosion was 
blamed on a madman. Allegedly, a lunatic had entered the school carry-
ing explosives and the police investigation was said to prove that the 
body of the man had been found and identified (Interview, Xu Feng, Shi 
Youli). This case exemplifies a typical procedure in which local authori-
ties decide to cover up a case and central authorities support this deci-
sion. The journalists who witnessed what had really happened challenge 
the authorities’ right to retouch history. Xu Feng’s photos are visual evi-
dence of what really happened, and he served as a kind of watchdog, 
even though he was prevented from publishing his story. 
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It must be admitted that the question of whether critical journalists are 
independent watchdogs or employed on government mission has a 
weakness. It furthers traditional binary thinking, and is too crude to cap-
ture the hybrid forms of journalism developing within the Chinese media 
field today. Journalists such as Xu Feng who are independent-minded 
and defy restrictions contribute to extending the parameters of what Chi-
nese journalists can do. Others do investigative work, but limit them-
selves to officially endorsed issues, or produce their stories for the inter-
nal channel. For instance, journalists at the Xinhua news agency continue 
to write internal reports that go directly to the political leadership (Inter-
view, Feng Junjiu, Wang Yi, Feng Lihong).To the extent that the objec-
tives of journalists are restricted to helping individuals who suffer from 
local authorities’ abuses of power, they do not explicitly question the le-
gitimacy of the central level of the state. On the contrary, the problems 
they address can contribute to making the government appear more re-
sponsive and compassionate. This has been a common argument about 
TV shows such as Focus (Jiaodian Fangtan), which only features problems 
that can be easily rectified and contributes to a positive image of the cen-
tral authorities (Chan 2002). In this sense, critical journalism can be seen 
as a continuation of the mouthpiece role of the media, as it serves a 
propaganda purpose. Finally, there are newspapers within party-state 
organizations that uncover important social issues, but they also have to 
uphold their role as a particular organization’s mouthpiece. 
A major problem inherent in combining the mouthpiece role with in-
dependent, investigative journalism is one of trust. Propaganda is de-
signed to provoke a specific reaction, while investigative journalism is 
defined by its problem-oriented content and by its methods. China 
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Women’s News (Zhongguo Funü Bao) is a paper which combines critically 
oriented news with traditional propaganda. The paper is the mouthpiece 
of the mass organization All China Women’s Federation. Its propaganda 
content consists mainly of pieces in which the local divisions write their 
accounts of what they have done in order to present a convincing and 
positive image of their own practice. The problem for the paper occurs 
when they want to put forward a more critical voice, because their con-
tinuing to promote propaganda content makes their real news harder to 
believe (Interview, Zhu Yang). The paper then depends on skilful read-
ers’ ability to separate between the typical patterns of the propaganda 
texts and freer and more real journalism. 
Another hybrid form of journalistic agency can be found in the con-
ception of the journalist as activist. To some journalists, the most relevant 
response when their capacity to influence through independent reporting 
is restricted, is to engage in politics as social activists. Seminars and meet-
ings offer a third channel, in addition to the open press and the internal 
channel. Meetings offer an opportunity to exchange views and to write 
reports and articles, and constitute a more direct way of influencing gov-
ernment officials (Interview Zhu Yang). For journalists to engage as activ-
ists within a mass organization is a way of engaging in advocacy on so-
cial issues without challenging the authority and legitimacy of the party-
state.  
The loyal critique is a genre with deep historical roots in China. To 
journalists, Liu Binyan exemplifies a person who has advocated press 
freedom without denouncing the party’s legitimacy. Liu Binyan was fa-
mous for his investigative reports exposing corruption and mismanage-
ment within the party. He was himself a loyal party member, but none-
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theless claimed that the CCP’s policies and practices needed to be im-
proved (de Burgh 2003b). However, Liu Binyan’s story also shows the 
fear within the CCP about the exposure of problems that cannot easily be 
addressed and rectified. Liu was expelled from the CCP because he wrote 
articles which claimed that party members could have opinions different 
from the party’s line or Mao. After the violent crackdown on the democ-
racy movement in 1989, Liu Binyan’s belief in the potential of the party 
was shattered, but in the article Press freedom: Particles in the air (Liu 1990), 
he expressed a strong faith in the Chinese people and its resistance 
against authoritarian and unfair rule. This shows the critical potential of 
investigative news. Even for the journalists who keep their work well 
within the limits posed by the party-state, their investigations raise their 
own and others’ awareness of problems and paradoxes within Chinese 
society. The ambition of the journalists who work for Southern Weekend 
has been to provide marginalized people with a voice, and to serve as a 
mediator between them and the authorities. This ambition is sympto-
matic of the aims of critical Chinese journalists. 
NORMALIZING CRITICAL DISCOURSE 
As a result of the development of more critical journalism within the 
Chinese media, the range of topics written about in the press expanded. 
This development challenged the hegemonic mouthpiece discourse, be-
cause it conveyed negative images of China and Chinese society. Social 
and environmental problems, grievances, crime and corruption were 
issues that had not previously been discussed within the open press, and 
making these topics part of the public sphere was contradictory to the 
mouthpiece media’s emphasis on positive news.  
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Critical journalists have tried to normalize their discursive and social 
practices by connecting them to aspects of the mouthpiece role, such as 
‘serving the public’. They acknowledge social stability as a discursive 
nodal point, but they argue that this is better protected by providing 
people with knowledge of the social conditions of the country, rather 
than keeping them ignorant and susceptible to rumours. However, social 
stability remains the benchmark against which critical discourse is meas-
ured. Fear of mass panic and protests constitutes one principal aspect of 
the limitation of critical discourse, and ‘the political’ comprises another. 
Everything that is defined to be within the vital interests of CCP is de-
fined as political; within the field of the political, the rules of the propa-
ganda system must be followed. This makes politics and the political 
taboo for critical, investigative journalism. 
The development and normalization of critical journalism in the Chi-
nese press has depended on discursive means to achieve representation 
for it as a legitimate part of the media. The category of ‘social news’ has 
been such a tool, and as such has been crucial for raising and promoting 
new issues in Chinese public discourse. Social news has been construed 
as clearly separate from politics. This category includes topics such as 
environmental disasters, corruption, violence against women, the per-
formance of the legal system, the health system and violations of consti-
tutional rights. The framing of these issues has made it possible to repre-
sent them as something apart from politics, and as not directly related to 
the government’s performance.  
From the mid 1990s Southern Weekend started to write more exten-
sively about social news. Fan Yihong explains that earlier, they had pub-
lished longer articles written by academics and authors in a supplement, 
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and these essays had proved popular and influential. Southern Weekend 
formed a group of their own journalists who started to look into the prob-
lems faced by ordinary Chinese, and the paper devoted more space to 
covering social problems. Fan says that the aim of Southern Weekend was 
to promote democracy and the legal system, and to do that they chose to 
focus on the situation of peasants, the unemployed and other weak and 
powerless groups in society. Seen from the outside, this is an explicit po-
litical objective, but within the Chinese media discourse, this aim was 
conducted under the heading of social news. This also meant that con-
cepts such as ‘democracy’ and ‘rule of law’ had to be given a content that 
did not challenge the rule or legitimacy of CCP. The way this has typi-
cally been done is by emphasising incremental, small steps towards more 
accountable and less corrupt social practices, while never questioning the 
legitimacy of CCP rule. 
Within these limitations, Southern Weekend’s articles nevertheless rep-
resented a new development within Chinese journalism, and readers 
considered its coverage of social problems to be brave and innovative. As 
previously mentioned in this chapter, the traditional/modern dichotomy 
is used to align investigative, bottom-up journalism with modernity and 
development, and to distance it from propaganda as traditional and 
backwards. In Southern Weekend journalists did the same within the cate-
gory of social news. Wu Yunlu explains that traditional, old-fashioned 
social news follows a set formula. For instance, when an accident has 
taken place, it describes how many people who were injured or killed, 
how serious the damage was and finally what the government has done 
to put things right again. He says that modern social news, on the other 
hand, breaks with this formula and describes problems that are not yet 
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resolved and problems that have more structural causes. Wu Yunlu’s 
explanation of the difference between traditional and modern social news 
is equivalent to the difference between the mouthpiece role of the media 
and critical journalism. However, Wu avoids terms that indicate opposi-
tion, instead choosing to present Southern Weekend’s social news as a 
natural part of modern media.  
In addition to Southern Weekend, other papers have also been central in 
developing new ways of reporting about social problems. China Youth 
Daily (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao) and Beijing Youth Daily (Beijing Qingnian 
Bao) have contributed to increasing Chinese investigative journalism’s 
critical capacity. China Youth Daily has been central in breaking a long-
standing taboo against reports about environmental disasters. Such re-
ports were not allowed in the reign of propaganda journalism, which is 
strange since they could not be blamed on the party-state. Gries and 
Rosen (2004) suggest that a possible basis for this taboo can be found in 
Chinese society’s Confucian heritage, in which environmental disasters 
could be a sign that the emperor was not fulfilling his heavenly mandate 
and that protests were justified. Another reason might be that within the 
high modernist project which constituted CCP’s transformation of China, 
man’s control over nature was a central aspect (Scott 1998), and admitting 
the existence of natural disasters could thus threaten the legitimacy of the 
ruling authorities. The first reports about environmental disasters in the 
Chinese media came during the 1980s. In 1987 Chinese media reported 
on a gigantic forest fire that started in Heilongjiang province and later 
spread to Inner Mongolia. It killed 200 people and left 50,000 homeless 
(Interview, Zhao Sanpeng). During the 1990s environmental news be-
came more common, but they remained contested and were not included 
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as a natural, unproblematic part of the news discourse. In a survey of 52 
major national and local newspapers from 1996, less than 0,5% of the 
press coverage was devoted to environmental news. Even within this 
tiny fraction of the general content, only a small part consisted of critical 
articles (Zhao 1998). Zhao Sanpeng explained that as late as in 1998 au-
thorities placed a ban on news coverage during a serious flood in Jiuji-
ang. The dykes were about to burst, but journalists were not allowed to 
write about it. China Youth Daily chose to defy the authorities and pub-
lished the story. This inspired the local paper to publish the information, 
something that was very important in informing the locals that they 
needed to evacuate. 
Another important topic that was introduced in Chinese news dis-
course as ‘social news’ was the recruitment system for the courts. In 1997 
a scholar from Peking University, He Weifang, wrote an article in South-
ern Weekend where he criticized the practice of employing retired army 
officials as judges. He argued that former army employees did not have 
any relevant qualifications and lacked an understanding of the inde-
pendence of the judiciary (Interview, Fan Yihong). The paper exposed 
and criticized malpractice within the Chinese judiciary by presenting 
concrete cases demonstrating the effect this practice had on people’s life. 
In order to represent the topic as legitimate, the paper emphasised how 
the disclosure of corruption within the judiciary was in the interest of the 
public as well as the party-state. The argument did not touch upon the 
lack of an independent judiciary, but only stated that corruption reduced 
people’s belief in the fairness of the judicial system. This made it possible 
for the party-state authorities to perceive this critique as limited and con-
crete. Together with the pressure generated by media attention, He Wei-
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fang’s article ended up being very influential. A few years later screening 
procedures in the recruitment of judges were established, judges were 
required to have a minimum level of education and had to pass a na-
tional examination. This has made it increasingly difficult for retired 
army officials to use a position as a judge as a means of increasing their 
personal wealth (Interview, Fan Yihong). 
The changes within Chinese news discourse during the 1990s did not 
only challenge the authorities’ conception of legitimate topics for the 
open news media. A topic such as domestic violence was met with resis-
tance, also within the media, because it was regarded as a social taboo 
and was looked upon as a marginal problem. In 1991, the female lawyer 
Pi Xiaoming published a “White paper on domestic violence”. Her publi-
cation was met with incredulity and Cai, Feng and Guo (2001) describe 
how the paper was received: 
When the article was presented to the chief editor of a major newspaper in 
Beijing, his reaction was, ‘Domestic violence? Is there violence in the family? 
What does that mean?’ His subordinate replied that it basically means physi-
cal abuse inflicted by husbands on their wives. The editor then asked: ‘Physi-
cal abuse? Do men nowadays beat their wives? Do you hit your wife?’ His 
subordinate said ‘No’. Then the chief editor turned to another assistant editor 
and asked the same question, again receiving the answer ‘No’. He therefore 
concluded, ‘You don’t hit your wife, he doesn’t hit his, I don’t hit my wife ei-
ther. This issue has no general applicability or interest.’  
(Cai et al. 2001:210) 
Domestic violence is a sensitive issue because it threatens the established 
discourse on gender relations in China. During the Mao era men and 
women were defined as equal, and news about violence within the fam-
ily did not reach the public. Even the term ‘domestic violence’ (jiating 
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baoli) did not exist, and to the extent violence within the family was rec-
ognized as a problem, it was linked with ignorant, uneducated peasants 
(Interview, Zhu Yang). When the white paper on domestic violence 
stated that domestic violence occurred in urban areas as well as in the 
countryside, and that it was quite common, editors did not want to en-
gage with it at first. The paper China Women’s News (Zhongguo Funü Bao) 
aimed to introduce a new discourse that would recognize discrimination 
against women as a social problem. The paper published a series of arti-
cles about domestic violence in 1996, served as a forum for discussion 
about domestic violence and received many letters from its readers (In-
terview, Zhu Yang). The paper succeeded in the sense that domestic vio-
lence became a more normal topic, and articles and discussions about 
domestic violence also appeared outside the women’s media to which 
China Women’s News belongs (de Burgh 2003a). The formation of a public 
discourse about domestic violence, and the resistance it was met with, 
illustrates how changes in Chinese media discourse during the 1990s 
were not only related to state-society relations and regulations. Patriarchy 
and gender relations within the media also contributed to the under-
standing of domestic violence as a marginal and sensitive issue. 
Summing up 
The CCP leadership has never officially redefined the political role of the 
Chinese media, and the hegemonic mouthpiece discourse of Chinese 
media still restricts what journalists can and cannot communicate to the 
public. The changes that have taken place in the organization of the me-
dia field and in media practices have evolved gradually. Today, the Chi-
nese media is diversified and characterized by a wide array of media 
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outlets offering products that cater to the interests of the audience. One 
aspect of this development has been the expansion in critical journalism 
within some media. The newspaper Southern Weekend has been particu-
larly important in this process. Critical and investigative journalism chal-
lenges the mouthpiece role of the media, while simultaneously adapting 
to a controlled media environment. Critical journalists utilize the tension 
between the propaganda and the informational aspects within the 
mouthpiece role of the media when they refer to serving the public as cen-
tral to their role as journalists. Critical journalists balance between inde-
pendence and loyalty, criticism and propaganda, but their journalism has 
nonetheless contributed to making social problems part of the Chinese 
public sphere. The naturalization strategies of critical journalists repre-
sent their journalism as a legitimate and necessary part of the Chinese 
media. Through this they contribute to redefining the political role of the 
critical press, so that it includes people’s right to be informed and the 
exposure of official power abuse and injustice. 
 
 Chapter six 
The polyphony of Chinese critical press discourse 
The post-Mao transformation of Chinese society has improved the living 
conditions of millions of people. But in the process of reforming itself, 
China has become one of the most inequitable countries in the world. 
Since the 1990s, there have been frequent protests where poor people, 
peasants and unemployed workers and others have voiced their griev-
ances and complaints (Shue and Wong 2007). The pace, the policies and 
the implementation of economic reforms in China are not unchallenged, 
and this has been an area of debate Chinese journalists have had to ap-
proach in a very careful manner. The human and environmental costs 
connected to the transition from a planned economy to a market econ-
omy constitute a highly sensitive aspect of the public discourse on the 
‘opening and reform’ (gaige kaifang) of China. By creating ways of reflect-
ing social problems and bringing new topics into public discourse, jour-
nalists seek to contribute to change. It is not possible to say whether or 
not the media’s focus on inequality and the pains of transition has influ-
enced the Chinese party-state authorities, but since the late 1990s the 
Chinese party-state has increasingly addressed the problem of deepening 
inequality (Shue and Wong 2007). 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the hegemonic role of the Chi-
nese media is to serve as the mouthpiece of the CCP. Accompanying this 
role is a set of limitations regarding what journalists can and cannot do, 
such as the requirement for 80% positive news. The mouthpiece dis-
course construes social problems as negative news, and these are sup-
posed to be limited in the open media. Critical journalism in China be-
comes what it is in relation to the mouthpiece role; and in critical dis-
course the mouthpiece discourse is present as a defining other. Its traces 
are evident in discursive adustment and in telling absences, and this con-
tributes to the polyphonic character of critical media discourse. The first 
part of this chapter investigates how polyphonic expressions come about 
in critical media discourse. The second part explores how social problems 
are presented through narratives about individuals’ suffering and mis-
ery. This is a way of conveying information about problems that evades 
the limitations placed on negative news by the mouthpiece discourse. 
The final section discusses the potential for criticism in the problem-
oriented articles under consideration, namely the following four articles 
from the newspaper Southern Weekend:  
• The strange disease (Guai bing), printed in Southern Weekend November 
11, 2000 
•  Three -year-old AIDS victim (San sui de xiao aizibingren), printed in 
Southern Weekend November 11, 2000 
•  Nine media houses sued for infringement of rights (Jiu jia meiti bei su qin-
quan), printed in Southern Weekend January 18, 2000 
• State-owned coal mines: difficulties beyond security (Guoyou meikuang: an-
quan zhiwai de kunjing), printed in Southern Weekend August 1, 2002 
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The first two articles appeared on the same day and both deal with the 
problem of AIDS. The strange disease is an investigative report about the 
spread of AIDS in Henan province and describes the causes and conse-
quences of an AIDS epidemic. Three -year-old AIDS victim recounts the 
history of a little girl who is an HIV carrier and whose mother died of 
AIDS. The third article, Nine media houses sued for infringement of rights, is 
an investigation of a corruption scandal in Heilongjiang province, while 
the fourth, State-owned coal mines: difficulties beyond security, discusses 
problems in the mining sector. Its starting point is a mining accident, but 
the main part of the article analyses the economic and political roots of 
the problems faced by state-owned coal mines.  
These texts illustrate some of the discursive characteristics of critical 
journalism in China. The manner in which these articles express causal 
relationships, align signs and create oppositions is not only a result of 
individual journalists’ choices and strategies. A newspaper article, or any 
text, is not a bounded entity conveying an original utterance. Through 
intertextuality, elements from different texts are combined, and any au-
thor will select elements from existing discursive repertoires (Fairclough 
1995). The articles I analyse in this chapter are long and complex texts, 
and they are well suited for illustrating how typical topics within the 
critical media discourse are represented in a polyphonic manner. The 
main reason, however, for choosing these four articles is that they pro-
vide a window onto a process of discursive structuration in which the 
texts are discursive actors.  
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POLYPHONIC REPRESENTATIONS OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
Recent developments within the Chinese media field have opened the 
way for more critical journalism and for a new media discourse that is 
making social problems part of the public sphere. The hegemonic politi-
cal role of the Chinese media is still defined through the mouthpiece dis-
course, and this restricts what critical journalists can and cannot write 
about. Nevertheless, critical journalism has expanded the range of topics 
it is possible to discuss within the public sphere, so a central question is 
how social problems are approached within critical media discourse? Within the 
context of the controlled, Chinese media, social issues must be framed in 
a way that makes them fall within the sphere of what is politically ac-
cepted. Interviews with critical journalists in China show that this is 
partly a conscious matter of evaluating possible consequences of their 
reports. However, their textual strategies are influenced and enabled by a 
Chinese discourse of critical journalism that reflects limitations imposed 
upon the freedom of expression. One of the characteristics of this dis-
course is the polyphonic mode of discussing problematic social issues.  
The term polyphony was used by the Russian writer and theorist Bak-
htin to describe the presence of many voices within the same text. He 
analysed Dostoevsky’s work and described the independent and conflict-
ing voices of the characters in his novels. The characters are not subordi-
nate to their author – their voices are as important as his – and the novels 
become dialogues between different characters (Bakhtin 1991). When this 
perspective is transferred from Dostoevsky and fictional literature to re-
search-based non-fiction texts, the different voices of characters become 
the different voices of the various perspectives in a text (Tønnesson 2001). 
Polyphonic narratives increase the number of ways a text can be read, 
174 The polyphony of Chinese critical press discourse 
because the relation between the different perspectives in the text is un-
defined. This complexity gives the reader an active role. Polyphony can 
contribute to making a text more interesting, but probably the most im-
portant advantage of polyphony in the critical media discourse in China 
is that it provides camouflage for critical messages. When critical journal-
ists break with the limitations built into the mouthpiece role of media, 
their resistance must be carefully formulated. When it comes to voicing 
opposition in the context of domination, Scott comments that “for good 
reasons, nothing is entirely straightforward here; the realities of power 
for subordinate groups mean that much of their political action requires 
interpretation because it is intended to be cryptic and opaque” (Scott 
1990:137). Subordinate groups typically insinuate their resistance in dis-
guised forms into the public transcript; one way this is accomplished 
within the Chinese media field is through polyphonic expressions that 
make texts open to diverse interpretations. As illustrated in Nathan’s 
(1985) work about the various decoding strategies employed in reading 
propaganda (discussed in chapter 4), the audience has played an impor-
tant role in interpreting and reading between the lines of propaganda 
journalism. People have often assumed that the truth was probably closer 
to a reversed or twisted version of the text that was presented to them 
(Ma 2000). The current diversification of the Chinese media continues to 
require an audience skilled at decoding different genres and their various 
purposes. Problem-oriented, investigative articles from Southern Week-
end are complex texts that combine different messages. This makes vari-
ous interpretations possible. Different readers, such as a critical, progres-
sive student and a conservative, responsible government official can read 
the same text, but because they relate in different ways to the various 
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voices in the text, their interpretations can remain divergent. This con-
tributes to disguising resistance and is a discursive strategy used by criti-
cal journalists in a controlled media environment.  
The tension between the media’s assigned role as the mouthpiece for 
the party-state’s ideological apparatus and the new media roles that have 
developed during the period of economic reform means that critical re-
ports must be carefully framed. The mouthpiece discourse is hegemonic, 
and the media must abide by its rules when reporting about political and 
sensitive issues. As discussed in chapter 5, the category ‘social news’ has 
been crucial for establishing a new and more critical media discourse, 
because the sign ‘social’ is construed as separate from ‘political’. Accord-
ing to the journalists interviewed, the marking of issues as ‘not political’ 
is perhaps the most important precondition for publication of critical is-
sues (Interview, Shi Youli, Ai Hongwen). One way of doing this is by 
including characteristics of propaganda discourse in critical, investigative 
reports. This polyphony contributes to a dialogue of voices between criti-
cal discourse and propaganda discourse. 
Polyphony is a way of creating meaning within one discourse through 
a dialogue with, or an awareness of, other discourses (Sletteland 2008). 
Bakhtin distinguishes between three types of polyphonic utterances. The 
first is expressions that imitate the style and characteristics of another 
discourse, in order to become as similar as possible. The second is expres-
sions that use another discourse, but for a different purpose than the in-
tentions inscribed in the original discourse. Contradictory intentions are 
played off against each other within the text, and the new discourse 
forces the old to serve another purpose than the one originally intended. 
Both imitations and parodies relate to the other discourse as a passive 
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voice, while the third form of polyphony is characterized by an active 
relationship with the other discourse. This category includes texts that are 
framed as being conscious of, and in relation to, the other discourse 
(Børtnes 1999). In the critical media discourse in China, the awareness of 
and relation to the propaganda discourse contributes to a polyphonic 
mode of expression. When critical, investigative reports are written with 
explicit or implicit references to the need to protect social stability, this is 
an example of an active dialogue between discourses. Børtnes (1999) ar-
gues that dialogic, linguistic structures are characterized by not being 
dominated by the intentions of their author, as the various discourses 
continue to forward their own, sometimes conflicting perspectives, 
within the same text.  
Critical journalism in China is mainly defined in relation to the propa-
ganda discourse, but is also in dialogue with entertainment and con-
sumer journalism. The inclusion of traits from the propaganda discourse 
within critical, investigative reports serves a double function. It contrib-
utes to confirming the hegemonic position of the mouthpiece role of me-
dia while simultaneously challenging the propaganda discourse. For in-
stance, when critical reports are framed according to a perceived need to 
protect social stability, this affirms the position of ‘social stability’ as a 
discursive nodal point. On the other hand, when critical journalists con-
duct critical investigations into state-sanctioned topics, they may exceed 
the intended limitations within propaganda discourse. This has been the 
case for reports about AIDS in Chinese media.  
In 1998 state ministries and agencies published a booklet titled “Ten 
key messages on HIV/AIDS prevention”, which was meant to be used as 
the basis for educating the general public about the topic through the 
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media. A year later, central media institutions were requested to focus on 
AIDS-prevention education as one of the major propaganda issues. This 
made AIDS a state-sanctioned topic, and included it as part of the me-
dia’s mouthpiece role (UNAIDS 2002). The inherent limitations in the 
mouthpiece role, however, requires that reports show the party-state in a 
good light and create a positive attitude in the audience. In the eyes of 
critical journalists, these requirements did not fit comfortably with the 
situation for AIDS victims in China around 2000. Even though the central 
authorities requested that information about AIDS should be provided 
through the media, journalists discussed how they should conduct this 
work while avoiding having negative sanctions imposed, because the 
problem under discussion was so serious (Interview, Fan Yihong). One 
discursive strategy employed for this purpose has been to respect the 
requirement of correct timing that is embedded in propaganda journal-
ism. Timing is connected to the instrumental perspective on news which 
requires that the effect of information is valued above people’s right to 
know. For instance, major political events or holidays require increased 
emphasis on positive news. December 1 is the United Nations’ AIDS day, 
and this day has provided a framework for publishing AIDS-related 
news in the Chinese media. The CCP uses the day to demonstrate what 
the party-state is doing for AIDS victims, and the media’s linkage of re-
ports about AIDS to this particular day serves as an acknowledgement of 
the hegemony of the mouthpiece discourse. This creates some room for 
manoeuvre, enabling critical and investigative reports on such a serious 
topic, because journalists and editors utilize the symbols attached to cor-
rect timing in the mouthpiece discourse. 
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In the late 1990s it was generally believed that AIDS did not exist in 
China. It was looked upon as a mysterious disease and considered 
shameful. As with domestic violence, the idea that media ought to cover 
AIDS was also met with resistance among journalists because would re-
veal the existence of a problem that people were ignorant about and 
evoke social taboos. In spite of the party-state’s encouragement for writ-
ing about AIDS, journalists still discussed whether or not writing about it 
could affect social stability. The uncertain status of this topic made the 
first reports about AIDS in Southern Weekend vague and abstract (Inter-
view, Fan Yihong).  
In 2000, when Southern Weekend started to investigate the AIDS 
problem in Henan, journalists emphasised poverty as the explanatory 
cause behind AIDS. The beginning of the article “The strange disease” 
(Guai bing), printed in Southern Weekend on November 11, 2000 states 
that “the most important reason is poverty”. The article argues that all of 
the people who are infected with the HIV virus embody stories of misery. 
This is significant because it transfers the sign ‘AIDS’ from a health dis-
course to a development discourse. According to Fairclough (1992, 1995) 
transferring elements from one discourse to another is a way of fostering 
social change. When this article about AIDS in Henan discusses the ill-
ness as a developmental issue, it relies on the status of economic devel-
opment as a less sensitive issue to discuss a much more sensitive issue. 
AIDS is positioned in a context where economic reform and growth are 
emphasised, and the potential cost of the problem shows why AIDS is a 
necessary and acceptable topic. In other aspects the article retains its 
state-sanctioned educational purpose, for example by informing people 
of how to protect themselves against the HIV virus. 
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Traces of propaganda journalism might be read as the paying of lip 
service to the authorities’ media control system, but it is not necessarily 
as clear as that. If these aspects of the article are interpreted as one per-
spective that contributes to the polyphony of the text, they cater to the 
readers who insist on the mouthpiece role of media. However, the rest of 
the article about AIDS in Henan exposes the reader to a thorough de-
scription of the suffering of the peasants involved. Transferring tech-
niques and angles from propaganda journalism to negative, investigative 
news also challenges the propaganda discourse because it makes visible 
the kind of information that is left out of the so-called positive news. 
The traces of propaganda discourse in critical articulations contribute 
to the polyphonic character of the articles, but other discursive strategies 
also add to the openness to interpretation of these texts. In many ways, 
these texts attempt to show rather than to tell the readers about the issues 
at stake. Showing and telling are narratological concepts that refer to the 
way a situation is mediated. When something is described ‘as it is’, and 
the description conveys a feeling of witnessing the situation, the text ap-
plies ‘showing’. ‘Telling’ is when the narrative describes, evaluates or 
analyses a situation. From a theoretical point of view the distinction be-
tween showing and telling is fragile. Because the world cannot be ap-
proached directly, and signs are discursively mediated, there is no sub-
stantial difference between showing and telling. However, within a text, 
the difference between direct and indirect representation can be quite 
powerful (Cobley 2003). Photos are used to the same effect, as they ap-
pear to be unmediated and give the reader an opportunity to interpret 
the situation; while telling seems to add a layer of interpretation between 
the reader and the text.  
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The voices of the people interviewed in the articles are another source 
contributing to the polyphonic expression of these texts. The interviewees 
are selected because they experience a problem themselves, or because 
their relatives do, while others are interviewed because of their profes-
sion, for instance as doctors or public officials. The interviewees lend au-
thenticity to the story, and their voices illustrate different aspects of the 
problems discussed. The voices of the interviewees also contribute to the 
construction of the journalist’s role as an objective mediator. However, 
most of the interviewees are anonymous, as is common in Chinese news 
discourse. The absence of openness and transparency is probably mostly 
due to people’s fear of the problems which could arise if they revealed 
their names, but sometimes anonymous sources are simply fictional, and 
only function as means for journalists to present their own views. This 
has been quite common within propaganda journalism (Interview, Xu 
Feng), and is another feature that adds to the polyphony of critical dis-
course. 
MISERY AND HUMAN TRAGEDY 
The articles about AIDS, The strange disease and Three -year-old AIDS vic-
tim, and the article State owned coal mines: difficulties beyond security all 
contain vivid descriptions of human misery, suffering and tragedy. Much 
of the journalism presented under the heading of ‘social news’ in China 
mediates suffering through representations of individuals who find 
themselves in difficult and painful situations. A media discourse that 
conveys misery and people’s grievances outlines possible subject posi-
tions for the audience. When suffering is mediated in a way that makes it 
feel real and acute to the audience, the readers are drawn in as compas-
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sionate and supportive witnesses, and as critical judges of power abuse 
and injustice. These subject positions establish a relation between text and 
audience that is very different from the relation between propaganda 
discourse and its audience.  
Representations of misery have been a politicized topic in China. Mao 
gave a speech in Yan’an in 1942 about the role of culture that established 
the dogma that cultural expressions should serve the revolution by in-
spiring people in their efforts to construct a new China. This raised the 
question of whether or not portrayals of the darker aspects of society 
could perform this positive function (Børdal 1978). Within culture in gen-
eral and media in particular, the emphasis was on the propaganda pur-
pose, and this required media to focus on positive news (Lee 1990). This 
means that in contemporary China, portrayals of misery in the open me-
dia appear to be part of the modern and ‘new’ media discourse.  
Descriptions of distant suffering can be placed on a scale ranging from 
fact-giving reports without any emotional elements, to individualized 
narratives that connect suffering with pity (Chouliaraki 2006). Within the 
Chinese critical media discourse, the tendency has been to relate towards 
stories of individuals who find themselves in a difficult situation. In the 
Chinese media context, reports about suffering individuals enjoy a dou-
ble advantage: such representations evoke an emotive function that cre-
ates a bond between reader and the text, and individualized representa-
tions of suffering offer a way of discussing complex social problems that 
would otherwise be judged too sensitive to be published.  
Representing social issues through the personal experiences of people 
who are struggling with problems gives readers concrete cases to relate 
to. The AIDS problem in Henan province is the topic of the article The 
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strange disease, but it is approached through the narratives of individuals 
who describe how the disease has influenced their lives. They explain 
that they sold their own blood to earn money. The social background of 
this phenomenon is that blood has been a commodity in China, and as 
late as in 1998, voluntary blood donations were estimated to constitute 
only 22% of the total clinical blood consumption (UNAIDS 2004). The 
remaining volume came from mainly poor, rural residents who earned 
money from selling their own blood. People did not have the necessary 
knowledge to protect themselves, and they did not know how illnesses 
could be transmitted. The article explains how blood pimps organized the 
blood business, going into villages and advertising their business, saying 
that giving blood was healthy. In the late 1980s, the buyers started to col-
lect blood plasma instead of whole blood. After the plasma had been col-
lected, the remaining part of the blood would be re-injected into the do-
nor to avoid anaemia. In the process of collecting plasma, blood from 
several persons was pooled, and if blood from one person was infected 
with HIV, the others would be infected too upon re-injection. There were 
no antiseptic controls in place, and the lack of general hygienic practices 
is expressed in the formulation “people did not even wash their faces”. 
The description of the blood business conjures up an image of people 
lying everywhere; every flat surface was used, with people stretching out 
first one arm, then the other. Needles were used several times and not 
properly cleaned between uses.  
This was how the people interviewed in the article became infected 
with the HIV virus. The scope of the problem is not explicitly established 
through the author’s voice, but is rather indicated by the disastrous effect 
the disease has on people’s lives. Two women, Liu Xiaorong, 33 years 
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old, and Chen Nan, 48, tell their own stories of how their lives are falling 
apart: their husbands are ill and can hardly stand upright, their children 
have dropped out of school, the fields lie fallow and medical expenses 
have left their families heavily indebted. Their testimonies show the so-
cial consequences of AIDS and demonstrate that AIDS is not only a 
health issue. It involves the entire community, including children. The 
two women’s suffering is described in a visual manner. The reader’s at-
tention is directed to the details of each person’s appearance and to the 
derelict surroundings. The visual descriptions of human misery contrib-
ute to polyphony because they leave open the possibility of a spectrum of 
reactions. Explanations and accusations are not brought into the text, and 
the reader may choose to understand the situation either as a pitiful sin-
gle case of human misery, or as evidence of structural injustice and the 
rich/poor divide. The visual descriptions are an example of narrative 
showing, in that they seem to confront the reader with the world ‘as it is’. 
To activate readers’ compassion, the audience must feel that it is about 
real people, because “pity is not inspired by generalities” (Boltanski 
1999:11). The interviewees’ names, their accounts of symptoms and sor-
row and detailed descriptions of their surroundings all contribute to this. 
A European study has shown that an audience’s compassion depends on 
the character of the victims. People are more likely to feel compassion for 
women, children and the elderly, while male adults are not seen as de-
serving victimhood (Höijer 2004). Portrayals of the right victims pre-
sented in a way that makes them feel familiar increase the readers’ capac-
ity to relate to their suffering. In the first part of the article about AIDS in 
Henan, the reader’s attention is tuned in towards the concrete, local and 
human face of AIDS in China: 
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A ray of the setting sun comes through the narrow doorway, slips through 
the reed-bamboo curtain, falling partly on the body of a woman, clutching her 
quilt while sleeping, partly on a broken fodder bowl in front of the bed. The 
woman is Sun Aijuan, who cannot get up because of a prolonged ‘strange ill-
ness’, her vomit is in the basin, covered with soil. 
The description of the light connects the outside of the house with its 
inside and becomes a metaphor for the connection between the reader as 
an outsider in the meeting with the couple and their situation. The 
woman inside has the “strange illness” and is unable to get up. Her hus-
band stands by the bed and tells the story of his wife’s illness. At first she 
thought it was a cold, but the fever never went away, nor did the diar-
rhoea. She visited a few doctors, and the prescribed medication always 
improved her condition for three days, then she fell ill again. It then 
dawned on her that this was “the strange disease”. Now her husband 
suffers from the symptoms too. Their misery is boundless, and it seems to 
the audience that life could hardly be any worse than it is for these two.  
Readers’ identification with the suffering individuals is facilitated by 
the narrative’s positioning of the interviewees’ subject positions at the 
forefront. The portrayals of the married couples and other AIDS victims 
in Henan focus on these individuals’ close surroundings and their rela-
tions to children, parents and family. This contributes to a discursive 
normalization of otherwise distant suffering, and enables similarities 
with the readers’ lives to become a source of identification. For instance, 
AIDS victim Liu Xiaorong underlines her subject position as a mother 
when she explains why she sold blood: “At that time the kids were small 
and weren’t eating. I just wanted to draw blood for money to give the 
children something good to eat.” As a parent she was willing to go to 
extremes to ensure her children’s well-being. This is a recognizable emo-
  The polyphony of Chinese critical press discourse 185 
tion, even for people whose life situations are very different. Her choice 
becomes more understandable and the focus on her subject position as a 
mother normalizes her account. The audience knows what it means to be 
a mother, a father or a spouse, and can relate to the sorrow of losing fam-
ily members to a disease. The word AIDS is absent in the first part of the 
article. Instead, symptoms are mentioned: fever, chills and nausea. These 
are recognizable to most people, and the descriptions of the symptoms 
make it possible to understand what people suffering from AIDS actually 
feel like. In this way the normalization of the victims’ suffering contrib-
utes to creating responsiveness to the text as well as the feeling that ‘this 
could happen to me or my family’.  
The tragedy conveyed in the texts about AIDS is constructed around 
the disastrous and unsettling effect the disease has on people’s lives. 
Where there would normally be happiness, there is only sorrow, and 
people who are in the prime of life are facing death. This reversal of eve-
rything normal is particularly strong in the article about the three -year-
old girl with AIDS. Her mother was infected with HIV when she received 
a blood transfusion while giving birth to her daughter. The girl was in-
fected too, and this was the beginning of their misery. This article pre-
sents a narrative of a little girl who is deprived of everything that is seen 
as essential in a child’s life. Her mother dies. Other children are not al-
lowed to play with her. The family’s neighbours have abandoned the 
common courtyard and she is growing up as a completely lonely child. 
When she wants to buy candy, the salespeople in the stalls run away 
from her and will not even touch her money. Doctors say that her life will 
be short, and that she will probably die before she is ten. Her father’s 
situation is dark, he grieves over the loss of his wife and the community’s 
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irrational discrimination against his daughter. If it were not for the con-
taminated blood, the little family would have led a normal, happy life. 
This makes the worry, sorrow and anger of the father understandable, 
and compassion and pity become a likely response in the reader.  
Close descriptions and normalization constitute two different aspects 
of the emotive function of these articles. Through such descriptions the 
audience becomes familiar with the people in the texts, their names and 
their fates. At the outset, the relation between a reader and the people in 
a newspaper article is inscribed with distance. It seems unlikely that the 
situation could be reversed. But by portraying people from the angle of 
their subject positions, and by illustrating the short distance between 
happiness and sorrow, these portrayals of misery set distance and close-
ness into play in a way that brings the far-away misery closer. 
The thin line between normal everyday life and catastrophe is also 
central in the article about the explosion in the coalmine in Heilongjiang. 
The text describes how the 29-year-old husband of Wu Jinyan got up 
from bed, had breakfast, grabbed an umbrella and left for work. Two 
hours later the pit exploded and he was buried 800 meters below the sur-
face. She will never see him again. The fear of sudden tragic accidents is a 
common emotion, and these articles show how vulnerable people can be. 
This seems to tell the reader: it could happen to you too. No-one is safe. 
This generalization of suffering is as important for representations of 
misery as the concretization of each case. That is a paradox: the represen-
tations have to convey that each case is specific, but at the same time re-
tain the notion that the people involved are interchangeable. “They there-
fore must be hyper-singularised through an accumulation of the details 
of suffering and, at the same time, underqualified: it is that child there 
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who makes us cry, but any other child could have done the same. 
Around each unfortunate brought forward crowds a host of replace-
ments” (Boltanski 1999:11).  
Birgitta Höijer has studied how European audiences react to exposure 
of distant suffering, such as victims of crises and wars. She writes that 
such questions have received little academic attention; we do not really 
know how people react to the emotional engagement the media offers 
(Höijer 2004). In these Chinese portrayals of misery, the expected reac-
tions of the audience are written into the text through a meta-discourse 
that presents people’s reactions to the narratives. The article about the 
three -year-old AIDS victim refers to responses from the readers received 
after a previous interview with her father that was printed a year earlier 
in Southern Weekend. The article says that feedback from the readers 
proved that people were deeply moved by the little girl’s story. People 
sent her toys and clothes. One student at Beijing Science and Engineering 
University even sent little Kaijia money. The meta-discourse provides the 
audience with an emotional vocabulary, and terms such as moved, speech-
less, uneasy frequently appear in the texts, either as expressions for the 
journalist’s voice in the text or as references to the general public and 
other actors that appear in the text.  
Discourse theorists argue that discourses are political because any rep-
resentation of the social world excludes other representations (Jørgensen 
and Phillips 1999). The representation of compassion and pity as the 
natural reaction to portrayals of misery excludes more explicitly political 
reactions. The articles construe compassion and pity as combining to 
form an impetus for charitable actions, not as a reason for protest. For 
instance, a local doctor who appears in the article about AIDS in Henan 
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contacted a medical professor because he “felt deeply that the conditions 
were too dire”. The professor came to the village and conducted blood 
samples that diagnosed the HIV carriers and explained their mystical 
symptoms. The narrative presents the doctor’s initiative as spurred by 
compassion rather than professional duty. This way, the article does not 
suggest that doctors’ failure to intervene can be blamed on their profes-
sionalism, as the emotional reaction is construed as the main factor be-
hind the intervention. Hypothetically, the audience could have reacted in 
a more activist way and argued that the minister of health ought to resign 
or that hospitals should provide free treatment for AIDS patients. The 
discourse on suffering demonstrated in the articles contributes to making 
such reactions less likely. The meta-discourse on reactions present people 
as wide-eyed and tongue-tied (chengmu jieshe) when confronted with the 
dire conditions in the Henan countryside. The emotional vocabulary pro-
vides a discursive repertoire for understanding the text, and places peo-
ples’ inner reactions at the forefront. 
However, there is a tension within the articles between the emotional 
interpretation focusing on pity and compassion, and a more critical edge 
pointing towards the structural causes of individual misery. Both the 
articles about AIDS are built up around individualized narratives, but 
they appeared on the same day in Southern Weekend and when read 
together, there is a connection between them. The strange disease reports 
on the spread of AIDS in Henan that was caused by greedy ‘blood pimps’ 
who bought poor people’s blood and infected the donors in the process. 
They later sold blood to hospitals. This is where the article about the 
Three-year-old AIDS victim starts, as her mother was infected by a blood 
transfusion at the hospital. In other words, the scope of the AIDS prob-
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lem in Henan is indicated by yet another individualized story, that indi-
cates the possible range of the problem. 
The narrative of the three-year-old girl’s father touches upon two gen-
eral problems. The first concerns the discrimination against HIV carriers 
in society, and exemplified by people’s fearful behaviour around and 
avoidance of his daughter. The second aspect is his wish for someone to 
take responsibility for the loss of his wife and for his daughter’s illness. 
Both problems are relevant to a large number of people; yet neither of the 
texts elaborates on the possible extent of the problem, instead retaining 
their focus on compassion and sympathy for the individual. 
The article about the state-owned coal mine in some ways offers a re-
versed emphasis. In this text, the main focus is on the structural factors 
that may explain why accidents happen. This emphasis is balanced by 
the gripping portrayal of the young widow whose husband was one of 
the workers that were killed in the accident. Her sorrow is immense and 
the description plays a dual role in the text. It humanizes a more struc-
tural and technical topic, and the young widow’s sorrow contributes to 
an intertextuality with other texts that apply individualized representa-
tions of social problems. This suggests to the audience that it is possible 
to read the article from the perspective of the human misery these struc-
tural problems cause. Second, the description of the widow’s suffering 
exerts a transformative power on the information that 115 people were 
killed in the explosion in the mine. It accentuates the fact that for each 
one of the 115 men, there will be family and friends who mourn them. 
The various possible angles on the problem depicted in the article con-
tribute to its polyphonic expression. 
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The articles’ individualized portrayals of misery are also intertextually 
linked to petitions. Petitions represent a possibility for filing complaints 
with the authorities through the State Council or the National People’s 
Congress. An individual’s reasons for petitioning are usually connected 
to an experience of being subject to injustice, such as through a forced 
land acquisition by a local government or other instances of abuse of 
power by local officials. Petitions make sense as long as people believe in 
the existence of good officials within the higher echelons of the system, 
who will do their best to set things right. During the 1990s the number of 
petitions to upper-level officials increased dramatically, and this genre of 
political representation also made its appearance within the media. The 
problem oriented TV-program Jiaodian Fangtan, broadcast daily in prime 
time on CCTV 1, has at times received more than a thousand letters every 
day (Chan 2002). As with petitions, the media offers an opportunity to 
make stories from the local level known to the political authorities of the 
central state.  
Zweig (2000) comments that the state seems to welcome petitions be-
cause they invite people to seek justice within legal bounds, and because 
petitions inform the party-state of problems in the countryside. Present-
ing petitions is a form of political protest that is more acceptable than 
other forms of protest in an authoritarian state, because individual offi-
cials, rather than the system, are blamed for the problems citizens face. 
Petitions can be conceived of as an apolitical protest form because they 
do not address the systemic reasons behind the problems from which 
people suffer. They are probably more acceptable also because it is easier 
to redress injustice done to one, than to an entire social group. The indi-
vidualized representations of social problems in the media share this apo-
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litical nature. Petitions are a contained form of political protest: as long as 
petitioners do not organize, they can be addressed or ignored one by one. 
In media representations of misery, concrete and individualized repre-
sentations contribute to limiting the scope of the problems discussed.  
Boltanski (1999) is optimistic about the political potential of mediated 
suffering. According to him, people actively involve themselves by talk-
ing and reacting to such news, and this forms a public opinion. In the 
Chinese media context, the descriptions of suffering people represent a 
kind of reportage that moves beyond the limits of propaganda journal-
ism. These representations are not educational because they portray 
problems and do not offer any solutions. On the other hand, it is also 
possible to read them as replacements for investigative analysis which 
would emphasise the systemic weaknesses and institutional responsibil-
ity in each of the cases.  
INDIRECT CRITICISM: INDICATING RESPONSIBILITY 
As discussed in chapter 5, the emergence of the category ‘social news’ as 
an accepted area of journalistic focus opened up a range of new topics in 
public discourse. For journalists social news offered a way to write about 
important problems in Chinese society, while avoiding ‘the political’ (In-
terview, Shi Youli). The institutionalization of social news as a category 
for critical and investigative journalism can be understood as an attempt 
to establish a new order of discourse that by definition is separate from 
the political order of discourse. In general explicit and direct criticism is 
avoided within ‘social news’. Most obvious is the absence of critiques that 
touch upon structural explanations which might imply some responsibil-
ity on the part of the central authorities. When investigated cases involve 
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local level party-state institutions, these are mostly referred to in very 
vague terms and the criticism of public officials and departments appears 
only indirectly. However, the texts all seem to raise a silent question: 
“Shouldn’t the government have interfered?” The articles analyse cases 
where people are portrayed as innocent victims who do not receive the 
protection as they ought to have done. This creates a tension within the 
texts. Emphasis on concrete and local explanatory factors on the one 
hand, and more structural explanations on the other contribute to the 
polyphony of the texts. This tension has a critical potential because it in-
directly questions how these problems could arise in the first place.  
Chinese journalists face a reality where injustice and abuse of power 
are ubiquitous. Many of the problems and issues Chinese journalists re-
port about are connected to far-reaching structural changes that have 
taken place within Chinese economy and society during the last three 
decades. Among these are “galloping spatial and class inequality, the 
explosive growth of migrant labor, and loss of security and jobs for many 
state sector employees” (Perry and Selden 2000:1). Adding grave envi-
ronmental problems, the deteriorating health system and corruption 
would still leave this list incomplete. Metaphorically, these problems can 
be represented as the pains of transition. The hegemonic discourse about 
China’s development is centred around modernization and progress. The 
contrast between ‘before’ and ‘now’ is emphasised. ‘Before’ is connected 
to international isolation and a stagnant planned economy while ‘now’ is 
associated with modernity, economic growth and international recogni-
tion. Writing about problems, or the ‘externalities’ of reform as Perry and 
Selden (2001) formulate it, contributes to the formation of a counter dis-
course that destabilizes the dominating representation of China’s devel-
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opment as a continual improvement. An important question then be-
comes whether individualized representations of social problems con-
tribute to a more general, critical discourse about the pains of this transi-
tion in China.  
The articles about AIDS, mining accidents and corruption that form 
the basis for this chapter are constructed around the nodal points ‘pov-
erty’ and ‘economic transition’. Victimized people suffer from the pains 
of transition: inadequate institutions, an absence of governmental ac-
countability, corrupt health personnel and officials and a fundamental 
lack of social security. The critical potential of the articles depends upon 
the way they construct causal chains. For instance, in the article about the 
Strange disease, the spread of HIV and AIDS is positioned in a causal rela-
tionship to poverty. Poverty makes people vulnerable, poverty made 
peasants sell blood, their poverty made them indebted when they sought 
treatment for their illness, and poverty made their children drop out of 
school. The lack of education and knowledge about AIDS among the 
poor people in the countryside makes them avoid agricultural products 
from the so-called AIDS villages, and people resident there become even 
more destitute. The outline of a causal relationship between poverty and 
the misery and suffering of these people would seem to prompt the 
broader question about the great divide between rich and poor provinces 
in China, and indirectly calls into question the economic policies that 
have caused this situation.  
When asked to comment on the presence of a structural perspective 
within ‘social news’, a journalist explained the positioning of concrete 
problems in a wider societal context as a sign of modernity. He con-
trasted this to traditional social news that only describes the immediate 
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causes of social problems and always emphasises what government offi-
cials did to rectify the situation. Modern social news, on the other hand, 
analyses underlying causes (Interview, Wu Yunlu). Aligning critical per-
spectives with modernity is a discursive strategy that contributes to le-
gitimizing problem-oriented journalism, but the Chinese critical media 
discourse continues to offer its criticism in an indirect and cautionary 
manner, focusing more on concrete cases than their structural causes. If 
journalists are to abide by the rules of propaganda journalism, represen-
tations of problems and conflicts pose a challenge because of the required 
focus on positive news. However, focusing on the solution of a problem 
has been one way to cross the boundary between positive and negative 
news. If a crisis has been solved and everybody is happy with the way it 
was handled, the report primarily reveals a positive aspect of society. 
Within critical journalism a focus on solutions provides a perspective that 
can add to the polyphony of a text. In the following section, I explore 
how the polyphonic expressions in the articles from Southern Weekend 
develop their discussion of sensitive and critical issues, and how they are 
balanced by other perspectives in order to make the articles appear ac-
ceptable within the Chinese media discourse. 
Mining accidents  
Every year in China thousands of workers are killed in mining accidents. 
In 2002 activist Han Dongfang of the China Labour Bulletin estimated the 
number of workers killed to be 10,000 per year (Interview, Han Dong-
fang). The official number is lower, but the Chinese government recog-
nizes that the lack of security in the mines is a major problem. Several 
fatal accidents have been reported in the media. Most of the mining acci-
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dents take place in small, privately owned mines and they are often 
blamed on corrupt managers and public officials. The main explanation is 
that they ignore safety measures and voluntarily expose the miners to an 
extremely dangerous working environment, just to increase their per-
sonal wealth. However, large mining accidents remain a sensitive issue in 
the open media, and when 81 people were killed in a mine in Nandan, 
Guangxi province, the municipal government did its best to prevent me-
dia from reporting about the accident (He 2004).  
The Southern Weekend title: State owned coal mines: difficulties beyond se-
curity does not suggest a focus on accidents, but rather a broader perspec-
tive on the general problems of the state-owned coal mines. Nonetheless, 
the article begins by describing the gas explosion on June 20, 2002 in 
Chengzihe mine, a state-owned coalmine in Heilongjiang province that 
killed 115 people. In this article, several critical perspectives are present. 
One perspective concerns the security problems that caused the accident, 
another perspective addresses the economic factors that have forced the 
leadership of the mine to under-invest in security, and yet another per-
spective explains how the transition from a planned to a market-driven 
economy have put state-owned coal mines in a position where they have 
no choice but to increase production and ignore safety regulations. These 
perspectives all carry a critical potential, but each of them contributes to 
balancing and softening the critical edge of the other perspectives. This is 
a discursive advantage, because it opens the possibility that the article 
may be interpreted in a number of different ways. It has probably also 
been an advantage in facilitating the investigation of the story. Accidents 
are sensitive, and as the Nandan accident shows, local authorities often 
seek to prevent journalists from publishing reports that reveal critical 
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conditions at the local level. In this case, the journalist’s ambition could 
be framed as a request for information that could contribute to demon-
strating that the explanatory factors behind this accident were beyond 
local control. This way the journalist can present himself as a sympathetic 
ally, rather than a critical antagonist. 
The article states that its objective is to show how problems other than 
security have contributed to the accident. These problems come as a con-
sequence of the transition from a planned economy to a market-driven 
economy. The text explains that the Chengzihe mine is one of the enor-
mous work units that were established as part of the planned economy, 
when the guiding economic principle was that enterprises should serve 
society. After the transition to the market economy, the costs of running 
these work units constituted a great impediment in the process of turning 
heavy industry into profitable enterprises. During the first phase of eco-
nomic reform, the state retained its responsibility for the industry and 
provided subsidies that covered its losses. After 1993 the subsidies to the 
mining industry were cut off, but the price of coal did not rise. The reason 
was that the three major consumers of coal remained within the planned 
economy. Electricity producers, the railways and the iron and steel indus-
try were not deregulated so the price of coal remained low, and the coal 
mines remained unprofitable. The article describes the planned economy 
as a system that made people passive:  
In the era of the planned economy, every time a new pit was established and 
new workers were recruited, the mine had to consider the problems of the 
worker’s family members and children, since their hukou [residence permit] 
changed from rural to urban. This policy gave the workers benefits, but it 
gave the company problems. A large proportion of the workers’ family mem-
bers lived within the area of the coalmine. Previously they had their own 
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houses, tilled their own land, ate their own food, but after they came to the 
coalmine, they became the company’s burden.  
This negative representation of the planned economy is not uncontrover-
sial because it questions central elements of communist ideology that still 
constitute parts of CCP’s political identity (Brady 2008). The paragraph 
signals that the media’s propaganda role has been relaxed, and that the 
text makes use of the newly won freedom to present a critical reading of 
the past; however later in the text it eases its critique by bringing it in line 
with the contemporary hegemonic project of economic reform. This can 
be interpreted as a very subtle re-constitution of the media’s propaganda 
role: apparently a text may be critical, but the conclusion indicated in the 
text should still support current CCP policies. 
In general, the discourse about mining accidents in China has focused 
on corrupt managers. The title of this article, “…difficulties beyond secu-
rity” distances it from this discourse, by suggesting another focus. How-
ever, the text also calls on the expectations built into this discourse when 
it begins with a description of the accident in the Chengzihe mine that 
killed 115 people. The article individualizes this tragedy by conveying 
how the life of a young woman was ruined after she lost her husband in 
the explosion. This is in line with the general discourse about mining 
accidents, and when the article moves on to discuss the leaders and the 
management of the mine, it continues this conventional approach. It is in 
this passage that the article moves from the individual and concrete to 
the more structural aspects of the mining sector’s problems. This shift is 
achieved through the representation of the director of the mine, Zhao 
Wenlin. He is depicted as an unselfish leader who works eagerly to make 
safety paramount. The article states that people have great respect for 
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him, and say that safety was his first priority from day one in his job. 
Early in the morning on 20 June, after Zhao Wenlin received a message 
about a fire in the mine, skipped breakfast and hurried off to inspect. He 
went down into the pit where he was killed in the explosion, together 
with his workers. This description is central to the narrative, because it 
distances this particular representation of an accident from others, in that 
it cannot be blamed on the manager in charge. The Chengzihe manager is 
not greedy, selfish and ignorant of his workers and their safety. Indi-
rectly, this means that the causes for this accident cannot be explained on 
this level, since it cannot be blamed on a corrupt, local leadership.  
Throughout the article, the voice of the author emphasises the struc-
tural perspective of the causes behind the accident, but within the text, 
the voices of interviewees contribute to blurring this picture, and to indi-
cating that local leadership may still be responsible for the accident. The 
article introduces an old man in this way: 
Sun Lianfen has come to take care of the arrangements for his son’s funeral 
and smokes his self-rolled cigarettes while he grumbles about the conditions 
of the state-owned coal mine: ”there are too many outside contract workers, 
and too many bosses and the way the bosses use people are haphazard, all 
kinds of people are allowed to go down in the pit, it is against the regula-
tions”. 
In the article’s narrative this man becomes responsible for introducing the 
topic of contract workers in the mine. He claims that this caused the acci-
dent in the mine. The article follows up on this and presents another 
voice, an anonymous well-informed person who confirms that among the 
people who died in the accident almost one-third were contract workers. 
Stating that the use of contract workers caused an accident is a state-
owned mine is a serious accusation, and the article modifies this by in-
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troducing other perspectives that further contribute to the polyphony of 
the article, such as an analysis of other factors that influence safety condi-
tions in the mines. This contributes to the flexibility of the text, because 
the interviewees and their statements are mediated through the article, 
but simultaneously retain a responsibility for their own agendas. 
The article’s structural analysis illustrates how safety and human fail-
ure are incomplete as explanatory factors. In spite of its safety conscious 
leadership the Jixi company never implemented the safety improvements 
imposed by the State Bureau for Production Safety. Instead, the company 
felt compelled to increase its output to be able to pay its workers and to 
keep its deficit in check. This analysis exceeds the limitations of the con-
ventional reports of fatal accidents in China’s coal mines, by tracing the 
causes to macro-economic factors rather than concrete, local misman-
agement. The problems of the state-owned mines are depicted as exten-
sive and complex. The article’s analysis does not explicitly blame the cen-
tral state, but it does state that the causes of the problem lie in the transi-
tion from a planned economy to a market-driven economy. This argu-
ment can be interpreted to the extent that the party-state becomes mor-
ally responsible for the accident that killed 115 people, but this accusation 
is softened through the conclusion of the article. This closes the narrative 
by stating that mining accidents happen because the industry has not yet 
been adjusted to the market economy. This can be read as an acquittal of 
state responsibility, because according to neoliberal economic principles, 
the most important contribution the state can make is to roll back and 
leave industries to the rule of the market. This article conducts a critical 
and structural analysis of current social problems. It clearly attaches itself 
to the hegemonic development discourse in China and singles out the 
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legacies of the planned economy system as a principal cause of the prob-
lems. The article balances different perspectives and is open to contradic-
tory conclusions regarding state responsibility.  
Corruption 
The article about a corruption case at a tent factory in Qiqihar, Heilongji-
ang, is interesting: it shows how the involvement of official institutions 
represents a boundary-limiting discourse on corruption, and the text 
demonstrates insinuations and hints can be ways of transcending that 
boundary. The article states that its objective is to tell the story of how a 
corrupt, female manager of the factory manipulates her surroundings 
and violates the rights of the workers. This is the major conflict addressed 
in the article, in itself it is rather uncontroversial, but involvement of 
party-state institutions and their relation to the media adds to the com-
plexity of the story. One of the involved entities in the story, the Second 
Office for Light Industry, has accused nine media organizations of defa-
mation. The article moves between a concrete, investigatory discourse 
and a principal and more abstract discussion of whether or not govern-
mental institutions are entitled to sue somebody for defamation. The risk 
of being accused of defamation constitutes another boundary in the cor-
ruption discourse, and in the critical media discourse generally. In other 
words, the text takes as its starting point a rather limited corruption case 
that only involves local government, but it uses this case to discuss a 
broader question that has decisive influence upon media’s ability to en-
gage in investigative and critical reporting. 
The explicit target of this article is a female manager, Li Shuqin, and 
the text attempts to prove that she has been corrupt. She was elected 
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leader of the tent factory, and the story focuses on her as the main culprit 
of this corruption story. The report in Southern Weekend seems clearly to 
document that she has abused her position and been very creative and 
clever in siphoning off funds for herself and her two sons. As manager of 
the company, Li Shuqin dismantled the factory, bought real estate, acted 
in her own best interests, and effectively sold out the interests of the 
workers. The article goes into great detail about the amounts of money 
that have been taken from different accounts and demonstrates the prob-
ability of the involvement of the Second Office for Light Industry. Due to 
Li Shuqin’s position as president of a collective enterprise, her policies 
have caused a deep-rooted conflict with the workers. They have found 
themselves bullied, their salaries are in arrears and mismanagement will 
probably cost them their jobs. Their formal rights as workers in a collec-
tive enterprise have been ignored and violated. This inspired protests 
among the workers, and as a consequence, three of the workers’ repre-
sentatives were murdered. The subsequent investigation by local authori-
ties was superficial and the article indicates that the real culprits are likely 
to go free.  
These are serious accusations, and they are most explicit at the scale of 
the enterprise, and less direct when they involve local authorities. Meta-
phorically expressed, it appears as if the narrative applies a zoom lens to 
magnify the circumstances at the most local level. In the sequences that 
deal with Li Shuqin, the money she has embezzled and the violence 
caused by her sons, the focus is close. The sums of money are given in 
precise figures and the text provides a detailed investigation of the cor-
ruption at the tent factory. When the narrative touches upon the in-
volvement of the Second Office for Light Industry, the text maintains a 
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distance and the pressure of the critical gaze is less aggressive. The em-
ployees of this office are nameless, faceless and not exposed in the text. 
The text remains at this distance when it describes the authorities’ in-
vestigation against Li Shuqin. The investigation committee was estab-
lished after a previous article about the corruption case was published in 
Southern Weekend, and the result of the investigation was published in a 
report: “About Southern Weekend’s published piece: ‘Worker’s vote to recall 
malfeasant Qiqihar manager instigates three successive murder cases.’ A report 
of the investigation of the problems touched upon in the article.” The text seeks 
to reveal that the conclusions of this investigation report are predisposed 
and prejudiced. One of the claims in the first article in Southern Weekend 
was that the manager had taken out large refunds for medical expenses, 
and the investigation report’s verdict is that a manager should not do 
such a thing when the workers are not entitled to such coverage of medi-
cal expenses. However, the investigation report continues, the managers 
at this factory have in general been good leaders and their mistakes do 
not overshadow their positive qualities. The article’s analysis of the inves-
tigation report indirectly exposes the connections that the manager of the 
tent factory has had with the local authorities, as her crimes are excused 
and smoothed over.  
In the article the exposure of the authorities’ involvement is carried 
out in a less detailed and accusing manner than the criticism of the cor-
rupt manager herself. However, it is evident that local authorities are 
involved in the corruption case through the Second Office for Light In-
dustry and it is equally evident that they are unable to investigate the 
case in an objective way. This raises more principled questions about the 
rule of law, but these are not explicit in the text. In relation to defamation, 
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the article makes a case against the right of government institutions to 
sue media, but this conflict is less antagonistically and explicitly ex-
pressed than the case against the corrupt leader of the tent factory.  
AIDS 
In the articles discussed in this chapter, there is a movement between 
different scales, from the individual and local scale to the national scale. 
In the article about AIDS in Henan, the local scale is described in detail, 
while the higher geographical scales are presented in vaguer terms. The 
first paragraph of the article reads:  
From the 1970s until the mid 1990s, due to the limited control by responsible 
offices and the blood pimps’ greed, the phenomenon of illegal collection of 
blood in the countryside was rampant in the eastern and southern parts of 
Henan province. This was the direct cause of the outbreak and spread of 
AIDS that we see now in this area, and some of the places where there was 
widespread sale of blood have now turned into “AIDS villages”. 
This introduction places the topic in time and space and provides readers 
with a twofold explanation for the AIDS epidemic in this part of China, 
based on the lax control and lack of interference by relevant official de-
partments (zhuguan bumen), and the blood pimps’ blind greed (liyu xin). If 
this phrase is read as a location of responsibility, it is striking how unde-
fined it is. The vagueness of this first paragraph creates a strong contrast 
to the detailed descriptions of human misery and suffering that follow 
later in the text.  
The article explicitly blames people working for local Epidemic Pre-
vention stations and the employees at the state blood banks for being 
blood pimps. They are accused of employing their relatives and friends 
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and for taking advantage of poor people for whom selling their own 
blood was their only means of extra income. One of the major culprits, or 
blood pimps, in Henan was a doctor surnamed Ni. He came from Shang-
cai County, where the Hygiene Office cleared space so that Ni could 
work there. This piece of information makes it clear that the local gov-
ernment was involved in the blood business. The readers only get to 
know the surname of the doctor, which does not fully identify him. The 
director working for him is anonymous, as are his employed family 
members. The article’s narrative represents a situation in which corrup-
tion and abuse of state offices abound, and where there are close connec-
tions between the state and criminals, but the accusations of state in-
volvement are made in an ambiguous and anonymous manner. This re-
flects the boundaries of what Scott (1990) calls the public transcript. 
Withholding the details of the involvement of the party-state institutions 
signals an acknowledgement that this is a field of power dominated by 
the party-state.  
However, in an indirect manner, the responsibility of party-state insti-
tutions for the explosive nature of the AIDS epidemic in Henan is made 
clear. Public officials facilitated the work of people who bought blood 
and infected people with HIV. The trustworthiness of government on the 
local level is questioned through intimations indicating that governmen-
tal information is misleading and false. For instance, a spokesman from 
the Epidemic Prevention Office is cited as stating that there are 636 HIV-
infected people in the province. The article comments that the number is 
probably the result of adding available data, and the real number is much 
higher. This claim is substantiated by statements from anonymous insid-
ers admitting that the real number of HIV/AIDS cases is much higher. 
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This information questions the legitimacy of the public transcript and 
explicitly states that behind official data, there is a reality that does not 
correspond to the information the public transcript provides. The narra-
tive portrays the officials that provide the journalists with true informa-
tion as people who are ridden by guilt and bad conscience, and who try 
to make up for this by telling a journalist the truth. This further contrib-
utes to blacken the local government, because the anonymous sources are 
portrayed as people who want do the right thing: speak the truth and 
help the powerless. When they need to remain anonymous, it is because 
they would otherwise risk their jobs. The information also positions the 
journalist as truth-seeking and investigative. 
The “Strange disease” article on Henan indirectly evokes the party-
state’s responsibility for the suffering and misery endured by poor peas-
ants who were abused by blood pimps who bought their blood with the 
help of public officials. There does not appear to be any attempt at mobi-
lization against the responsible officials, and the interviewed people suf-
fering from AIDS appear to be too consumed by their own misery to be 
able to voice their accusations against the party-state. This is in contrast to 
the article about the “Three-year-old AIDS victim”. This narrative is con-
structed around an explicit conflict between the father of the girl, Wang 
Weijun, and the local representatives of the party-state. The article starts 
by describing Wang, saying that he hardly can be recognized anymore, 
because he has let his hair and beard grow. This symbol of protest makes 
him stand out, and fellow citizens have noticed him and offered their 
help. A centre providing free judicial support for women has helped him 
sue the hospital that conducted the blood transfusion that infected his 
wife with the HIV virus. In court the director of the hospital stood with 
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his eyes almost closed from the beginning to the end of the case. The 
symbolic value of this is clear, namely that the hospital does not ac-
knowledge the scope of the problem, nor its responsibility; and that is 
why Wang wants his story heard by an “audience higher up”. He wants 
the state to respond to his grievances and to recognize the scope of the 
AIDS problem in China. His protest attacks the lack of accountability and 
shows the limited power of Chinese citizens in relation to the state. His 
protest is supported by a statement from a leader of the Epidemic Pre-
vention Station. This official admits that due to feeble routines and lack of 
control of the blood supply, known incidents such as the one that killed 
Wang’s wife constitute only the tip of the iceberg. The article does not 
single out any governmental institution or official as the concrete target 
for Wang’s accusations, but it draws a general picture of the relation be-
tween a citizen who seeks rectification and the state. At the centre of this 
picture is the invisibility of the citizen.  
This severe criticism of the local state and the hospital is not allowed 
to dominate the narrative. The central perspective of this text concerns 
Wang’s struggle to cope with the prejudice and lack of knowledge which 
make people shun him and his daughter. It is in relation to this conflict 
that the article is most outspoken. When the article refers to people’s reac-
tions and responses to this story, it describes readers’ condemnation of 
local discrimination and their compassion for the little motherless girl. 
The first line of conflict between Wang and the local state, and the sec-
ond, between him and the local community, together create a polyphonic 
expression where it is possible to read the article as a narrative in which 
Wang’s antagonist is either the ignorant community surrounding him or 
the local state. If the emphasis is placed on the local community’s dis-
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crimination, the article fulfils a propaganda mission, informing people 
about HIV and AIDS. If the conflict with the local state is positioned at 
the forefront of the narrative, the critical potential of the article becomes 
evident. The text can be read as a critique of a state that does not assume 
responsibility for its mistakes, and that is inaccessible to its citizens and 
hence illegitimate.  
Summing up 
Southern Weekend has been central to the development of a more critical 
media discourse in China, and this chapter has analysed articles on social 
problems that have been printed in this paper under the category of social 
news. The main finding of this analysis is that these texts are polyphonic, 
ambiguous expressions: on the one hand, they actively relate to the 
hegemonic mouthpiece discourse, but they can also be critical and inves-
tigative through their opposition to the requirements of mouthpiece dis-
course. The polyphonic features of such newspaper articles offer a dis-
cursive advantage in a controlled media environment, because the ambi-
guity makes possible different interpretations while decreasing the likeli-
hood of sanctions being imposed by the propaganda authorities. The 
focus on individuals’ misery and suffering also contributes to this pur-
pose. The representations of human tragedies on an individual scale im-
ply expectations of compassion and pity on the part of the audience. 
These emotions are less likely to contribute to political mobilization than 
anger, and contribute to framing these narratives as social news rather 
than political criticism. To the extent that these articles forward political 
critiques, it is in a limited and indirect manner. Nevertheless, this leaves 
open the possibility that readers may infer that problems at the local level 
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are related to the central scale of government, and that individual suffer-
ing can be traced back to underlying, systemic causes. In this indirect 
manner the articles hint at the political responsibility behind social prob-
lems in Chinese society. 
 
 Chapter seven 
Conditional autonomy: restrictions and resistance 
There are many contending understandings and interpretations of the 
changes that have taken place within the Chinese media field. One ap-
proach interprets the Chinese media in light of its allegedly transitional 
character, during its development and diversification away from the 
mouthpiece role (Lagerkvist 2006). Observers have assumed that China is 
in a post-propaganda state, and that modern communication technology 
makes the party-state unable to control information as it did in the past 
(Lynch 1999). Technology-related optimism combined with economic 
determinism emphasise the view that the Chinese media and its political 
context are likely to be liberalized as a consequence of the economic re-
forms underway since the 1980s. However, recent scholarly contributions 
to the debate about the Chinese media and its political role have ac-
knowledged the capacity of the Chinese party-state to extend its control 
into the digital age (Brady 2008, Lagerkvist 2006). Under this interpreta-
tion, rather than suggesting the demise of propaganda, the diversification 
of the Chinese media has provided the party-state with more finely tuned 
and sophisticated means through which to conduct thought work. For in-
stance, the social and current affairs program Focus (Jiaodian Fangtan) has 
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been interpreted in this manner (Chan 2002, Zhang 2006). In this pro-
gram, social problems are addressed, but in a manner that presents the 
central party-state in a positive light and emphasises its capacity and le-
gitimacy. 
This chapter addresses the issue of how the media’s conditional 
autonomy is being restricted, and how journalists are attempting to in-
crease their autonomy. Due to the mouthpiece role ascribed to the media 
in communist China under Mao, the media’s practice was heavily regu-
lated. The relationship between the CCP and the media in that period has 
been described as command communication, because the media’s main 
role was limited to distribution and propagation of the party line. Brady’s 
(2008) comprehensive work on the current Chinese propaganda system 
shows how the economic deregulation does not exempt media from this 
role. Compared to the situation in the 1980s, the party-state today places 
not less but rather more weight on thought work and propaganda, This 
renewed emphasis on propaganda delivered by the media has decisive 
influence on the situation critical journalists confront when they want to 
extend the range of issues it is possible to discuss in the open media. The 
discursive and social practices employed by critical journalists are ex-
pressions of resistance. Critical journalists defy the authorities’ attempts 
to restrict their work and seek to overcome the limitations this poses on 
their work. Nevertheless, faced with political control and possible nega-
tive sanctions, they have to adjust, and self-regulation becomes a neces-
sary practice in a context of domination. Critical journalism is a field of 
contention, in which party-state authorities, actors defending economic 
or personal interests and critical journalists all participate. They all em-
ploy power techniques. For instance, through its regulatory practices, the 
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party-state’s authorities seek to utilize limited media criticism for their 
own purposes, while imposing negative sanctions on journalists who do 
not stay within its determined bounds. Within this field of contention, the 
relation between critical journalism and the party-state is characterized 
by a conditional autonomy, under which journalists seek to work around 
the limits imposed by the party-state to expand and create new spaces of 
representation. 
SELF-REGULATION 
Foucault claims that modernity is characterized by the development of 
more indirect and efficient ways of disciplining subjects. To him, the 
‘prison-like’ is a defining feature of many central institutions in modern 
societies. Schools, asylums and prisons all require discipline, and in Dis-
cipline and punish (1995) Foucault provides a detailed description of Ben-
tham’s Panopticon. This is an architectonic construction consisting of a 
large circular building divided into cells, with an observation tower in 
the middle. From the tower, a guard would have unimpaired lines of 
sight to the cells, while being shielded from view by some ingenious il-
lumination system. The Panopticon reverses the logic of the dungeon: 
instead of darkness and invisibility, there is light and the constant possi-
bility of being watched. The combination of strict regulation and the ever-
present possibility of being watched has contained political opposition in 
China, much as Foucault imagined that the Panopticon would facilitate 
disciplinary power. Interpreted in this light, the increased emphasis on 
propaganda and thought work in China in the post-1989 period may 
have strengthened the party-state’s influence over the formation of public 
opinion (Brady 2008). Foucault’s view of the close connection between 
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observation and discipline has been criticized by Alford (2000). He points 
out that the Panopticon remained an unrealized idea because Bentham 
was never able to convince British authorities that they should build this 
prison. Contrary to Foucault’s belief, modern prisons enforce discipline 
through means which are nearly the opposite of those embodied in the 
Panopticon. Current high security prisons are characterized by a lack of 
observation rather than constant surveillance, for as long as they control 
the entrances and exits, observation is superfluous: “Real power means 
not having to look in the first place. The need to look is itself a sign of the 
limits of power” (Alford 2000:129). This is relevant to the Chinese context, 
because if Alford is right, it indicates that a state that has extensive sys-
tems for controlling the media is incapable of dictating media content. 
In the Mao era, when the Chinese media was entirely integrated in the 
party-state and ideological control determined media content, the party-
state’s control over journalists and their work was direct and immediate. 
During the economic reform period, increased financial freedom and 
decreased emphasis on ideology have given media institutions more 
leeway in their work. This has empowered the media, and relations 
where there is power on both sides are more likely to be regulated 
through panoptic power techniques (Alford 2000). Chinese journalists 
and editors know that their work is being controlled, they know that they 
are being watched, and they know the range of potential sanctions; as in 
the Panopticon, self-regulation is a logical response to observation and 
control. However, what the panoptic metaphor does not capture is the 
dynamics in the relationship between the authority and the subjects of 
control. 
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 Self-regulation can be interpreted as a consequence of the internaliza-
tion of control, analytically almost akin to false consciousness. In this 
sense, self-regulation among Chinese journalists simply reflects the 
power of the party-state. However, self-regulation can also be under-
stood as a conscious strategy that enables journalists to continue their 
work within the context of an authoritarian one-party state. Even the 
most severe oppression will be met by resistance (Scott 1990). When 
open, political mobilization is impossible, the field of infrapolitics becomes 
the site of conflict. Infrapolitics consist of acts and discourses that convey 
opposition without being openly detected as such. This perspective on 
domination and resistance is important for this analysis of the conditional 
autonomy of critical journalists. The party-state’s ambition to dominate 
and control the media field in China does not mean that it succeeds in 
eliminating journalists’ ambition to reverse the top-down nature of Chi-
nese media and their wish to serve the people rather than the party.  
In interviews with critical journalists in China, self-regulation was of-
ten described as a “gut-feeling”. When I asked Wu Yunlu how he evalu-
ates news and issues regarding what can and cannot be published, he 
answered:  
That’s easy, it’s based on experience. We have accumulated news, we know 
what we can and cannot say. The balance between the market and the party is 
a result of a long process, it is very difficult to explain clearly to you.  
This response is emblematic for the interviewees’ representations of the 
ability to evaluate news according to relevant boundaries as a form of 
initiated knowledge, a gut feeling that is based on experience. They depict 
self-regulation as an active strategy that is necessary in order to operate as 
a critical journalist in China. Several of the interviewees present their abil-
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ity to foretell the consequences of reporting a particular issue as central to 
their professionalism as journalists. When I asked Xu Feng whether he 
had experienced any negative reactions upon his work as a critical jour-
nalist, he seemed proud and confident when he replied that he never had 
encountered any negative sanctions based on reports he had published. 
He had experienced authorities’ interference in his work many times, but 
his published work had never been sanctioned. To him, this confirmed 
his ability to read the system at any given moment; naturally, this would 
make him a popular employee given that his work is interesting, but he 
knows where the limits run. To Zhao Sanpeng, the choice to write or not 
to write about something is based on what he calls the “political crite-
rion”. He finds that his deep knowledge of Chinese politics provides him 
with shelter, because he is able to foresee the changing boundaries within 
the Chinese news discourse. This is also a form of initiated knowledge 
that is not readily available, but based on extensive experience. 
Zhao’s reason for emphasising the political as the decisive criterion for 
his evaluation of news is probably that journalists regulate their own pro-
fessional behaviour according to the taboo of critical political discourse: 
“But one thing is that we remind ourselves is…that when there are politi-
cal issues, try to stay away” (interview, Shi Youli). The ‘political’ is a fleet-
ing signifier, its meaning is changeable, but it always signals the presence 
of taboos for investigative and critical journalism. That is expressed when 
Xu Feng uses the metaphor of the “high voltage wire of politics”. When 
the political is construed as a taboo, it remains within the domain of 
propaganda journalism.  
For critical journalists the security and protection efficient self-
regulation offers is weighed against the competitive advantage of pub-
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lishing interesting news. The journalists describe media competition as 
fierce, and “if you do not publish it, somebody else will, if you don’t tell, 
somebody else will” (interview, He Rigao). On the other hand, sensitive 
issues involve risk: the risk of losing one’s job. He Rigao says that “if you 
want to disclose domestic problems it is very likely that you might end 
up shot and killed”. Self-regulation is necessary because transgression is 
dangerous.  
Another dimension of self-regulation is the way censorship is built 
into news organizations through hierarchical structures and the division 
of responsibility. Editors are held responsible for the work of their subor-
dinates, and the editor-in-chief is responsible for the product in general. 
The media hierarchy has layers of control: courageous journalists are con-
tained by a careful editor, and an editor-in-chief can restrain the whole 
organization (interview, He Rigao). At the time I interviewed He Rigao, 
he worked in TV and he felt that the hierarchical structure of news or-
ganizations reinforces a tendency to prioritize safety above news value 
and competitive interest. He experienced the vested power of editors as a 
severe hindrance in his work. What happened at his workplace in the 
wake of September 11 illustrates the relation between journalists and edi-
tors. He Rigao’s work focuses on economy and finance, and when the 
news about the Twin Towers reached him and his colleagues, they as-
sumed that since this was foreign news, they would be able to report it. 
They incorporated the news into the program they were making, and 
focused in particular on the accident and on its potential economic con-
sequences, especially for civil aviation and tourism. As it turned out, He 
and his colleagues had misread the situation, and their leaders wanted to 
await the instructions from the Propaganda Department. The editors 
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wanted to be on the safe side, and the breaking news of this incident was 
delayed for several hours due to their decision. Zhao Sanpeng related a 
similar experience, when he was working on a story about a representa-
tive to the People’s Congress who had been illegally detained. It was his 
newspaper that had assigned him to write about the case, but in the end 
they did not have the courage to print it. The journalist’s strategy was 
then to look for a different outlet for publishing the story, on the theory 
that other mainland newspapers might be more courageous, and if they 
refused, he would publish it in Hong Kong. In general, editors’ risk aver-
sion means that censorship becomes integrated into the news organiza-
tions they run. 
Shi Youli sees the hierarchical structure of news organizations from 
another point of view, and emphasises the protection the editors offer, 
rather than the containment and censorship. In her workplace, journalists 
often discuss their ideas for a story with their editor, who gives advice, 
encouraging certain angles and warning against others. Shi Youli sees her 
editor as open-minded and feels that she provides valuable advice. 
Whenever she feels unsure about something, she will talk to her. Her 
editor ensures that the stories they publish remain within the boundaries 
of the accepted and in Shi’s experience, the relationship to her editor re-
duces the pressure on the journalists: “And that way, when our stories 
are out, we won’t get too much trouble”. This journalist works within a 
media organization that is subject to strict control, but within her de-
partment, journalists enjoy a relatively high level of freedom. This proba-
bly influences her perception of her situation as less constrained. 
The importance of the editor-in-chief is also reflected in journalists’ ac-
counts of factors that enable critical journalism in China. The backing of a 
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strong editor-in-chief is understood to be a prerequisite for investigative 
journalism; without such an individual’s support investigative journal-
ism is both too dangerous and futile, since it will not be published. That 
was why several of Southern Weekend’s journalists left the paper in protest 
in 2002, as a response to the policies of the new editor-in-chief and his 
allies. The former editors were replaced as part of the negative sanctions 
against the paper, and the journalists interviewed described the new ones 
as spineless cowards supported by the propaganda authorities (Inter-
view, Xu Feng, Ai Hongwen).  
These editors decided they wanted to pay more attention to political 
news (interview, Wu Yunlu). The newspaper had been through several 
rounds of criticism and sanctions from the authorities, and a likely inter-
pretation is that this increased emphasis on political news was part of the 
paper’s rectification process with the party-state authorities. As the ‘po-
litical’ is construed as a taboo for investigative journalism in China, the 
publishing of more political news would strengthen the mouthpiece role 
of the paper and restrict its watchdog function. It was therefore surprising 
when one of the experienced staff members from the paper explained that 
this turn of the paper was unrelated to rectification, and was instead sim-
ply because politics were important; as a paper with national distribution, 
it should pay more attention to politics. The same journalist added that 
the strong focus on social news had brought the paper into trouble, but 
that the new focus on political news seemed to bring on even more diffi-
culties (Interview, Wu Yunlu). This view was in contrast to those of several 
of the journalists who by then had left the paper after a conflict with the 
new leaders over the future course of the paper. They felt that Southern 
Weekend had caved in, that it had lost the attitude that made it so special.  
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Southern Weekend’s turn towards more political news and less critical 
journalism can be read in yet another way. In the end, it might be the 
only way for the paper to continue to publish and avoid being closed 
down. Another paper in the Southern group, the Metropolitan News (Nan-
fang Dushibao) made a similar choice after several instances of negative 
sanctions, the most serious of which was the detention of three of its edi-
tors for several months. The editor-in-chief then coined the formulation 
power is in the mainstream (Wang 2006). The most immediate concern for 
the editor-in-chief was to continue to produce a paper that brings in lots 
of money for its corporate owners and secures the work of his employees. 
After all the difficulties the paper had been through, the power to con-
tinue was directly linked to a more mainstream positioning of the paper. 
Wu Yunlu says the same about Southern Weekend: “it should change from 
being a marginal paper to become a mainstream paper”. A dimension of 
this kind of self-regulation is that by continuing to exist, and by connect-
ing the newspapers’ past with the future, these papers normalize their 
existence within Chinese news discourse. There is power in establishing 
something as mainstream, and in continuing despite authorities’ interfer-
ences.  
POLITICAL CONTROL AND SANCTIONS 
Freedom of expression and freedom of the press are protected under the 
Chinese constitution, which was adopted in 1982. Whether or not there is 
freedom of expression in China was a question none of the journalists I 
interviewed brought up in our discussions. Instead they compared the 
present to the past, and introduced me to a context that provided them 
with a larger degree of freedom to conduct ‘real’ journalism, in contrast 
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to previous propaganda practices. Some even claimed that they could 
investigate and publish nearly anything they wanted to (Interview, Feng 
Lihong). Utterances as this reflect the heterogeneity of the group of inter-
viewees. In spite of their common engagement with investigative news, 
their choice of topics and angles expose them to different degrees of regu-
lation. In general, critical journalists appear to internalize political limits 
to freedom of expression in much the same way as journalists in liberal 
democracies internalize the limits imposed by the market. Most of my 
informants made it clear that they did not accept the limitations to free-
dom of expression as legitimate, but that there are nevertheless bounda-
ries they have to take into consideration in their work. 
In contrast to the Soviet propaganda system, media regulation in 
China has not been conducted through extensive pre-publication censor-
ship (Brady 2008, Wu 1994). There are some exceptions: for instance, the 
producers of CCTV’s program Focus have to seek permission for every 
program, because they expose local problems and reach out to such a 
large audience (Chan 2002). Political regulation within the Chinese media 
field has been implemented through administrative practices, political 
managerialism and ad hoc notices. These regulatory practices are em-
bedded within the Propaganda xitong, and their evolution reflects shifts 
in the power relations between different factions within the CCP leader-
ship, as well as variations in the emphasis placed upon propaganda and 
thought work over time. It is not that strange that the interviewed jour-
nalists refer to their “gut feeling”, when asked about how they manage to 
keep within the limits of the politically acceptable. The regulations guid-
ing Chinese media practice are complex, volatile, and the use of direc-
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tives and ad hoc interventions means that they can be unpredictable (Fu 
and Cullen 1996).  
During the 1980s, the need for a media law was a central political 
question. The political leadership of the decade concentrated their efforts 
on economic reform (Brady 2008). Premier Zhao Ziyang favoured 
strengthening the watchdog role of the media and political control of the 
media thereby decreased. Zhao advocated a media law that would make 
journalists less vulnerable to arbitrary restrictions. This process came to 
an end with the crackdown on the Tiananmen demonstrations in June 
1989 (Zhao 1998). Zhao Ziyang was forced to resign and Chinese journal-
ists faced new and stricter regulations that reflected the renewed power 
of the Propaganda xitong (Brady 2008). 
The central Propaganda Department outlines policies regarding the 
mass media, such as the priority of different kinds of news reports. Some 
of these guidelines are printed in an internal paper, the Internal Report 
(Neibu Tongxin) which is distributed to provincial and local propaganda 
departments and to the newspapers. Here, policies and regulations ac-
cording to current topics are presented, and politically correct vocabulary 
is explained; the paper also publishes warnings and speeches by central 
propaganda officials (Brady 2008). In addition to the hierarchy of propa-
ganda departments, the government has a central agency of media and 
publications and provincial bureaus of media and publications. Their 
task is to maintain day-to-day newspaper control (Fu and Cullen 1996). 
However, these government offices are also part of the Propaganda xi-
tong, and in practice they are subject to the authority of the central propa-
ganda department (Brady 2008). Probably as a consequence of the diver-
sification and extension of the media sector, propaganda authorities es-
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tablished groups of retired propaganda officials, journalists and editors to 
carry out post-publication control of local papers (Brady 2008). This way 
the propaganda authorities will be informed if a paper goes too far, and 
can impose negative sanctions. 
The laws that journalists and other media workers must abide by are 
directed towards society in general and cover areas such as national secu-
rity and state secrets. The Protection of state secrets provisional regulations 
from 1951 included a broad conception of state secrets involving military 
and banking secrets as well as meteorological forecasts and all state af-
fairs not yet made public. Since then the scope of the definition of state 
secrets has been narrowed, but any matter that might affect the security 
and interests of the state, its integrity, national unity and social stability is 
still regarded as a state secret (Fu and Cullen 1996). The consequence is 
that the list of state secrets is incomplete, because any topic might be a 
state secret if its disclosure leads to consequences such as social instabil-
ity. State units at different levels classify state secrets within their own 
units, and each central state organ has its own rules on the classification 
of secrets. Within the judiciary, it is the Supreme People’s Court that is 
entitled to classify information. The most important secrets within this 
area will be drawn from information about cases which have serious con-
sequences for social stability, national unity, race relations, and foreign 
relations. Statistics on sensitive topics, such as the use of death penalty, 
constitute a state secret in this sense. Several dissidents have been ac-
cused of revealing state secrets because the information they revealed 
could ostensibly have this effect (Fu and Cullen 1996). 
China has strict rules against pornographic materials, and these rules 
also extend to publications which are seen as partially obscene and inde-
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cent. These involve elements such as “explicit portrayal of degenerate 
behaviour, which could cause juvenile imitation”, and “explicit portrayal 
of sexual diseases, such as syphilis, gonorrhoea and AIDS which ordinary 
people find disgusting” (Fu and Cullen 1996:172). Regarding pornogra-
phy, Brady (2008) explains that there has been a movement among 
propaganda authorities towards a greater tolerance for “soft” porn. Nev-
ertheless, protecting the public from pornography remains a central ex-
planation for the need to control and regulate the media, in particular the 
internet. 
Perhaps the primary judicial instrument for controlling Chinese media 
has been the law on defamation (Fu and Cullen 1996). Defamation occurs 
when “ A says to another or to others, something about B which is false 
and derogatory and which does harm to B’s reputation” (Fu and Cullen 
1996:183). Defamation can be a crime, but generally it is a civil wrong and 
is redressed through civil law suits. In China, the personal right to repu-
tation acquired protection through the Civil Law General Principles in 
1986. This law was followed by a “ suing reporters fever”, where among 
others many high ranking officials, policemen and representatives to the 
People’s Congress accused journalists and editors of defamation. Defa-
mation law is better suited for day-to-day control of the media than are 
the other formal restrictions. State secrets and national security are more 
limited in their application, the rules are vague, and they do not protect 
against criticism of the CCP and government officials being uttered. 
As the direct political control of Chinese media has gradually weak-
ened, the use of civil law of defamation offers an indirect method of con-
trol. According to He (2004), Jiang Zemin issued a secret directive in 
Shanghai in 1994 which encouraged authorities to handle political ques-
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tions through non-political means. Rather than accusing people on the 
grounds of crimes of conscience, the party-state should bring its enemies 
into disrepute through accusations of visiting prostitutes, fraud or cor-
ruption. In private lawsuits, the role of the party-state is further con-
cealed, because the judiciary appears as a neutral third party in the con-
flict between a plaintiff and the media. The increased financial independ-
ence of Chinese media makes defamation a particularly apt tool for con-
trolling journalists, because lost defamation suits threaten the financial 
viability of commercial media outlets. When this risk makes media out-
lets careful about exposing officials and other people in a negative way, it 
also means that the cost of censorship is transferred from the party-state 
to the parties who might be involved in a potential defamation suit.  
LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND MEDIA CONTROL 
State ownership and control of personnel has probably been the most 
important means to ensure the mouthpiece role of Chinese media. After 
the revolution in 1949, private ownership of the media was gradually 
reduced until it was abolished in 1957 (Fu and Cullen 1996). In the Mao 
era this control was almost absolute. There was no labour market, the 
party-state appointed journalists to their work unit and the media outlets 
had no alternative sources of funding than state subsidies. The party-
state’s financial control over the media has been weakened during the 
economic reform period, and journalists are hired and fired, but the 
party-state’s formal ownership of some media outlets remains an impor-
tant source of control. The organization of ownership is decentralized 
and authorities on every level of the party-state can control their own 
media. This ownership structure gives local authorities power to imple-
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ment policies within their own jurisdiction, and contributes to great 
variations in the levels of media control (Interview, Wu Yunlu, Xu Feng, 
Feng Junjiu).  
Southern Weekend is owned by the Guangdong Provincial Party Com-
mittee, which has been known to give the media more freedom to pub-
lish critical and investigative journalism than other provincial authorities. 
To avoid provoking the Guangdong authorities and risk having the rela-
tively greater freedom of the media withdrawn, Southern Weekend has 
focused less on cases that have involved the responsibility of Guangdong 
authorities, and more on other provinces. According to journalists who 
have worked for the paper, they have raised important social issues in 
Guangdong too, but within the Southern group, this has perhaps particu-
larly been the task of the Metropolitan News (Nanfang Dushibao) (Interview, 
Fan Yihong).  
One case from Southern Weekend that illustrates geographic power re-
lations in the media is the Zhang Jun story that figured in the media in 
2001. Zhang Jun led a criminal gang operating in Guangdong province, 
had conducted armed raids against banks and shops and was also ac-
cused of murder. Within the mouthpiece role of the media, such stories 
are reported in a uniform way, by morally condemning the criminal acts 
and emphasising the action taken by the party-state to put an end to the 
activities of the criminals. Southern Weekend took another approach to the 
Zhang Jun case and went to his home village in Anhui to research his 
background. The story became an investigation of how this intelligent 
man became a hardened criminal. The journalists situated the case of 
Zhang Jun in a more general context of problems in China’s rural areas 
and the discrimination against Chinese peasants in the cities (interview, 
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Wu Yunlu). This story infuriated the leader of Anhui’s provincial party 
committee, who claimed that the Zhang Jun case was only about a rotten 
criminal and had nothing to do with social problems. But the Anhui au-
thorities could not intervene directly: the paper fell within the jurisdiction 
of Guangdong province and the current relationship between the prov-
inces does not allow one province to enforce its will upon another prov-
ince, although they can use their influence to negotiate as equals. The 
Anhui authorities therefore adopted a twofold strategy. They approached 
representatives of the Guangdong Party Committee and argued their 
case. They also contacted central party authorities and claimed that the 
Guangdong media had inflicted harm on the whole party. The Anhui 
representatives argued that reports such as Southern Weekend’s articles 
about the social background of Zhang Jun satirized and made fun of the 
party and constituted a serious threat to the CCP and its ability to govern.  
As a result of the pressure from central authorities and Anhui provin-
cial authorities, the Guangdong Province Party Committee had no choice 
but to carry out a supervision of Nanfang Zhoumo (interview, Wu Yunlu). 
The first stage in the Provincial Party Committee’s supervision was to 
remove the party’s editor-in-chief, Jiang Yiping; she was transferred to 
another paper within the Southern group (He 2004). The propaganda au-
thorities’ argument was that it was necessary to replace her with a person 
better able to serve the party. The second stage of the supervision was to 
discipline the journalist and the editor behind the Zhang Jun story; both 
were dismissed. This piece of investigative journalism was interpreted as 
posing threat to the CCP’s ability to govern because it suggested that the 
party and its policies were to blame for criminal behaviour of the kind 
committed by Zhang Jun (Interview, Wu Yunlu). According to Wu 
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Yunlu, other articles with a similar critical content had been passed ear-
lier, but this time the reaction was so strong that sanctions were imposed.  
The process which followed the Zhang Jun case reflects the arbitrary 
nature of sanctions against the Chinese media. Decentralized control over 
the media contributes to this phenomenon, because in most cases it is up 
to local authorities to decide whether or not journalists will be allowed 
access to and be permitted to report on a local issue. After accidents, or 
other major incidents, the local government will usually establish a group 
that handles information and other aspects relating to the incident. This 
often results in a news blockade; journalists are refused access and any 
documentation, such as their film, is confiscated (interview, Fan Yihong). 
The local authorities’ decisions are then conveyed to news media by the 
Propaganda Department, which calls or sends a fax to the provincial 
party committees; these in turn contact the newspapers within their ju-
risdiction. They either call the editor-in-chief and ask the paper not to 
publish the report, or they call the paper and tell the editor that the report 
may not be published. Xu Feng explained that when he hears about acci-
dents or other major incidents, he and other journalists will go intending 
to investigate, conduct interviews and write their reports. When local 
government authorities decide to close a case, he normally receives a 
phone call where a voice asks: “Have you left yet? If so, come back, don’t 
write a single word”. From the perspective of the party-state and its 
propaganda authorities, phone calls have the advantage of not leaving a 
paper trail. The suppression of free speech this control involves is diffi-
cult to document extensively, because it is ad hoc and orally transmitted 
(Brady 2008). 
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Local authorities can deny the media’s access to a case by refusing to 
allow them to write anything about it, but a widespread alternative is to 
control the media by restricting relevant sources. This also has the advan-
tage of making the political control of media more indirect. Xu Feng ex-
plained that this had happened when he was investigating a case where 
several people had been poisoned and killed in Nanjing. The local inves-
tigation group withheld information and would not even reveal the 
number of people who had been killed. The same strategy is employed 
by local authorities all over the country (He 2004). Xu Feng considers that 
this strategy is pointless, explaining that the propaganda bureaucrats still 
believe that if they block the news sources, people will believe what the 
Propaganda Department is saying.  
This raises the more general question of whether or not propaganda’s 
function to any extent depends upon its believability. Scott (1990) argues 
that propaganda can be an empty spectacle, such as a parade without 
spectators, because propaganda’s value is connected to the power it 
demonstrates, and not to its ability to convince people. In cases where the 
Chinese party-state distributes false and absurd information, it demon-
strates the state’s power to suppress opposition and alternative voices. 
During the last decade, the propaganda authorities’ have aimed to 
strengthen the believability of propaganda. For instance, they have 
warned against publishing exaggerated reports about model workers, 
depicting them as people who will not even go home to sleep, because 
this will make it hard for people to follow their example in real life 
(Brady 2008). This underscores Scott’s point that propaganda’s principal 
value is independent of its ability to convince people. 
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SANCTIONS 
The sanctions against Chinese journalists range from public apologies in 
the form of self-criticism, replacements or dismissal to court cases and 
prison. A self-criticism is a public apology that restores the norms of 
domination. By making a public apology, the subordinate admits the 
offence; the authority’s judgement is also publicly accepted (Scott 1990). 
As in the relation between propaganda and believability, public apolo-
gies do not depend on sincerity to be effective, because their importance 
lies in how they represent the power holder. Power relations can accom-
modate a high level of resistance as long as it is not publicly displayed 
(Scott 1990). Common forms of public apology within the Chinese media 
field are the replacement of journalists and editors and the publication of 
a self-criticism. For instance, China Youth Daily had to publish a self-
criticism after it had reported on the flood in Jiujiang and how the dykes 
were in danger in 1998, refusing to follow the authorities’ decision not to 
publish anything about the dykes. One of their journalists subsequently 
used this example when he gave a public speech at the elite Qinghua 
University in Beijing. He had been invited to talk about how to be a good 
journalist, and he chose this example in spite of the reaction it had 
evoked from the authorities. This shows that the self-criticism was an act 
of pretended subordination. The journalist’s resistance to the political re-
striction of news media continued when he chose to display his lack of 
repentance in front of the Qinghua students. 
One experienced editor said that the most dangerous cases are the 
ones involving children of high officials. The party-state’s sanctions can 
be triggered on the basis of the hurt feelings and personal interest of 
powerful people, and not because any rules were broken. There is no 
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doubt that the risk of state sanctions has a disciplinary effect on journal-
ists and editors. Losing one’s job is a serious problem, and it is difficult to 
find a willing employer for a journalist who has caused serious trouble. 
Verdicts and imprisonment are even more serious, and the threat of state 
sanctions ensures that journalists remain attentive to and interpret the 
signals as to what they may or may not write. What makes it particularly 
difficult for Chinese journalists to manoeuvre is that the imposition of 
sanctions often depends more upon who is involved than what the case is 
about Whether anyone powerful is involved, or the issue includes some-
one with a relationship to the central government, is decisive in deter-
mining whether or not material about an issue can be published (Inter-
view, Shi Youli). Critical journalists in China try to protect themselves 
against this risk by investigating the personal networks of people in-
volved every case they research, trying to predict the reactions of the in-
volved parties in order to avoid sanctions. As mentioned in chapter 5, 
critical journalists see their ability to predict the boundaries of what can 
and cannot be written as an aspect of their professional qualifications. 
This was reflected when Wu Yunlu discussed the Zhang Jun story. He 
did not emphasise that the Anhui authorities had reacted in an unex-
pected way. Instead, he underscored that the propaganda authorities had 
no choice but to react the way they did, given the nature of the protests 
from the Anhui provincial authorities. In other words, Wu considers the 
sanctions to be a kind of logical necessity. This does not imply that he 
accepts the reaction as legitimate, but he construes the ability to interpret 
and foresee state sanctions as part of his professional skills as a journalist, 
even in hindsight. 
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Lack of judicial protection also makes the media vulnerable to reac-
tions from private actors. In the day-to-day work of the Chinese media, 
pressure and threats from private actors are perceived as presenting a 
larger obstacle to the work of journalists than the party-state’s interven-
tions (Interviews, Gao Jing, Fan Yihong, Ai Hongwen). State interven-
tions and sanctions can be arbitrary and unforeseen, and the aggregate 
numbers of sanctions such as imprisonments and court cases imposed on 
Chinese journalists reflect the difficult working conditions for Chinese 
journalists. 
 Nevertheless, party-state sanctions are in general never life-
threatening, and investigative journalists rarely find that their watchdog 
role in relation to the state exposes them to physical danger. Much inves-
tigative reporting, however, targets topics such as economic misman-
agement, corruption, shady deals in the stock market and quackery, and 
involves private actors. Information that protects costumers against fake 
products and services has been an important arena for the development 
of critical journalism in China. In 1995-96, when the disclosure of corrup-
tion cases and other examples of investigative journalism was a new 
phenomenon, private actors posed a relatively greater threat to Southern 
Weekend journalists (interview, Fan Yihong). One example was a case in 
which journalists from Southern Weekend investigated a story involving a 
group of immigrants from Shanxi province pretending to be doctors 
treating venereal diseases in Guangdong. They had a profitable business 
and were protected through connections with people in the Department 
of Commerce and Trade. Cases such as this, where media attention will 
deprive people of their illegal income, are dangerous for journalists. The 
endeavours undertaken by private actors to prevent journalists and edi-
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tors from publishing their reports take different forms, ranging from 
bribes to violent threats. The journalists who investigated this case re-
ceived threatening phone calls from people instructing them to drop the 
case or else (Interview, Fan Yihong). 
Ai Hongwen has worked a lot with mafia-related problems, and has 
handled many difficult situations. In one case he received several phone 
calls where funeral music was played in the other end of the line, which 
he perceived as death threats. He was also approached by mafia repre-
sentatives asking him to discontinue his investigations. In one case his 
enemies tried to make it look as if he had received money from them, so 
that they could question his integrity and reduce the impact of his work. 
Another journalist, Gao Jing, described an investigation in the countryside 
where she was on her own and the person she wanted to interview kept 
delaying their appointment; when night fell she felt threatened and man-
aged to return to the city. Many Southern Weekend journalists have had 
such experiences. One journalist was chased by a car while she was in-
vestigating a case in Xi’an. She called the paper and they made colleagues 
in Xi’an help her. Others have received threats against their families 
while they have been investigating cases in other locations. In these situa-
tions, support from the newspaper has been extremely important. Editors 
have mobilized colleagues, called the police and defended the journalists 
against false accusations (Interview, Fan Yihong). In this unstable envi-
ronment, the relationship between a paper’s editor-in-chief and its jour-
nalists becomes particularly important (interview, Ai Hongwen). 
The widespread phenomenon of paid journalism in China means that 
many private actors assume that journalists can be paid to stop an inves-
tigation. Offering money to ensure the cooperation of journalists is a 
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common reaction from people who think their interests will be threat-
ened by media attention. If a journalist refuses bribes and continues to 
work, another strategy employed is make it seem as if huge bribes have 
been accepted (Interview, Ai Hongwen). The meaning of taking bribes is 
not clearly defined within Chinese media discourse. Paid journalism ap-
pears as a normal practice. As a result, for journalists who do not accept 
bribes and seek to establish an independent stance, this becomes a defin-
ing feature of their professional identity. For independent-minded jour-
nalists, accepting bribes is perceived as something that is incompatible 
with objectivity and professional journalism. However, critical journalists 
argue that there are cases in which it is impossible to avoid bribes. South-
ern Weekend has tried to resolve this dilemma by requiring that journalists 
hand over any bribes received to the paper, in order to ensure the inde-
pendent position of the paper’s journalists (Interview, Fan Yihong).  
Critical journalists in China risk negative sanctions from party-state 
authorities if their work is perceived as a threat to powerful people. Criti-
cal journalists also lack protection from the party-state in relation to pri-
vate actors. They interpret their own vulnerability in relation to private 
actors as a consequence of a corrupt and clientelist system. Judges, police, 
the procuratorate as well as political leaders accept attacks on journalists 
because their personal interests are at stake (interview, Ai Hongwen). 
POWER TECHNIQUES: DOMINATION AND RESISTANCE  
Critical journalists in China are subject to a substantial number of limita-
tions in their work. They mediate information within an authoritarian 
context in which the hegemon’s conception of the media is as a mouth-
piece for the CCP. This section of the chapter focuses on the power tech-
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niques employed by party-state authorities and the strategies of resis-
tance with which critical journalists respond. After the crackdown on the 
Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989 and the intra-CCP power 
struggle which ensued, the winning faction within the CCP leadership 
argued that one of the main causes for the uprising was that propaganda 
work had been neglected in the period of economic reform (Brady 2008). 
The leadership realized that they had to develop their propaganda and 
thought work to accommodate a new situation characterized by modern 
information technology and an increasingly diversified media, and 
changed the emphasis from a narrow mouthpiece (houshe) conception of 
the media to one focusing on agenda-setting (yulun daoxiang). However, 
the CCP leadership never questioned the principle that media should 
serve the interests of the party-state (Chan 2002). Agenda-setting differs 
from previous propaganda paradigms since it allows for more than one 
voice. It reflects a change in the party-state’s ambition, from aiming at 
controlling what people think, to seeking to influence what people think 
about. Agenda-setting represents an active approach to propaganda, in-
spired and influenced by Western PR methods and debates (Brady 2008).  
Agenda-setting makes space for public supervision (yulun jiandu) as 
long as journalists only expose limited problems, for instance problems at 
the local levels of Chinese society that can be addressed and rectified. 
When these problems are dealt with, this contributes to an image of the 
central party-state as being responsive and responsible. Through public 
supervision, local cadres are held responsible for their mistakes, and so-
cial problems are linked to local mismanagement rather than fundamen-
tal policy failures or a lack of legitimacy on the part of the CCP. In other 
words, the development of more critical journalism can be traced to a 
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change in party-state policies. This raises the question of whether critical 
journalism only is a way for people and journalists to let out steam, to 
express anger and criticism on a very limited scale. When my conclusion 
suggests otherwise, it is because of the potential for transgression in-
volved in critical journalism. It is clear that it is journalists and not the 
government who have pushed out the boundaries of critical journalism. 
The party-state seeks to employ investigative and problem-oriented jour-
nalism for its own purposes, but this ambition does not guarantee the 
loyalty of journalists. When Scott (1990) analyzes the use of hydraulic 
metaphors, he argues that they underestimate the agency of the subordi-
nate. In the case of the Chinese media, a limited, autonomous space 
might allow for valuable practice, and indeed the increase in critical jour-
nalism in China in the latter half of the 1990s trained journalists in inves-
tigative methods. These methods can easily be transferred to a different 
level. Another important aspect of the practice of critical journalists is 
their willingness to “toe the line”. They do not passively accept the 
boundaries established by the authorities. By toeing the line, they try to 
go as far as is possible without incurring sanctions. However, this does 
not make it impossible for critical journalism that stays within the ac-
cepted limits to serve the interests of the party-state. Tthe following dis-
cussion explores the character of the relevant limitations, and what criti-
cal journalists do to expand their spaces of representation.  
LIMITS TO INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM 
When former president Jiang Zemin visited the People’s Daily (Renmin 
Ribao) in 1996 he exclaimed that: “Correct agenda-setting will benefit the 
people, while incorrect agenda-setting will bring disaster” (quoted in 
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(Chan 2002:48). This statement illustrates how central principles defining 
the mouthpiece role of media are maintained within the policy of agenda-
setting. First, by saying that correct agenda-setting will benefit the peo-
ple, Jiang upholds the notion that the relationship between the party and 
the people is harmonious and does not contain conflicts of interest. Sec-
ond, his statement continues the instrumental understanding of media’s 
role. Third, his statement upholds the discursive practice of associating 
freedom of speech with chaos and disaster. Correct agenda-setting and 
public supervision are new means for achieving the same goal as previ-
ous propaganda journalism, namely to contribute to positive image con-
struction for the party-state (Chan 2002). This is possible as long as jour-
nalism contributes to construing the party-state as responsive; in order to 
have this effect, the negative issues which the media discusses have to be 
limited to problems that can be rectified. This was emphasised by Yang 
Weiguang, the president of CCTV (China’s national TV station) at a 
seminar about the current affairs program Focus (Jiaodian Fangtan). He 
said that:  
No matter whether a topic is a positive or negative one…programs must give 
people encouragement, confidence, and strength to march forward, rather 
than a feeling of hopelessness. … Problems that the government has paid at-
tention to or is trying to solve may be dealt with…. Don’t deal with problems 
that are essentially unsolvable. Don’t deal with those problems for which 
there are definitely no immediate solutions.  
(Zhao 1998:120) 
Journalists may or may not support these considerations, but they will 
have to relate to them in their own work. While it is less limited and ideo-
logical than old-fashioned propaganda journalism, agenda-setting con-
tinues to regulate the timing, scope and content of critical reports. These 
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discursive boundaries express that the instrumental evaluation of the 
potential social effect of news is valued above what Chinese journalists 
call their readers’ right to know. 
Timing is a key factor within agenda-setting, and freedom of expres-
sion within the Chinese media fluctuates in relation to central social and 
political events and public holidays. The spring festival, the holiday week 
around May 1 and the national day on October 1 are seasons of the year 
when the media has to be warier than at other times. A student taking 
her master’s degree in journalism explained to me that one year while she 
was growing up, an environmental disaster had happened somewhere in 
China during the New Year’s celebration, but news was first disclosed a 
week later. She saw this as quite natural, because such sad news would 
have spoiled the celebration for the people (pers. comm. Shanghai 2001). 
Her account draws on a discourse that Lee (1990:7) calls a “Confucian 
ethos in Leninist disguise”. Within the Confucian tradition the relation-
ship between rulers and their subjects is likened to that of a family. The 
rulers are best qualified to represent and take care of their subjects’ inter-
ests. Both the family and society in general are conceived of as power-free 
spaces where there are no deep conflicts of interest. The image of benevo-
lent rulers with a heavenly mandate has been recast in CCP rhetoric, and 
it is this relation between rulers and subjects that is implicitly referred to 
when the media is silenced during holidays. Other sensitive times of the 
year include the anniversary for the crackdown of the democracy move-
ment on June 4th and major political events such as the annual National 
People’s Congress assemblies and Party congresses. Party-state authori-
ties see the periods leading up to political events or national holidays as 
times during which the media should convey optimistic attitudes and 
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national pride. This enhances the risks arising in connection with the 
critical exposure of social problems, and presupposes increased sensitiv-
ity to the directives given by propaganda authorities. Some of the jour-
nalists I wanted to interview about their critical and investigative work 
explicitly asked me to postpone our appointments until after the comple-
tion of the16th party congress in November 2002. For several weeks before 
the congress, restrictions would be intensified and talking to foreigners 
could cause difficulties. At that point Southern Weekend had recently been 
subjected to criticism, and journalists in the Southern group were proba-
bly more wary of crossing the line than others. Other journalists and edi-
tors I interviewed did not understand why such precautions would be 
necessary. This difference between journalists reveals that they perceive 
restrictions in different ways; their conception of their own freedom to act 
depends on what they want to do.  
The injunction to avoid problems that are not easily solved gives an 
indication of the scale-dimension of agenda-setting (Zhao 1998). Scale is 
relevant to the restriction of critical journalism in two senses: the first is 
the scale at which the incident or problem is located, and the second is 
the scale at which the news-media is located. Regarding the scale of 
news, the most important restriction is the one that protects the central 
level of the party-state against unauthorized or negative exposure. Every 
piece of information that might threaten the legitimacy of CCP rule is 
taboo, and this includes ridicule in the form of cartoons and jokes. Offi-
cials at the local levels are not protected in the same way, since their mis-
deeds can be explained as individual failures rather than systemic weak-
nesses. The media’s exposure of local and limited problems gives the 
central level of the state the possibility to intervene, rectify and hence to 
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appear as responsive and just. This illustrates how agenda-setting can be 
image-building since the lack of media criticism against the central levels 
of the state conveys an image of a well-functioning system. Differences in 
the reputation of the top leadership and local officials have also been a 
feature of other authoritarian systems. In late nineteenth-century Russia, 
there was a myth that the tsar had freed his loyal servants of serfdom, but 
that unfaithful officials deceived him and prevented the implementation 
of the decree (Scott 1990). Exposure of local problems may contribute to 
strengthening the image of the central level of the party-state as untar-
nished and legitimate and as a representative of the justice of which cor-
rupt local official so often deprive the people. As discussed in chapter 6, 
scaling can also be an active, discursive strategy. Corruption cases can be 
framed as limited and local, for instance through a narrative about a dis-
honest businessman whose greed brought him into trouble. At a higher 
scale, and with a larger scope, corruption cases may call into question the 
legitimacy of the entire political system. Knowing which problems can be 
discussed and at which scale is represented by Chinese journalists as a 
tacit understanding shared by everyone (Interview, Li Mingdao).  
The second aspect of scale and media restrictions concerns the organi-
zation of the state-owned media. In principle the media is owned by the 
party-state, and every newspaper has an affiliation with the party or the 
state which provides it with an administrative rank. There is a division 
between central, provincial and local media outlets. Among the central 
media, the People’s Daily has the highest rank. It is published by the CCP 
Central Committee and is the only paper with an administrative status 
equal to a department. The news bureau Xinhua also belongs to the cen-
tral media and is attached to the State Council. There is an informal rule 
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that media entities may criticize administrative layers corresponding to 
their own rank and below, and Shi Youli explains that “It is more or less 
the case that for issues in the local areas, at the provincial level, it is quite 
easy for Beijing, central media, to report”. Administrative rank is impor-
tant because it influences a media entity’s access to information, the size 
of its subsidies and who and what it may criticise (Fu and Cullen 1996). 
However, high administrative status restricts as well as enables. The Peo-
ple’s Daily, which has the highest administrative rank, is constrained by 
its status as the principal mouthpiece of the CCP. It is tacitly prohibited 
from publishing anything that breaks with the party line and its position 
makes it liable to strict censorship (Wu 1994).  
The Chinese party-state is not a monolithic and unitary political struc-
ture, and different provinces have practiced various levels of regulation 
and media control. The position of Southern Weekly is related to the rela-
tive openness of the Guangdong provincial authorities. Guangdong was 
the first province to embark on the process of economic reforms and 
neighbouring Hong Kong’s influence has been strong, also within the 
media. Beginning in the 1980s people had access to Hong Kong radio and 
television and this led to a situation in which provincial media had to 
compete with entertaining programs that were very different from Chinese 
state-regulated education-oriented information. As a response, the Pearl 
River Economic Radio was established in 1986, and its focus on light en-
tertainment, local social and economic issues represented an attempt to 
compete with Hong Kong radio. Similarly Hong Kong television has also 
had profound influence on local Guangdong television (Latham 2000). 
However, there is no necessary relation between economic develop-
ment and openness. Shanghai is often described as a locomotive in China’s 
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economic reform, but the Shanghainese media has operated under rather 
strict conditions (Interview, Zhao Sanpeng). Possible explanations may 
be that Shanghai’s history, known for its cultural decadence in the cen-
tury leading up to 1949 and a tradition for independent minded intellec-
tual life, has convinced the city’s leadership that the media needs to be 
closely controlled. The relationship between Shanghai provincial authori-
ties and the central government has been close, and several of the top 
leadership, including former president Jiang Zemin, have come from 
Shanghai. According to the journalist Zhao Sanpeng, there is a saying 
that local media should not “give the centre or Jiang additional problems”.  
Positioning of problems at the local scale does not help if the scope of 
the issue is too broad. An illustrating case is the demonstrations in 
Daqing during the spring of 2002. Fifty thousand oil workers took to the 
streets in this industrial city in Heilongjiang province, in the north-east of 
China. According to Han Dongfang, a Hong-Kong based labour activist, 
this were the biggest demonstrations over labour issues since 1949 (Wes-
ton 2004). When I asked journalists why news about the demonstrations 
did not appear in the open Chinese media, their answers made it clear 
that this was unthinkable within the present system. Large-scale demon-
strations directed against state-owned enterprises can only be reported 
by Xinhua journalists through the internal media channel. The main am-
bition of the party-state in such situations is to contain the protests, and 
they believe that public reports may inspire demonstrations in other lo-
calities as well and result in the problem getting out of hand. This does 
not prevent journalists from finding out about what is happening, since 
information spreads through informal channels, but they will not be able 
to act. The profound problems of Chinese state-owned enterprises mean 
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that any general analysis of the situation would risk questioning the eco-
nomic policies that created the financial difficulties that have left innu-
merable workers without salaries and/or pensions for substantial peri-
ods of time. The discursive boundaries block reports that might inspire 
and instigate protest. Conflicts between workers and private counterparts 
are less problematic and reports about such incidents are quite frequent, 
even in the open media. These conflicts are smaller in scope, and the 
chances that the problem can be solved are higher. 
News that has less obvious political implications is also restricted ac-
cording to scope. For instance, accidents are divided into three categories: 
small, intermediate and big (Interview, Xu Feng). Small accidents involve 
less than five deaths, five to ten are intermediate and more than ten 
deaths is a big accident. Coverage of big accidents is subjected to stricter 
controls, and often only Xinhua reporters are allowed to report on them. 
These restrictions exemplify how the division between positive and nega-
tive news continues to shape media content in China. The discursive 
boundaries for the scope of accidents uphold the notion that the news 
ought to be bearable. The journalist Ai Hongwen formulates it this way: if 
“the black is too black” it is difficult to publish the report. The notion of 
the need to protect the audience’s emotions is part of the paternalistic 
discourse that is typical for the mouthpiece role of media. 
The boundaries that are best protected and most dangerous to cross 
are the ones protecting national interests, which are broadly defined. For 
instance, the armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is a taboo 
and can only be represented through propaganda journalism. Foreign 
politics is another area that touches upon national interests, and where 
journalists have to respect the boundaries drawn up by the central gov-
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ernment. When propaganda authorities are particularly wary regarding 
foreign news, it is also because reports on foreign issues have been a 
means of expressing opinions of domestic matters in China. During the 
1980s, the Economic World Herald printed reports focusing on the devel-
opment of Hungary and the central role of political reforms in Hungarian 
politics. These articles were written by the well-known researcher and 
political scientist Su Shaozhi, and made it possible for him to make the 
argument for political reforms in an indirect way (Li and White 1991). 
From the view of propaganda authorities, ideal coverage of foreign news 
reflects a careful balance between different, sometimes conflicting, inter-
ests. The Chinese media’s reports about the United States demonstrate a 
critical attitude towards what is seen as US ambitions to dominate the 
world, as ostensibly exemplified by US accusations of Chinese human 
rights infringements such as the lack of freedom of expression, organisa-
tion and religion. Criticism of US politics is one of the areas where nega-
tive emotions may be released. This was particularly evident after the 
NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1998, and has 
been in evidence again during the recent uproar over the Olympic torch 
relay. In 1998, for example, for several days the Chinese media was filled 
with severe criticism of the US as a false, dishonest hegemon who pun-
ished the peace-loving Chinese people for resisting the United States’ 
ambition to rule the entire world (Sæther 2000). While party-state au-
thorities assumed that this criticism served a positive nationalist purpose, 
they felt compelled to restrict the criticism of the US in order to prevent a 
negative influence on China’s economic relationship with the US, in par-
ticular China’s upcoming application for WTO membership.  
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The media must approach sensitive issues with caution, and a central 
aspect of Chinese propaganda has been the regulation of the words used 
to describe topics of particular political importance (Schoenhals 1992). 
Information from the propaganda authorities provides news organiza-
tions with definitions and terminology (tifa). Reporting on religion in 
general, and Tibetan Buddhism in particular, is sensitive, and must fol-
low prescribed wording. The media is required to reflect the party-state’s 
antagonism towards the Dalai Lama, and this is signalled through name-
calling, such as ‘splittist’ and the ‘renegade Dalai Lama’. Similarly the 
banning of the Falungong movement has meant that every mentioning of 
Falungong in the media had to be followed by the description ‘the evil 
cult’ (Brady 2008). To the audience, the use of tifa signals that this is 
propaganda journalism, conveying politically ratified information. Such 
signs demarcate boundaries that critical journalism cannot cross. Doing 
that would mean the same as explicitly challenging the political legiti-
macy of the party-state, and for journalists who wish to continue their 
practice, there is nothing to be gained in doing so. Instead, critical jour-
nalism has developed within less politically sensitive fields. It is clear, 
however, that Chinese critical journalists do try to shift the boundaries 
where possible. For instance, reports about the police have been sensitive, 
but as Fu and Cullen (1996) note, that some defamation cases have been 
brought by the police indicates that the police is increasingly subject to 
negative exposure in the media.  
CREATING NEW SPACES OF REPRESENTATION 
When critical journalists describe their professional identity, they posi-
tion themselves as mediators between citizens and authorities. Their in-
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vestigations are often inspired by contact with ordinary people. Critical 
journalists aim to create new spaces of representation by giving voice to 
people who would otherwise have few means of attracting attention and 
being heard. During the post-Mao period of economic reform, the media 
has become more interactive, as opposed to the top-down character of 
pure propaganda journalism. Call-in shows on the radio and letters to the 
editor in the print media have become common (Zhao 1998), and on the 
web, online news portals offer new channels for interactive communica-
tion (Lagerkvist 2006). Journalists who have established a reputation for 
being critical are often approached by people who want their case heard, 
either personally at the newspaper, or by letter (Interview, Zhao San-
peng). Ai Hongwen explains that this was how he began an investigation 
of a corruption scandal in Zhejiang in 2001. Immigrants from Fujian 
province were working as fishermen in a village where they were ex-
ploited economically by the local government. Representatives for the 
fishermen contacted Southern Weekend, but the editor was sceptical be-
cause the case seemed difficult to investigate. The fishermen then ap-
proached Ai Hongwen personally and convinced him that this was an 
important case. During the course of investigation it became evident that 
behind the maltreatment of these immigrant fishermen there was a com-
plex corruption case. Ai documented how police and government offi-
cials were involved with local mafia, and responsible for serious criminal 
acts. Only some aspects of this story were published in Southern Weekend. 
At that time the paper was already under substantial pressure and edi-
tors and journalists did not know whether or not the propaganda de-
partment would instigate disciplinary measures. However, Ai’s knowl-
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edge and understanding of the central actors in this story has led him on 
to further investigations of corruption and abuse of power. 
The bottom-up approach prompts questions regarding the positional-
ity of journalists in relation to citizens in general. Within the confines of 
the mouthpiece role, it is no problem that journalists, together with other 
authorities, have a higher social standing than the people to whom they 
communicate the party line. In the context of highly stratified Chinese 
society, interaction between people of different class backgrounds is not 
without its problems, and journalists in general belong to the educated 
urban middle class which often looks down upon peasants as backward 
and uncultured. Many Chinese are also hesitant to provide journalists 
with information because they fear that officials will be able to use the 
information against them (Interview, Shi Youli). To make people feel 
safer, and to compensate for the class differences, journalists have to be 
very conscious of the way they treat people, how they dress and talk, and 
how they approach people. Journalist Xu Feng emphasises that in order 
to establish good relations with different people, the journalist has to re-
gard people as equals. A beggar and a prime minister have the same 
value, and the journalist is not above or below them in status. To Xu, this 
is the essence of the profession of journalism. To overcome people’s res-
ervations about talking to journalists, Xu negotiates with and explains 
things to them. He puts in plain words why he is working on a case, and 
in his experience most people calm down and open up when they under-
stand what he’s saying. He also makes sure that his outward appearance 
is very ordinary, so people will not feel intimidated. His education and 
role differentiate him from the people he interviews, but he tries to com-
pensate for that by respecting them and using a language they will un-
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derstand. He is also conscious that people’s inhibitions about talking to 
journalists mean that he will not get the whole truth. This is not necessar-
ily a problem, Xu argues, since two-thirds will usually be sufficient to 
write a story. Xu Feng’s thoughts on what it means to be a journalist re-
flect a belief in the journalist as a neutral actor, which is also part of West-
ern journalists’ self-conception.  
Being a critical journalist in China means working around limits. Jour-
nalists have to employ various strategies and approach problems from 
unusual angles in order to obtain information. de Burgh (2005) notices 
that the methods of investigative journalists everywhere are becoming 
increasingly similar. The same technology is available in China as else-
where, but the lack of openness and transparency in China poses a par-
ticular challenge. Hence, when critical journalists conduct their investiga-
tions, they pursue a great number of leads. It is particularly important to 
trace the social networks of people involved, because this is decisive for 
determining the risk involved in exposing a story. Other important 
sources of information are financial transactions, criminal records and 
government information, as well as conducting interviews.  
As mentioned in chapter 5, when there was an explosion in an elemen-
tary school in Jiangxi province, where school children had been exploited 
to produce fireworks, local authorities refused journalists access to the 
case. This meant that journalists could only write about it by approaching 
the case from another angle. Shi Youli tells that she had been interested in 
questions regarding education for a long time, and that she originally 
wanted to go to Jiangxi to write an article about education and security. 
She first called a colleague to ask about the opportunities for conducting 
interviews, and was told that nobody was being allowed in. Not even the 
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journalists of Education Daily, the Department of Education’s own 
mouthpiece, had access. The journalist’s next strategy was to approach 
the department for interviews or relevant statistics. This was a tedious 
process, because she had to post her questions and a copy of her journal-
ist’s ID, and all in vain, because the department never responded. When 
she called the department, it seemed impossible to get past their informa-
tion controllers. While telling this, Shi Youli made fun of such gatekeep-
ers, saying that they are all retired elevator operators and that rejecting 
people gives them a sense of power. By ridiculing the gatekeepers at the 
Department of Education, Shi Youli vented her frustration over the lack 
of information from central authorities and the waste of time and energy 
by of journalists who want to mediate this information. Finally, the only 
thing the people at the department told her was that relevant statistics 
could be accessed on their website, but the journalist never found them. 
This is a typical situation: Chinese authorities have established websites 
in order to appear more available and responsive, but in practice infor-
mation is still guarded and difficult to obtain. 
Searching for a new approach, Shi Youli then called the local Depart-
ment of Education. The man she spoke with was rather reluctant to talk 
to her, but she managed to strike up a conversation about more general 
things. During this talk he admitted that it was part of the local culture to 
“let the children do some easy work with their small fingers”. Based on 
the information from this source, Shi managed to find a person who 
could confirm that the explosion was caused by the children’s production 
of firecrackers. Shi’s experience is illustrative of the practices within Chi-
nese investigative journalism in several respects. First, it is essential for 
the journalist to find an acceptable entry into a topic. In this example, 
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education and security topics constitute a more general approach and 
could be used to overcome local authorities’ censorship. Second is the 
journalist’s impression of governmental authorities as distant and inac-
cessible, guarded by ignorant people with too much power. That web-
sites are offered as an excuse for not answering direct questions is also a 
common experience among Chinese journalists. The third typical feature 
is that Shi nonetheless manages to obtain some useful information due to 
a combination of her own personal skills and because she represents the 
media on a higher geographical level than the local government official.  
The power relations between higher and lower geographical levels 
sometimes sufficiently embolden the central media to cross the limits set 
by local officials. This was the case with the Jiujiang flood in 1998 in 
which the dykes were about to burst, as discussed in more detail in chap-
ter 5. Local officials forbade journalists from publishing anything about 
the story, but China Youth Daily ignored the prohibition and published 
the information. Two days later the local paper did so too and people 
were saved who might otherwise have become flood victims (Interview, 
Zhao Sanpeng).  
Due to the difficulties in acquiring information from officials, as well 
as the fear among people of being interviewed, critical journalists in 
China depend upon their own networks for information. One journalist 
described how his own work experience within the judiciary from the 
time before he became a journalist has provided him with a network of 
former colleagues and friends who can give him important information. 
He emphasised the value of retired cadres as useful sources, as they are 
less vulnerable and often dare to speak their mind in cases of corruption 
and malpractice. Experience from previous cases is also an important 
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resource in journalists’ investigations. For instance, if a case has led to 
good relations to public security officials, they might assist the journalists 
in later investigations (Interview, Shi Youli). For university educated 
journalists, relations to other alumni can be a particularly useful resource 
in their investigations. Alumni from elite universities obtain important 
positions and can provide information from various fields (Interview, 
Fan Yihong).  
In addition to carefully conducted methods of investigation, working 
around the boundaries set by the authorities involves employing discur-
sive strategies. The use of academic experts or as sources can contribute 
to discursively transferring the boundaries from academia to the media 
field. Universities and the media are two different discourse orders with 
different limits on speech. Chinese academics and researchers have more 
freedom than journalists to present controversial statements, and hence 
interdiscursivity becomes a means of extending the spaces of representa-
tion within the media. This was the case when Southern Weekend started 
to publish social news in the 1980s. At that time scholars and academics 
wrote essays which the paper published, and this became the inspiration 
for the paper’s launch of investigative and critical journalism on social 
issues. Shi Youli explained that:  
Normally we don’t get many interviews from above, we just search our data-
bases and find some policies and try to get some ordinary people to talk 
and…not officials, but the experts, the scholars to talk. That is easy. We try to 
do this and now the scholars are willing to talk about their views.  
Scholars and UNAids were important actors in the process of making 
AIDS a topic of public discourse. Representatives for the UN organiza-
tion that had started to work with China’s AIDS problem contacted 
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Southern Weekend, and the journalists started to research how coverage on 
AIDS was being handled in international news. They used the internet, 
which was still a new tool for Chinese journalists around 1998, and dis-
covered that the problem was already very serious. In Southern Weekend’s 
first exposure of the AIDS problem in China, they sent journalists to 
Yunnan province to interview people, and to illustrate the article, they 
used a picture of an ill and weak girl, only four or five years old (inter-
view, Fan Yihong). The picture received a lot of attention and inspired 
compassion from the paper’s readers. In the discursive opening of AIDS 
as a topic within the public sphere, Southern Weekend combined the use of 
experts as sources with the individualising strategy of presenting one 
suffering child as a symbol of an extensive problem. Both strategies con-
tributed to the paper’s ability to work around the limits of journalism in 
China in the 1990s. 
In democratic countries, the political opposition is very important in 
facilitating journalists’ investigations (de Burgh 2000c). Within the Chi-
nese one-party system, journalists do not have that kind of backing, but 
they still make use of conflicts within the state. Oppositional factions 
within the political leadership were important for the development of 
investigative journalism in China during the 1980s (Zhao 1998). Few 
journalists have this kind of elite support, and a more common strategy is 
to utilize conflicts between different departments of the local state. When 
Shi Youli investigated a trafficking case in Guangxi province, part of the 
problem was the weak border control that allowed Vietnamese traffickers 
to cross the border. The frontier border control section and the public 
security bureau had opposing interests in this case. The frontier section 
did not want attention drawn to the lack of effective border controls, 
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while the public security bureau thought that the traffickers were a public 
security problem and wanted the problem exposed in order to achieve 
more efficient border control. Such differences within the party-state can 
be leveraged to unearth out new information about social problems. Wu 
Yunlu emphasised that even though the party has a central level, it does 
not make the interests of different places unitary. Critical journalists have 
used these differences:  
Newspapers have discovered that within the party organization, not every 
level and branch has the same interest. It is within these differences that 
newspapers have sought for their space for survival.  
(Interview Wu Yunlu) 
Different local authorities also have varying degrees of tolerance for criti-
cal and investigative journalism. A media scholar, Min Yuxi, gives an 
example from Shanxi province, where a city mayor in Changzhi encour-
aged critical journalism and declared that he had no use for journalists 
who did not dare to criticize. Min says that this development has been 
followed with great interest, both from media people and from the cen-
tral government, but no one has tried to intervene. Local differences in 
levels of control may also be used when a journalist who is not allowed to 
publish a story in his or her own newspaper contact colleagues in a less 
restricted locality to have it published there. 
Utilizing scale is a discursive and social strategy that enables journal-
ists to bring forward information about which the public would other-
wise not known. This extends the space of representation, and contrib-
utes to normalizing critical discourse. As previously discussed, journal-
ists’ scaling of social problems is a conscious strategy that doesn’t only 
take into account geographical levels. When Shou Yan recounted her 
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experience in reporting about the political mobilization among Hepatitis 
B carriers, she emphasised how she approached the case from the indi-
vidual scale and only hinted at the more systemic context of the case. At 
the outset, the striking feature of this case was how activists used the 
internet and mobilized against the labour law that excluded Hepatitis B 
carriers from the labour market. This, however, was too closely con-
nected to political mobilization and could not be presented as the fore-
front of the story. Instead, Shou approached the case upside-down: not 
from the angle of the social movement, but from the angle of individual 
stories of misery and suffering. She first wrote about a two-year-old child 
who was not admitted to a nursery centre, and then on the basis of the 
personal narratives touched upon the internet campaign and its support-
ers’ request for an end to discrimination against Hepatitis B carriers. 
A major ambition of critical journalists in China is to give voice to the 
weak. Wu Yunlu says that he wants to argue against the two-track soci-
ety, where the division between the rich and the poor only grows deeper 
over time. For this purpose one discursive strategy is to use the language 
of the past but employ it for new ends. The CCP’s discourses on equality 
can be turned around and used as a critique of present policies. In this 
way, journalists avoid highlighting explicit systemic criticism, because 
China is allegedly a communist country in which socialist values are 
praised. This resistance strategy has also been employed by other groups. 
Weston (2004) describes how the protesting oil workers in Daqing repre-
sented themselves as being allies of the CCP, and how they appealed to 
the paternalist discourse of the CCP. Similar discursive strategies consti-
tuted means of resistance among American slaves before the US Civil 
War, who used the owners’ paternalist discourses to appeal for better 
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living conditions (Scott 1990). When journalists employ CCP discourses 
on equality to indirectly criticise present policies and injustice, it creates a 
protective shield against interference. This is a necessity in a context of 
domination, but it does not prevent the message from being conveyed. 
Summing up 
The critical press in China is characterized by a conditional autonomy. 
The need for self-regulation by critical journalists reflects their working 
conditions within an authoritarian one-party state. In order to avoid 
negative sanctions, critical and investigative journalists carefully evaluate 
the possible consequences of their reports and see their ability to foresee 
and avoid difficulties as central to their successful practising of their pro-
fession. Their work is subject to control and restrictions from both party-
state and private actors. Freedom of expression is a constitutional right in 
China, but it is subordinate to the protection of state interests. This de-
prives critical journalists of the protection which their colleagues in estab-
lished democracies have. When journalists cross the boundary of politi-
cally accepted media discourse, they risk disciplinary sanctions such as 
self-criticisms and dismissal, but also more severe punishments such as 
prison sentences. 
After the upheavals of 1989, the CCP leadership decided to increase 
the emphasis on propaganda and thought work, while recognising the 
necessity of adjusting propaganda methods to the emerging information 
society. Agenda-setting (yulun daoxiang) is the result of this policy, and 
represents a more subtle approach to propaganda. This turn has opened 
the way for more critical and investigative journalism, as long as it is re-
stricted in scale and scope and avoids problems that cannot easily be 
254 Conditional autonomy: restrictions and resistance 
solved. In this sense, critical journalism in China can be interpreted as 
propaganda, just by new means. The exposure of limited problems at the 
local scale of the state can contribute to promoting an image of a more 
responsive and legitimate central state that listens and responds to the 
grievances of the people. Nevertheless, the ambitions of critical journal-
ists do not correspond to the aims of propaganda authorities. Rather than 
accepting their boundaries, critical journalists work around the limits. 
They seek to establish the media as a bottom-up communication channel. 
Through their social and discursive strategies they frame criticism in 
ways subtle enough to be allowed publication, and direct enough to sug-
gest the existence of severe social problems in Chinese society. The ability 
to do this secures a conditional autonomy resulting in new spaces of rep-
resentation. 
 
 Chapter eight 
Conclusion 
This dissertation is motivated by an interest in how our ways of thinking 
and expressing ourselves work politically. Discourses are linguistic 
means of categorizing and organizing the world, and as we establish rela-
tions between signs that result in discourses, we create meaning. Sur-
rounding our discourses is a field of other potential meanings, alternative 
possible articulations; due to this, discourses are always constructed in 
relation to what they are not. This is where the political aspect of dis-
course analysis comes from: by shaping our conceptions, discourses 
make some acts more likely than others. In daily language, as well as in 
scholarly exchanges, words are often conceived as being ephemeral and 
less important and influential than acts. Within discourse theory, this 
binary opposition between discourse and the real is criticized (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001). Discourses gain power from the way they are embedded in 
institutions and this makes them resistant to change. 
The importance of the media as a social and political institution is re-
lated to the power of discourse. This is the background for this disserta-
tion’s focus on the media’s political role in China. The media has an abil-
ity to create and distribute particular outlooks on the world that contrib-
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ute to establishing some discourses as more central, and more normal, 
than others. That is why political control of the media is important to 
authoritarian states. Changes in the media’s discursive practices are likely 
to influence the audience’s conceptions of society; in the context of an 
authoritarian one-party state, social change is dangerous unless it sup-
ports the existing relations of domination. 
Over the course of the post-Mao economic reforms the party-state has 
allowed the Chinese media to be diversified. This has opened the way for 
the development of new media discourses which have made critical and 
investigative journalism part of the media environment. This may seem 
paradoxical: how can critical and investigative journalism be compatible 
with the control and limits imposed on media practice in China? This 
apparent paradox led me to the first research question considered in this 
dissertation, namely: 
What are the political roles of the Chinese media? 
In liberal democracies, the media’s political role is closely connected to 
protecting and upholding democracy. The media serves democracy by 
providing people with a channel for articulating grievances and criticism, 
and by keeping citizens up to date so they can make well-informed 
choices in elections. Investigative and critical journalism is the principal 
expression of media’s independence and enables the media to keep gov-
ernment and other authorities in check. In authoritarian contexts, state 
ownership is assumed to prevent the media from fulfilling this role, and 
that is probably the reason why the media’s role in political transitions 
has received little attention (O’Neil 1998). Within liberal democracies the 
notion of the media as an independent social force has begun to be criti-
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cized for underestimating the linkages between media and other political 
and economic interests (Curran 2005, de Burgh 2000c). The media is 
never completely free and independent of other social actors, and it is 
important to study changes in the media’s practices, because they are 
indicative of changing power relations. 
China is clearly in transition, moving from a planned economy to a 
market-driven economy, and its media has been adapting to new eco-
nomic circumstances. However, as Lagerkvist (2006) comments, this does 
not imply that Chinese media is transitional in the sense that it will be-
come similar to the media of liberal democracies. To understand the po-
litical roles of Chinese media today requires a contextual approach, and 
this has been the objective of this dissertation.  
The hegemonic political role of the Chinese media is to be the mouth-
piece of the Chinese Communist Party. This role was already developed 
and defined in the period before the establishment of the People’s Repub-
lic in 1949. After the revolution the media was positioned as an integrated 
part of the party-state and was given an instrumental role in contributing 
to the formation of the new China. The CCP assigned two main tasks to 
the media. The first was to propagate the party line to the public (Cheek 
1989). The second was to reflect the attitudes, conditions and responses 
among the people (Nathan 1985). This double assignment created a ten-
sion in the media’s political role, as journalists were expected to be propa-
ganda workers and investigative at the same time. The solution to this 
conflict was the establishment of a two-channel system, where so-called 
negative news were restricted to an internal channel (Polumbaum 1990). 
As a consequence of the economic reform process, media organiza-
tions have increased their financial independence, while continuing to be 
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controlled by the state. New reliance on income from advertising and 
sales has made entertainment and lighter media content widespread. 
This has challenged the dominant position of the propaganda produced 
by mouthpiece journalism; as a result, the traditional party-supported 
media entities have created media conglomerates that have launched 
more popular publications to cater to readers’ interests. Through this 
process, party-state authorities conceived of market interests as an addi-
tional aspect of the political role of the media (Lee et al. 2006). Contribut-
ing to the economic development and teaching the people about the new 
economy was understood to be part of the media’s mouthpiece role 
(Zhao 1998).  
The new importance of the saleability of the media has facilitated the 
progress of critical and investigative journalism within parts of the Chi-
nese media. The newspaper Southern Weekend has been at the forefront of 
this development. As a weekly paper located in Guangzhou the Southern 
Weekend has taken advantage of the relatively loose restrictions on free-
dom of expression within Guangdong media as compared to the rest of 
the country. Journalists and editors working for this paper have defined 
their political role in opposition to the top-down direction of the mouth-
piece discourse. Their objective has been to establish the paper as a chan-
nel for bottom-up communication. This has meant reflecting people’s 
grievances, exposing corruption, abuse of power and other social prob-
lems. To be able to do so, Southern Weekend defined their critical journal-
ism as social news, in order to distinguish it from political news.  
Diversification of the media during the period of economic reform has 
added new facets to the political roles of the Chinese media. These roles 
now reflect hybrid conceptions of the media’s political roles, combining 
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co-optation, loyalty and conditional autonomy. For instance, the China 
Women’s Daily, previously a propaganda organ, now voices critical con-
cerns, while continuing to be the mouthpiece of the All China Women’s 
Association. Hybrid roles are also the result of the widespread practice of 
paid journalism. This means that the mouthpiece conception is being 
extended from being the party’s mouthpiece, to a more general form of 
advocacy journalism, one serving economic interests as well as political 
interests. As part of this complex media context, the party-state accepts 
critical journalism to a certain extent, and regards exposure of limited and 
local problems as being in line with its own interests. The political roles of 
the Chinese media now contain other objectives besides being the mouth-
piece of the party, but these are conditional, and subject to strict regulation. 
The second research question of the dissertation has addressed the power 
relations involved in the development of a critical press: 
How is the media’s conditional autonomy being restricted, and how do critical 
journalists attempt to increase their autonomy? 
The concept of ‘conditional autonomy’ contains two signs that pull in 
opposite directions. How can something that is conditional be autono-
mous, when autonomy triggers connotations such as independence and 
impartiality? As I have shown in chapter 7, this contradiction quite accu-
rately captures the tension between containment and independence ex-
perienced by critical journalists in China. The conditionality of media 
practices requires critical journalists and their employers to practice self-
regulation. On the basis of their experience and interpretation of political 
opportunity structures, critical journalists try to ensure that their work 
stays within the limits of the politically acceptable. ‘Political’ is a discur-
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sive nodal point in this regard, because ‘the political’ represents the 
boundaries of issues that can only be expressed within the propaganda 
discourse. Self-regulation is also built into the news organizations them-
selves: since editors are responsible for the work of their journalists, they 
tend to value security over bravery.  
The conditionality of critical journalists’ autonomy stems from a com-
plex set of restrictions. Propaganda authorities continuously distribute 
information on current norms, and local authorities and private actors 
frequently interfere in the work of journalists, resulting in a lack of pre-
dictability regarding the boundaries of critical discourse. In addition, 
there are a number of general laws that can be invoked to impose nega-
tive sanctions on transgressions by critical media. The absence of a media 
law means that journalists are not protected by the party-state while con-
ducting their inquiries, and there is no law that gives them, or other citi-
zens, a right to access information. In consequence, critical journalists 
must be alert to avoid acts that will bring about negative sanctions from 
the party-state authorities. They risk prison sentences and violence as 
well as the loss of their jobs as journalists, and they seek to avoid these 
dangers through conscious discursive and social strategies. 
The discursive strategies of critical journalism reflect the need to frame 
social problems in a way that does not raise accusations about subversion 
of the social order and stability. Polyphonic expressions are open to more 
diverse interpretations, and this reduces the risk of negative sanctions. In 
the articles from Southern Weekend discussed in chapter 6, critical texts 
are formulated in ways that relate to the hegemonic mouthpiece dis-
course, either as a ‘defining other’, or by including aspects commonly 
associated with propaganda. Polyphonic expressions invite the reader 
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actively to interpret and evaluate, and this enhances the critical potential 
in the article’s descriptions of social problems, while avoiding explicit 
criticism. For example, when the texts focus on individual cases, the 
reader may infer a more systemic explanation as to why these people 
suffer from such grave problems. On the other hand, the depiction of the 
suffering and misery of individuals evoke compassion, rather than direct-
ing attention towards the political responsibility of the party-state. Po-
lyphony is achieved by balancing different perspectives, which is another 
means of presenting social criticism in public discourse. This contributes 
to the conditional autonomy of the media, because it opens up a space of 
representation outside of the hegemonic mouthpiece discourse. 
As a response to the new information society, the possibilities offered 
by the internet and the developments of a more diversified media, the 
propaganda authorities have set aside the ambition of controlling what 
people think. Instead they are concentrating their efforts on controlling 
what people think about, by using methods of agenda-setting. This has 
raised the question of whether critical journalism also serves a propa-
ganda purpose, albeit by new means. This logic is parallel to what Scott 
(1990) calls the hydraulic metaphor of resistance, which supports theories 
that assume that critical social strategies are means of letting off steam in 
order to stabilize existing relations of domination. If this were the case, 
critical journalists would be pacified and content with the spaces of rep-
resentation available to them. However, a main finding of this disserta-
tion is that they are not. Critical journalists continue to put pressure on, 
and to try to work around, the limits imposed on the media by the au-
thoritarian context in which they work. They make use of the acceptance 
for exposure of local issues to focus on topics of general importance. 
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Critical journalists have made use of the geographical organization of 
media ownership and control, as illustrated by Southern Weekend’s posi-
tion at the forefront of the development of a critical journalism between 
the mid 1990s and 2002. In their investigative methods, critical journalists 
try to use their knowledge, their networks and their experiences to fore-
see reactions and to avoid problems. They carefully choose approaches 
that are less likely to cause problems while still managing to communi-
cate the existence of serious social problems in Chinese society. 
Contributions to relevant debates 
With this dissertation I have hoped to make a contribution to the debate 
on political change and media’s role in China. As a political geographer, 
the spatial aspects of journalists’ practices, such as their discursive scaling 
of social issues, caught my interest when I began working on this project. 
This awareness on the spatiality of politics adds an important perspective 
to the general debate about the role and situation of the media in China. 
The party-state is not a monolithic structure, and critical journalists have 
carved out their new political role by utilizing differences in control be-
tween places. They have exploited the fact that similar phenomena have 
different meanings depending on their context, and this consciousness 
has been crucial for journalists’ social and discursive strategies for ex-
panding the spaces of representation in Chinese public discourse. The 
dissertation’s combination of a post-structural approach to the politics of 
meaning with human geography’s emphasis on contextuality demon-
strates the close relation between meaning and materiality. This disserta-
tion shows that the politics of meaning are inseparable from processes of 
political change. 
  Conclusion 263 
However, this dissertation also suggests that the media’s role as an in-
fluential social and political institution means that the media ought to be 
considered to be among the central objects of study for political geogra-
phers. This is not yet the case, but the media’s roles in society are too im-
portant to be left only to media studies. Among the potential interfaces 
between political geography and the media are debates on representation 
and democratization, power and resistance, as well as the media’s role in 
shaping and distributing discourses on social issues.  
In the debate about the course of political change in China, the relation 
between economic and political liberalization continues to be a central 
issue. On the one hand, the legacy of modernization theory inspires a 
belief in a causal relationship between the introduction of a market-
driven economy and free elections. On the other hand, contextual analy-
ses of democratic transitions do not support such optimism (Nathan 
2003, Pei 2007). This dissertation directs attention at discursive and social 
practices that have a potential democratizing effect within an authoritar-
ian context. This does not imply that the development within the media 
field will be the cause of a Chinese transition to democracy, but rather 
that relations of domination within an authoritarian context are change-
able. Critical journalists in China have succeeded in extending the space 
available for critical discourse within the public sphere, and this has 
brought about new opportunities for citizens to have their problems and 
grievances addressed. The conditionality of the media’s autonomy means 
that this is a space in which the party-state retains the veto over what can 
and cannot be said, but any reversal of the development of new spaces of 
representation would likely inflict high costs on the party-state. 
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The changes within the media field indicate that institutions within 
the party-state can assume new roles. The development of a more critical 
journalism has added a bottom-up approach to the media’s purpose, in 
addition to the top-down propaganda channel defined through the 
mouthpiece role. A similar process of role accumulation has taken place 
among delegates to the National People’s Congress. Whereas previously 
delegates were confined to mediating central party policies locally, they 
have expanded their role as local delegates representing their constituen-
cies (O’Brien 1994). Institutional diversification can be seen even within 
China’s state-controlled unions. During the era of market reforms, the 
unions have expanded their field of influence, because their position 
within the party-state structure gives them substantial power in relation 
to private enterprises (Chen 2003). The institutional reform which has 
received the most scholarly attention is the local elections, because they 
represent an apparent element of democracy in an otherwise authoritar-
ian structure (Shi 2000). Taken together, these examples illustrate that 
within the existing organizational structure of the Chinese party-state, 
changes in the relationship between state and society are underway. 
These reforms share the conditionality that characterize the situation of 
the critical press in China, but nevertheless reveal how people use their 
available freedom to carve out new spaces of representation. 
Finally, this dissertation contributes to demonstrating the political im-
portance and influence of discourse. In contexts of domination, resistance 
is conducted through infrapolitics, which contain strategies that cannot 
easily be identified and reacted to (Scott 1990). The Chinese party-state 
has shown great willingness and ability to control discourse. Propaganda 
authorities’ distribution of tifa, denoting politically certified language on 
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sensitive issues, shows insight into the power of language. In today’s 
China, the technologies of the information society make it more difficult 
to control public discourse, but measures of control have developed 
alongside people’s increasing access to information (Lagerkvist 2006). 
The major contribution by investigative journalists to the infrapolitics of 
resistance in the Chinese society is their normalization of critical dis-
course. Through their exposure of social problems, critical journalists 
have succeeded in making criticism a tolerated aspect of the media field.  
The relationships between discourse and materiality and between dis-
course and social practice are central issues in this dissertation. Within 
discourse theory, it is argued that as our approach to the social world is 
mediated through language, there is no reason to draw a line between 
discourse and materiality (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Discourses are insti-
tutionally embedded; I have shown how the development of a more criti-
cal media discourse has been enabled through institutional reforms in the 
media field. What discourse theory does not sufficiently explain and ana-
lyse is the relationship between discourse and social practices. The the-
ory’s structuralist inheritance leaves little explanatory space for how so-
cial actors work to change the discursive structures that limit and enable 
their strategies. The final stages of the work with this dissertation have 
made me increasingly conscious of the importance of developing the in-
sights of discourse theory in a direction which acknowledges the impor-
tance of human agency.  
Developments in the field of critical journalism in China  
The fieldwork for this dissertation was conducted in the period July to 
December 2002. The interviews and newspaper articles that constitute the 
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central empirical material illuminate the relations of domination and 
journalists’ strategies of resistance in a formative phase. In the period of 
time leading up to 2008 and the Beijing Olympics there has been a con-
tinuous discussion of whether media regulation has become more severe, 
and whether or not there has been a backlash regarding the media’s free-
dom of expression in China. In this debate, it is important to emphasise 
that the media has never enjoyed unlimited freedom of expression in 
China. When Hu Jintao was chosen as Jiang Zemin’s successor at the 16th 
Party Congress in China in November 2002, there was a hope among 
observers and actors in the Chinese media field that he would liberalize 
media control. This has not been the case, as CCP rule under Hu contin-
ues to uphold the mouthpiece role of media (Brady 2008). To the party-
state, media control is as important as before, and propaganda authorities 
seek to contain media discourse as part of their agenda-setting policy 
(yulun daoxiang). In a media ‘reform’ in 2003, a large number of newspa-
pers were closed down or forced to merge because their financial situa-
tion was judged to be unsound. This reform was motivated by the CCP’s 
aim to secure subscribers to the key party-papers, and contained a wish 
to lessen the burden of offices’ forced subscriptions to local party papers 
(He 2004, Liebman 2005). It was also an act that demonstrated the condi-
tionality of the media’s autonomy. The enormous increase in the number 
of tabloids and small local publications during the period of economic 
reform made media control increasingly resource-intensive, and through 
closures and mergers, the authorities aimed to acquire oversight and con-
trol (He 2004). 
The outbreak of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in 2003 
clearly illustrated the conflict between the people’s right to know and the 
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party-state’s perceived need to contain information. The last months of 
2002 were characterized by intensified media control due to the 16th Party 
Congress. The CCP always requires increased compliance and emphasis 
on positive news during major party-state events. The particular timing 
made reports on a contagious and dangerous disease very sensitive, and 
activated the restrictive discourse in favour of social stability. Rather than 
valuing the importance of information in such situations, party-state au-
thorities believe that news blockades will prevent panic and mobilization 
among the population. Again, it was Guangdong media and the Southern 
group that pushed the party-state’s limits when they were the first to 
publish news about the disease (Zhang 2006). Not until April, when 
SARS had spread to other countries, did the party-state allow extensive 
coverage on the topic. These reports were strictly limited by the mouth-
piece discourse and the focus was on the party-state’s efforts to control 
the situation. The paternalistic propaganda discourse was employed to 
calm the audience by reassuring them that the party-state would protect 
them (Zhang 2006).   
The cover-up of the SARS outbreak is an example of the continued 
media repression in China (Esarey 2006). The general manager and vice 
president of the Southern Metropolitan Post were sentenced to eight and 
six years in prison for corruption, most likely because of their paper’s role 
in disclosing news related to SARS. The paper’s editor-in-chief was de-
tained for five months and then released. Imprisoning the leadership of 
the Southern Metropolitan Post for alleged corruption offences is in line 
with Jiang Zemin’s directive of handling political questions by non-
political means (He 2004). Brady (2008) supports the interpretation that 
the limited reporting on SARS shows that the Chinese media has become 
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increasingly restricted, and she sees this as a consequence of the authori-
ties’ strengthening of the propaganda system in the post-1989 period. 
However, in the SARS crisis it was media itself that put pressure on the 
party-state authorities to disclose news about the disease. This demon-
strates agency on both sides, something that is underestimated in Brady’s 
work. The strengthening of the propaganda xitong does not imply that 
critical journalists have accepted new limitations without resistance. The 
party-state’s policies for containing and controlling critical discourse are 
a consequence of the pressure it perceives, suggesting that power rela-
tions within the media field have changed over the course of the reform 
period. 
The Beijing Olympics are set to be held in August 2008 and are an 
event of great symbolic importance to the CCP leadership. Due to the 
party-state’s established practice of restricting criticism and negative ex-
posure in sensitive periods, the event is likely to be accompanied by in-
creased repression within the media field. The party-state’s power to 
sanction journalists and media continues to impose conditionality on the 
critical media, but it does not eradicate the work conducted by critical 
and investigative journalists over the last decade. Critical discourse has 
become part of the public sphere in China, and to the audience this gives 
even the absence of criticism a new meaning. The conditional autonomy 
of the critical press in China means that more voices are being heard and 
more problems are being discussed. Through this, new spaces of repre-
sentation have arisen.  
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 Appendix 
THE STRANGE DISEASE  
(Southern Weekend November 11, 2000) 
"怪病" 
 
七十年代未至九十年代中期,由于主管部门疏于管理以及地下血站血头
们利欲熏心,河南省东部、南部地区的广大农村非法采血现象十分猖獗,直
接导致目前艾滋病在该地区爆发和蔓延,有些当年采血严重的村庄现在甚
至成了艾滋病村。 
 
一线夕阳透过狭窄的房门,穿过散了的芦苇篱笆,一半落在拥被而睡的女
人身上,一半落在床前一只残破的塑料盆里。女人是"怪病"缠身无法下床
的孙爱娟,盆里是她的呕吐物,用沙土盖着。 
她的男人张军武,36 岁,提前谢了顶,穿着一件看不清颜色的绒衣,瑟瑟缩
缩站在床前,说着老婆和"怪病"的事情,说着说着,就有了哭腔。  
今年夏天,孙爱娟"感冒"了，低烧不退,同时止不住地拉肚子。看了几回
医生,吃了些药这后，她不去医院了,一是家里再也拿不出钱,二是她已经知
道,自己得的是"怪病"。 
"怪病"是治不好的。它是个幽灵,三年来,一直在这个与新蔡县人民院一
路之隔的小村子里游荡,已经有 20 条生命被它一批一批地带走。无一例外
,20 个人都是青壮年,开始时都是"感冒",发低烧,拉肚子,还有,多年以前,都
卖过血。 
心性和善的张军武没有办法,只能眼睁睁地看着自己的妻子在床上一天
天地瘦下去,更可怕的是,他也被"怪病"缠住了。他现在也整天"感 冒",掉头
发,这都是"怪病"的先兆。 
在西河村,还有另外两个女人遭受着与孙爱娟一样的厄运,她们是 33 岁
的刘小荣和 48 岁的陈霞。 
三个家庭都是女人卧床不起,男人困坐床头,孩子退学,庄稼荒芜,同时,负
债累累。 
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西河村人口近千人,根据村民自己不完全统计,当年有 300 多人卖过血,
现在,在 300 多人中,超过一半的人发低烧、出虚汗、拉肚子。他们中肯定
有人要步那 20 人和孙爱娟她们的后尘。 
与西河村挨着的烟洼、孔岗等村庄近两年也有十几个青壮年人死于这
种"怪病" 。 
大约在去年,西河村的村民知道了,"怪病"就是艾滋病。 
就目前而言,除了卫生防疫部门,新蔡县古吕镇西河村的情况尚不为外人
所知,但 100 多公里外的上蔡县芦岗镇的陈楼村早已因为媒介报道而被称
为"艾滋病村"。 
自从 1998 年陈楼村第一个艾滋病患者陈伟军死亡以来,这个只有 800
多人的小村庄已经有 19 人被艾滋病夺去生命。1999 年,当地一位医生深
感事态严重,遂向湖北医科大学第二附属医院的桂希恩教授求援。桂教授
第一次在陈楼村有选择地抽取了 11 份血样,结果 10 份 HIV 呈阳性;第二次
在自愿化验的村民中抽取 155 份血样,其中 96 份 HIV 呈阳性,艾滋病病毒
感染率竟然高达 61.9%! 
在河南成千上万的村庄里,西河、陈楼这样的村庄究竟有多少,目前尚无
法获得具体数字。不过,河南省卫生防疫站副站长王哲说,目前河南全省每
个地市都已经发现了艾滋病人,自 1995 年发现第一例艾滋病患者至今,全
省共有患者 636 例。显然是这一数字与实际情况大有出入。王哲承认,这
个数字是各级卫生防疫部门层层报上来的,肯定会有漏报的病人,而且其数
字很可能要远远不止掌握到的区区 636 例。 
据一位知情人土透露,从全省范围看,黄河以南地区较为严重,其中尤以
东部和南部的开封、商丘、周口、驻马店四市感染者最多。据说,目前这
四个地区已经没有空白县了。 
在河南以自费防治艾滋病而知名的高耀杰教授经常接到这四个地区农
村患者的求救信,但上蔡县人民医院一位姓李的医生说,高教授掌握的数字
比他们门诊时接触到的病人少得多。 
上蔡县卫生防疫站一位自称自己正处在火山口上的负责人私下里说,单
单一个上蔡县县,艾滋病感染者就将近一万人,他想把实情说出来,以对得起
自己的良心,但是又害怕吃不了兜着走。 
 
卖血 
 
目前河南农村艾滋病爆发和直接原因就是当年的卖血。 
任何一位病人对自己和当地卖血史的回忆,都会令人瞠目结舌。 
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自文革后期起,驻马店、周口地区以及相邻的安徽阜阳一带,不少农民卖
血谋生,到八十年代初期,卖血的农民渐渐增多,尤其是从八十年代未、九十
年代初开始,豫东、豫南血站密布,引得不少农民争相卖血。也就是在这个
时候,出现了卖血专业户、专业村,并且由一个小的自然村扩大到大的行政
村,由一个行政村扩大到一个乡,再由一个乡扩大到相邻的几个县,卖血遂成
为当地的一项"产业"。 
当地一位人土说,以上蔡县城为中心,从西边的无量寺、大路李,到县南
的芦岗、邵店、延伸至县东南的五龙、杨屯以及汝南的金铺、留盆,这周
围十来个乡镇形成了一个方圆几十公里的卖血重灾区,也正是现在的艾滋
病高发区。 
卖过血的农民说,10 年前,上蔡的血流向全国各地。东至上海,西到乌鲁
木齐,北起黑龙江,南至广州、海南,这些地方没有长途跋涉,各地流动的上
蔡县的献血队,也会有上蔡人的血从上蔡运送到那里。 
采访中,有人说之所以会有这么多人卖血,是因为在当时的情境之下,任
何身处其中的人都难免要跟着走。在一些献血村,甚至到了不献血的小伙
子讨不上老婆、姑娘嫁不出去的地步。 
最主要的原因还是穷。 
上蔡县一位干部说:"每一个卖血的农民都有一段悲惨的故事。 
11 月 26 日下午,在西河村刘小荣家,这位已经卧床半年多的母亲泪流满
面:"那时候,孩子小,没吃的,就想去抽血换点钱回来给孩子买点好吃的。 
她的丈夫王平坐在一边,一脸无奈。他说河西村地势低,癞蛤蟆撒泡尿都
会把地给淹了。1975 年发大水,村里第一回有人卖血,打那以后,只要年头
不好,左邻右舍就去血站伸胳膊。 
陈楼村已经确诊患上艾滋病的陈军说,这么多的老乡拼死去卖血赚钱,主
要是用于盖房、成家和老人治病等。 
陈军,17 岁卖血,19 岁结婚,从 1981 年一直卖到 1997 年,从"全采"卖到"
单采"。17 年里跟着献血队走遍了全国各地,哪儿贵去哪儿卖,17 年里他和
媳妇一起抽了无数管血,挣了 5 万多块,治老母亲的偏瘫花掉了一万 多,盖
四间房子花了将近一万,交超生费 4000 多,其余的钱都不知道去哪儿了,现
在还欠镇里一万元贷款。 
周口和驻马店所辖的沈丘、鹿邑、新蔡、平舆、汝南等 18 个县  市，
虽然人均耕地较多,但地力贫瘠,地势低洼,有些县乡就是淮河流域的洪水走
廊,所以百姓生活困难,不少县市至今仍是国家级贫困县。 
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"杀了他!" 
 
当年的卖血人,不管现在有没有感染上艾滋病,心目中最育恨的人是"血
头"。  
据记者了解,当年一般的三种人做血头。 
一是卫生防疫部门工作人员,有的是医生,有的是国家血站或防疫站的职
工;二是这一类人员的亲戚朋友。第三种就是那些头脑活络、在地方上有
点关系、从血民中"脱颖而出"的人。 
 在陈楼村,群众反映,当年最大的血头是上蔡县的医生尼 XX。 
陈军说,1995 年,国家已经禁止地下血站采血,尼还是带着儿子、儿媳妇
、女儿、女婿,开着一辆车,在陈楼村租了四间房子,不体检,不化脸,来人伸
胳膊就采,一边采了整整十天。床不够用了,灶台上、柴火垛边都躺着人,这
只胳膊抽两袋,换只胳膊再抽。 
除了在陈楼设点,尼还到黄铺,城北肖庄等地非法采血。 
尼 XX 之外,还有齐 XX、董 XX 等人。 
齐 XX 的窝点在一个名叫十里铺的村庄。有一段时间,上蔡县卫生局的
大楼都腾出来让他抽血。 
董 XX 的窝点在董寨,陈军说,董寨每天最少有十个血头,其中董氏兄弟有
钱有势,附近几个乡镇都有他的采血点。 
在新蔡,西河村村民反映,自 1991 年至 1995 年,县城附近有三个血 站,
三个血站的头目都不一般。为了揽生意,这几个血站派人到村里大肆鼓动,
说什么"来回换换血，对身体好些"，说什么正常人一天可以抽两 次。 
血头的出现是在八十年代末期,也正是这个时候采血由全采改成了单采
。所谓单采,是提取血清后,将澄下来的红血球再输回供血人体内。由于这
一变化，加上血头的肆意妄为,导致十年后今天的这场灾难。 
村民们说,对于血头而言,克扣盘剥血民卖血钱,是天经地义的事 情,最可
怕的是他们草菅人命,采血过程中不体检,不化验,消毒不严格,多人共用一
个针头,输回红血球时经常出错,等等,正因为如此,才会一病百病,否则无法
解释现在会有这么多老实巴交的农民感染上艾滋病毒。 
在上蔡县陈楼村,当谈起这些当年的"吸血鬼"时,一个 30 多岁的艾滋病
人咬牙切说"杀了他"! 
但是这帮人个个活得逍遥自在,当时他们也被有关部门抓过,但是最终不
是放了,不放没钱花还是"抓了放，放了抓，抓了不放没钱花"。 
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现状 
 
一种可以说是最为可怕和病魔,降临到最为弱小的人身上,会是一种怎样
的不幸? 
在驻马店、周口等地,有两个传说流传甚广:一个是上蔡陈楼的病人为了
报复他人,抽了身上的血注射到西瓜里;另一个是新蔡河西的病人将身上的
血注射到猪肉里。 
经记者实地调查,这纯系谣言。而且,有一点艾滋病预防常识的人都知道
,即便有人这么做了,艾滋病毒也不会存活,不会再度传染。 
但是,那些没有被病毒感染的村庄,那些没有被感染的健康的人,依然在
起劲地传播着这两个流言。他们自己不买,也劝别人不要买陈楼人种出来
的菜,不要买河西人养肥的猪。 
即便在本村,艾滋病人也在遭受了当年无钱无粮之苦、抽血之苦,颠沛流
离之苦后,又开始遭受被人拒斥，隔离之苦。 
上蔡县五龙孟庄一位妇女今年夏天确诊为艾滋病患者,结果全村家家户
户齐买蚊香,天刚擦黑就在大门口点上,以防她家的蚊子飞过来。 
更让人忧心的是在艾滋病人中间,也盛传着这样的谣言:” 千万别暴露病
情，暴露了也不能上大城市,到大城市里打了一针就给打死了。”  
就记者几天来所接触到的病人家庭看,无一不是家徒四壁,没有一家不欠
债,没有一家能够买得起较贵重的药。不止一人对记者说,他们连治低烧拉
肚子的药也买不起。 
难道他们真的只能坐以待亡? 
还有两个让人担心的现实。 
 豫东豫南一带几十个县市个个是劳务输出大县,全县总人口动辄超过
百万,每个县每年都要有十万、数十万的劳动力流向东西南北全国各地。
他们中间有无艾滋病毒携者没有人作过统计,对这一地区的劳务人员如何
管理,如何控制病毒再传播,是个亟待解决的问题。 
此外,这一艾滋病高发区内,色情行业屡禁不绝。在上蔡县委,县政府的
两个招待所里,每晚都有” 三陪女” 拔打骚扰电话,前来给陈楼村民抽血化
验的桂希恩教授对此痛心疾首。纵贯河南省南北的 107 国道新乡段和驻
马店段以色情服务闻名全省,屡打不尽之下,河南省防疫站在这两个地方搞
了两个” 行为干预试点” 。 
这两个问题解决不好,后果可想而知。 
(文中艾滋病严重的村庄,艾滋病人皆为化名) 
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THREE-YEAR-OLD AIDS VICTIM 
(Southern Weekend November 11, 2000) 
3 岁的小艾滋病人 
 
再见到王为军令人大吃一惊,一个帅小伙儿落魄得像个在逃犯,他一年多
来没有理发剃须,长发夹杂着些许银丝,他对记者说:” 我现在等着当地政府
什么时候能给我说句公道话!" 
记者去年曾采访过他,由于众所周知的原因,在当时的报道中他化名张树
清。  
如今他的遭遇在当地已尽人皆知:爱人生孩子后,医院给她输了卖血人的
血,爱人 1999 年死于艾滋病,留下两岁的女儿,是艾滋病毒携带者。医院只
承认非法采血,不承认因此使王妻感染艾滋病。与此同时，当地不断发现
新的艾滋病毒感染者，正如一年前采访时一位防疫站站长所说,由于血液
管理长期混乱,对艾滋病传播监控不力,暴露出来的仅仅是冰山一角。 
记者发现,本报去年 12 月 3 日头版报道中的另一家受害人(去世产妇的
丈夫宗和平,他也被传染了艾滋病),在索赔无望,受人歧视的绝境中,陷入对
社会的讽狂报复― ― 宗在长途贩运途中,尽可能多地将艾滋病毒传染给其
他人。 
相比之下,王为军几乎还算” 幸运” ,在一连串徒劳而屈辱的上访之后,
北大妇女法律援助中心免费帮他打官司,10 月 18 日,一审在邢台市中级法
院开庭。王为军说,医院院长王顺英始终微合双眼,她没想到自己会站在被
告席上。 
时隔一年,记者又来到王为军的家,王为军的女儿凯佳 3 岁了,依然娇憨
可爱。王为军从衣柜顶层拿出爱人的遗像,说:” 我偷偷拿出来,看看就放回
去,不想让孩子看见。”  
一年前采访时,王为军含泪问女儿想不想娘,女儿毫无反应。爱人生下孩
子输血后” 生怪病” 一直到死,女儿是王为军一手拉扯的,已经忘记了 ” 娘
” 这个生命中最重要的称呼。如今,看到别的孩子有娘,女儿开始问"俺娘呢
",每到这时,王为军就把话岔开,爷爷则回答” 上班走了” ，孩子高兴起来:
” 上班挣钱，回来买新衣服！”  
凯佳的生活里只有爸爸和爷爷,连同住一个院子里的叔叔伯伯都搬走了,
王家和爱人家的亲戚在当地倍受歧视,虽然王为军本人并没有感染,也是人
见人躲。他上访到省妇联,还没说话就被推出门外,有人说把这孩子弄死算
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了,爷爷质问 :” 这病,是她自己愿意得的? 孩子她妈不在了,就不能让这孩
子多活几天?”  
这一切,小凯佳浑然不觉,没意识到为什么小朋友都不跟她玩,为什么活
动空间除了家里就只有门前 50 米长的巷子。她最高兴的事是上街花一毛
钱买糖吃,人家连钱都不要,给地两糖打发走,给她两块糖打发她快 走。本
报报道后,不少好心人寄来布娃娃,小衣服、北京理工大学学生黄秀猛寄来
40 元钱。 
王为军害怕女儿长大,说:” 越大明白的事越多,妈妈去世,她自己的病,我
都没法跟她解释。” 也许孩子等不到明白的那一天,等不到官司胜诉,获得
赔偿的那一天。据诊断过凯佳的一名医生介绍,孩子 5岁之前最容易发病,
基本上活不到 10岁。对此,王为军不敢想,说:”我只想她天天能高兴就行
。” 
 
南方周未 
南方日报报业集团 
2000 年 11 月 30 日星期四 
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NINE MEDIA HOUSES SUED FOR INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHTS  
(Southern Weekend January 18, 2000) 
九家媒体被诉侵权 
 
1998 年 3 月 27 日，本报一版头条报道, 主要内容如下: 齐齐哈尔市帐
篷厂厂长李淑琴在帐篷厂工人大量下岗, 企业极端困难的情况下, 却大肆
报销吃喝招待费,医药费; 李淑琴未经厂职工代表大会同意,擅自批准齐齐
哈尔市一家房地产开发公司拆扒帐篷厂厂房,出卖职工利益;向市二轻局先
后两次上缴管理费 12.5 万元;李淑琴以儿子李静涛的名义,从厂里提走 18
万元;职工代表会投票罢免李淑琴,民主选举新厂长;李淑琴的儿子带人到厂
里威胁;民主选举厂长后,该厂连卖续发生三起血案,三起血案都与厂长候选
人和活跃分子有关;帐篷厂上级主管部门,市二轻局在处理帐篷厂发生的一
连串问提时态度不积极.... 
 
本报记者 郭国松 
 
群众来信作为诉讼证据 
 
这篇报道发表后,一系列触目惊心的事实,在社会上引起强烈    反响。 
"齐市市委、市政府高度重视,主要领导亲自批示,责成市纪委、市政法
委牵头组织成立了市委联合调查组,对报上所涉及到的有关问题及帐篷厂
等有关部门进行调查。" 并很快形成了长达 30 多页的《关于〈南方周未
〉报刊载的〈工人投票罢免渎职厂长齐齐哈尔连发三起血案〉文章所涉
及问题的调查报告》(下称"调查报告")。  
期间,一位看到报道的外地读者写信给齐齐哈尔市委主要领导,对发生在
帐篷厂的种种怪事提出批评意见,1998 年 5 月 8 日,这位领导大笔一挥,在
信上批示道:"转二轻局作为起诉佐。" 
三天后的 5 月 11 日,已被职工投票罢免的原帐篷厂厂长李淑琴向哈尔
滨市中级人民法院提起诉讼,将该文作者戴煌、《南方周未》报社、齐齐
哈尔市帐篷厂、《黑龙江日报》社、《黑龙江晨报》社、《黑龙江价格
信息报》社、《中华周末报》社 (北京)、《中国老年报》社(北京)一并告
上法庭,要求"确认上述被告对原告构成名誉侵权";"赔偿损失 100 万元"。 
李淑琴在诉讼列出七条"侵权"事实,对整篇报道全部予以否定。 
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1998 年 7 月 11 日,齐齐哈尔市二轻局也向哈尔滨中院起诉,要求"确认
被告对原告构成侵权, " ;"停止侵害,恢复名誉,消除影响,赔礼道歉,赔偿损失
100 万元"。被列为被告的还有另 3 家媒体。 
2000 年 1 月 12 日、13 日,哈尔滨市中级人民法院分别开庭审理李淑
琴母子和齐市二轻局诉戴煌及 9 家媒体"名誉侵权"案. 
 
为"名誉权"要价 100 万 
 
作为被罢免的原帐篷厂厂长,李淑琴何以能为自己的"名誉权"开出 100
万元的天价?  
1997 年 6 月 17 日,李淑琴被齐市二轻局任命为帐篷厂厂长兼党总支书
记,到 11 月初被厂职代会罢免为止,前后,  "执政"不过 4 个半月。 
李淑琴上任后所干的最大的一件事便是对帐篷厂进行拆迁,但是,对于这
起关系到全厂职工利益的重大决策,李淑琴在没有获得职工代表大会一致
同意和授权的情况下,擅自同意开发商对工厂进行拆扒,导致工人多次集体
到市委,市政府上访、静坐,李淑琴至今仍认为,这是经过集体研究同意的。 
李下台后,帐篷厂对拆扒工厂的房产开发公司提起诉讼,1999 年 6 月 10
日,黑龙江省高院"经审理查明……1997 年 9 月末开发公司在未取得合法
手续、拆迁许可证及没与帐篷厂达成动迁安置协议的情况下,对帐篷厂
1189.93 平方米房屋进行拆迁。" 此事以开发公司向帐篷厂补偿 40 万元
而告终。 
1997 年 10 月 6 日,在几经交涉无效的情况下,帐篷厂职代会贴出了罢
免李淑琴的公告,据该厂职工反映,从 9 月份开始,厂房被拆,工人们四处上
访,企业实际上已处于瘫痪状态,到罢免李淑琴的公告贴出时,全厂基本停
产。 
然而,李淑琴签字报销的"招待费"却如水银柱般直线上升--6 月份 527 元
,7 月份 1699 元，8 月份 5772 元，到 10 月份猛增到 13000 多元,同时,李
淑琴还用出租厂房所得的租金支付吃喝费 6000 余元。 
李淑琴在诉状中说:"在厂内报销的招待费,有关部门已经多次审查没有
问题。其中,报销的票据中没有一张的白条,全部都有两人以上签字或经财
务科长签字,没有违反财经纪律。" 
对这个问题，《调查报告》是这样认定的:"李淑琴在任职期    间,....其
余 5586 元公款用于厂内人员吃喝是错误的;用帐外资金支付李淑琴 、....,
三人观鹤节期间的厂长奖金 1500 元也是错误的,对此,李淑琴应负主要责
任。另 1326,6 元招待费无法认定其支出去向,李淑琴应负主要责任。对上
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述 8412,6 元款项应由李淑琴及其有关人员承担,由市纪委收缴后上交市财
政返还给帐篷厂。" 
在医药费报销上,帐篷厂早在 1993 年,就已经做出规定,职工每人每月医
疗费 3.5 元,在工资中支付,平时不再报销其他任何医疗费用。但李淑琴的
医疗费却照报不误,仅 1997 年 1 月、5 月,李淑琴就报道销医药费
1688,38 元。 
李淑琴在诉状中说:"所报医药费不是她在任时报销,而是其前任厂长在
任时经其前任厂长分三次批准后报销。" 
就是李淑琴所称的这个前任厂长,却从 1995 年任厂长至 1997 年调离
帐篷厂时,先后报销医药费 5668,65 元。《调查报告》说:"曹 XX 在全厂职
工都不报销医药费的情况下为自己报销药费是错误的。应全额收缴其所
报销的医药费。" 
就是这样的一任又一任厂长,齐市二轻局却在诉状中说:"六任厂长大都
是品行良好的干部,尽管有个别厂长有时候存在一些问题,但瑕不掩瑜,尤其
是最后一任厂长李淑琴,二轻局是经过认真考核研究的.... " 
 
还有更多的问题 
 
帐篷厂作为一个集体小企业,从辉煌一步步走向破败,二轻局称"是计划
经济向市场经济过渡过程中多种原因所致"。  
时至 1997 年,帐篷厂已连年亏损和拖欠的银行贷款, 职工工资等, 总额
达数百万元,大批工人被迫下岗,自谋生路。 
在如此困境下,帐篷厂的当权者却在 1997 年 5 月慷慨地向二轻局上交
9 万元"管理费",同年 10 月底,李淑琴在即将被罢免之际,又向二轻局交纳
35000 元 "管理费"。 
这笔钱到哪里去了呢？《调查报告》认为:"市帐篷厂在职工放假,工资
发放困难的情况下,向主管局缴还联社借款,主管局用合作事业基金(联社借
款)26374,94 元发放了奖金,此做法是错误的,已违反了财经纪   律。" 
伴随这种不正常行为的还有以下一系列事实:  
1、 李淑琴之子李静涛"借"给厂里 18 万元现金。从帐篷厂的帐面上反
映,经李淑琴批准,李静涛从 1997 年 5 月 31 日至 10 月 16 日,先后借给帐
篷厂 18 万元,此后,李静涛以"3 分利"的高息,每月从厂里提取利息，总额
到 19000 元。 
2、 1995 年 12 月 8 日,李淑琴通过当时的厂领导,将年仅 17 岁的儿子
李静涛招工进厂,三天后转正定级。在此后的 6 个月时间内,李静涛连升三
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级工资,连进厂之前的司机培训费 2590 元也在厂里报销了。此时,帐篷厂
职工已在大量下岗。 
当帐篷的最后一辆车被拉去顶帐后,李静涛被"借调"到二轻局,给局领导
开车,工资由帐篷厂支付。原报道说是给局长张云学开车,市委调查组说"此
车为二轻局副职领导工作用车。"  
3、 1996 年 2 月 14 日,李淑琴的丈夫因病死亡,此前,李为其夫在帐篷
厂代办了简易人身保险,保险公司因投保不足 6 个月而拒绝赔付保险金。
李淑琴认为"是厂财务人员没及时到保险公司办理手续,给耽误了,此钱应由
工厂负责。"李随后在帐篷厂支出保金 2020 元。《调查报告》说:"李淑琴
违反规定,在工厂支付保金是错误的,应全额收缴,并应追究其责   任。" 
4、 原报道引述帐篷厂职工的意见说,二轻局任命李淑琴为厂长,未履行
职工代表大会讨论通过这一法定程序。二轻局说:"从局党委任命李淑琴为
帐篷厂厂长整个过程看,我们认为是认真的,符合《中华人民共和国城镇集
体所有制企业条例》和组织程序,不存在不合法问题。" 
《调查报告》认为:"在李淑琴任帐篷厂厂长问题上,市二轻局党委没有
严格贯彻集体企业条例。" 
 
民选厂长到底惹急了谁 
 
1997 年 10 月 29 日,帐篷厂召开职工代表大会,顺利地选出了以郭志得
为厂长的新一届领导班子。  
就在选举厂长的当天上午,李淑琴的大儿子李静波(原报道误为李静涛,
经查系笔误,在此表示歉意)带着几个人来到厂里,他当着工人的面大喊:"谁
叫郭志得?出来!"帐篷厂当即向公安机关报案。 
郭志得退下阵来。  
第二轮选举结束,43 岁的刘敏霞接任厂长,一场血腥顷刻降临到她和另
两人身上。 
1997 年 12 月 18 日晚,5 名歹徒破门而入,将刘敏霞和丈夫以及 14 岁
的孩子击倒在血泊中,一番打砸后扬长而去；1998 年 1 月 14 日,上访和民
主选举厂长冲在最前面的退休老工人郭荫范外出未归,他的老伴张秀云被
砍死在自己家中;2 月 25 日晚,帐篷厂干部李忠欣回家途中,被 5 个歹徒拦
住,身中 10 刀,险些丧命。 
调查组说:"26 日上午 11 时犯罪嫌疑人即被抓获,此案(李忠欣)告 破。
这伙抢劫团伙在 25 日晚共作案 5 起,未发现案犯与帐篷厂选举厂长一事有
任何联系,报载严重失实。" 
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记者为此专程采访了大难不死的李忠欣。他拿起一件满是刀口的黑色
皮衣说: " 我当时连中数刀,头上脸上都是血，昏死过去，醒来后发现被从
路中间拖到了路旁的水沟里,身上的 BP 机和几百元现金,什么都没丢,绝对
不是打劫。"  
郭荫范老伴被杀一案,调查组引述警方的话说,郭家二女儿的前夫贺凌瑞
具有重大作案嫌疑。1998 年 10 月 28 日,贺凌瑞被逮捕,紧接着,当地媒体
报道了此案被侦破的消息。 
没想到,当法院开庭审理该案时,贺凌瑞当庭翻供。1999 年 11 月 23 日,
齐齐哈尔市中级人民法院下达刑事裁定书,"准予撤诉机关齐齐哈尔市人民
检察院撤诉。" 
然而,在本次庭审期间,李淑琴和二轻局的代理律师却当庭出示了一份由
齐齐哈尔市公安局于 1 月 10 日(开庭前两天)出具的有关贺凌瑞一案"正在
审理"的证明。 
戴煌的文章仅仅是客观报道了这三起案件发生的事实,并没有说是何人
所为,有关方面如此煞费苦心"求证",称报道"失实"，实在令人费解! 
至于刘敏霞一案,《调查报告》有一段话,不妨引述如下:"市公安局......
决定对重点嫌疑人进行实质性接触、并同时采取技术侦察手段,发现了李
淑琴有作案嫌疑的重要线索：4 月 3 日下午调查与李关系密切的梁艳时,
梁反映,在刘被打伤后的一天下午 2 点钟左右,李给她打电话让她去李的家
中。梁去后她们在一起喝酒,谈话中李透露是她找人打的刘敏 霞,原因是她
的厂长被免,刘上任后还整她,这口气实在咽不下去,要教训教训她。那几个
人干完后都乘通往北京方向的车走了。公安机关马上传讯了李淑琴和她
的两个儿子,均拒不供认。" 
 
纪委的案卷怎么到了被调查人手中 
在连续两天的庭审中,原告李淑琴母子和二轻局将长达数百页的齐齐哈
尔市纪检委的调查案卷搬到了法庭上,同时还有一份对该案卷综述的 30 多
页的《调查报告》。 
《调查报告》上写着"此件复印于齐齐哈尔市纪检委,"盖有齐市纪检委
的公章,落款是 1998 年 6 月 29 日。案卷材料上注明:"本卷内材料复印于
齐市纪检委关于南方周末报导的调查材料卷宗,"盖有市纪委"第一检查监
察室"的内部公章,落款日期为:2000.1.6。 
从卷宗上可以看到，这实际上是对李涉琴等人所涉及的问题进行调查
的案卷材料，其中包括二轻局。案卷中有大量的反映李淑等人问题的材
料,在"被证明人"一栏中,有相当一部分是李淑琴、李静涛、李静波母子。
292 Appendix 
二轻局和李淑琴母子作为被调查对象，齐市纪检委居然将调查案卷交到
了被调查人手上，此事引起了旁听的中央及当地多家传媒记者的关注。 
同时,戴煌及本报代理人当庭指出,齐齐哈尔市二轻局作为行政机关,不
存在名誉权问题。理由是:  
1. 行政机关与公民不是平等的民事主体, 公民对行政机关提出批评, 是
宪法赋予的不可剥夺的政治权利, 不属于民法调整的范畴。本案中的原告
二轻局作为行政机关,从职能上讲是以国家拨给的行政经费作为它行使行
政职权的费用,而只有当它以此经费作为支付手段,从事与机关活动所必须
的商品交换的时候,它才处于民事法律关系当中,享有民事权利,承担民事义
务,与交易的对方处于平等地位。 
2. 行政机关没有要求名誉侵权赔偿的法律基础。名誉权是民事主体享
有的一项人身权,民事权益的存在是民法保护的基本前提。侵权责任的成
立,必须同时具备四个条件:侵权行为,主观过错,损害后果以及侵权行为与
损害后果之间的因果关系。民事赔偿必须以民事权益损害结果的存在为
前提。 
显然,社会舆论对行政机关任何形式的评价,都不能够导致其财产损失,
也不妨碍它继续行使权力。没有民事权益的损害结果,就不存在承担民事
责任的问题。原告二轻局始终无法举出任何证据证明其财产损失数额,即
充分说明 100 万元的所谓"名誉损失费"是毫无根据的无理要求。 
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STATE-OWNED COAL MINES: DIFFICULTIES BEYOND SECURITY  
(Southern Weekend August 1, 2002) 
国有煤矿:安全之外的困境 
 
2002 年 6 月 20 日上午 9 时 15 分,黑龙江鸡西矿业(集团)公司属下城
子河煤矿发生严重瓦斯爆炸事故,以 115 个生命的罹难击碎了一些人对国
有煤矿生产安全的乐观看法;它在炸塌护棚支架、炸毁煤井巷道的同时,也
以一种非常的方式,将国有煤矿安全之外的困境公之于众。 
 
115 个煤矿工之死 
2002 年 6 月 26 日,29 岁的矿工孙奎芳之妻吴金艳显然还没有从飞来
横祸中清醒过来。她坐在炕上,不说话,也不动,失神的眼睛只是盯着一个地
方看。 
6 天前那个下雨的清晨,她的丈夫孙奎芳起床后,草草吃了点东西,拿起一
把伞,就去下井了。两小时后,井下一声巨响,丈夫就被埋在 800 多米深的
地下。她再也见不到他了。 
她同样再也见不到哥哥吴成林了,哥哥和丈夫死在一起。 
她同样再也见不到其他们 113 名煤矿工了,他们都死在一起。 
在这次事故中遇难的还有集团公司的总经理、矿长、书记。一位工作
人员说:"我们的总经理、矿长、书记就是因为检查安全生产,才死在了井底
下,能说我们不重视安全吗? " 
的确,近年来,矿山事故此起彼伏,意外爆炸声不绝于耳,来自上层的指令
与追究措施一个接着一个,早已在行业内形成草木皆兵的气氛,作为国有老
矿,鸡西矿业集团公司也身处其中。更何况,就在"6。20"事故前两个月的 4
月 8 日,该公司下属的东海矿已经发生一起重大瓦斯爆炸,24 人死亡。 
此次遇难的总经理赵文林,在当地享有非常高的声誉。关于他在安全生
产方面的举措,典型的说法是这样的: 
他在上任第一天去的第一个单位是国家安全生产监察管理局鸡西办事
处,批示的第一个文件是有关安全生产的,召开的第一个会议是安全会议,直
到 6 月 20 日早上,他先是在滴道矿处理井下着火,没吃早饭接着又赶到城
子河矿,下了井,而根据电视录像记录,他说的最后一句话也和安全有关。 
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公司党委宣传部副部长刘维久称赵文林是"安全专家"。这位安全专家
最为人称道之处是强令部下到井下办公。他给自已定下每个月下井 12 次
的指标,而 10 个矿 106 名矿级领导分别是 18 次、24 次。公司专门为此
成立一个"干部入井考核领导小组",定期在集团内部的矿工报上公布,并对
违规者扣除奖金。 
刘维久说,强令领志下井的目的,一是促产量,二是保安全。 
所以很难说鸡西矿业集团公司和各煤矿不重视安全。同样,也很难说矿
工缺乏安全意识。 "下井三分险",这是矿区妇孺皆知的道理,"三块石头夹块
肉"的危险,也只有矿工们体会最深。 
据了解,国家安全生产监察管理局鸡西市办事处在今年 2 月至 6 月,先后
5 次检查城子河煤矿,每次都发现问题,都提出停产整顿,但无一例外,五次都
没能落实。就在发生瓦斯爆炸的西二区,145、140、801、804 四个采煤
和掘进面都已查出安全隐患;6 月 10 日,爆炸前 10 天又有一次检查,并且再
次发出停产整顿通知书,矿长刘永金(已遇难)还签了字,但是，生产依旧照
常进行。 
 
煤矿工的艰难生活 
鸡西矿业(集团)公司属下有 10 个矿区,聚居着 7 万名矿工以及他们近
40 万的妻儿老小。根据 2001 年黑龙江省经贸委的一份调查报告所披露,"
贫困户达 3.8 万户,其中特困户 1.3 万户",按照相关标准,家庭人均收入不
足 100 元,可定为贫困户;不足 70 元,就是特困户。 
对此,矿上一位干部不以为然,他说:"不是说得多了,而是说得少 了。" 
这位三十出头的干部 15 年前就已是城子河煤矿的工人,最令他难忘的
是, 1996 年和 1997 年,两年里他只领过四次工资,加在一起不到 1200 元,
也就是说,平均每月不足 50 元。 
那份报告还透露,至 2000 年,鸡西矿务局"累计拖欠职工工资 3.7 亿元,
平均拖欠 18 个月,最长的 48 个月"。但 6 月 28 日下午，鸡西矿业集团龄
副总经理姜明告诉记者,拖欠最长的不是 48 个月,而是 60 个月。 
 
透视安全之外的困境 
6 月 28 日,公司副总经理姜明说,连年的亏损,造成公司在安全、生产、
生活三个方面都有欠帐,而且很严重。 
生活欠帐:1991 年以来,开始拖欠职工工资,至 2000 年,已经累计拖欠 4
亿元左右。 
  Appendix 295 
生产欠帐:1994 年以来,基本上停止了设备投资,现在有三分之二的设备
严重老化,所用设备相当于 20 世纪六七十年代的水平;截至 2000 年 4 月底
,井下掘进欠尺高达 17 万多米,这等于近两年时间没有搞掘进;许多矿井已
经深入地下 800 米,接近了煤矿业采掘的极限。 
安全欠帐:过去全公司每年有近 3000 万元的安全保护设施投入,但近几
年几乎分文未投,许多安全设备年久失修,目前安全欠帐累计 1.5 亿 元。 
而公司要维持生产,要有效益,就得有足够的产量,就必须不断加大生产
任务。城子河矿今年初自报年产量是 120 万吨,集团公司在全面均衡后,又
"分配"过来 20 万吨,变成了 140 万吨。而全公司去年产煤 700 万吨,职工
只是开始领到工资,"吃上了饭",今年的目标是达到 800 万吨,只有这样才能
"吃饱饭",而明年的目标是 900 万吨,那样就能"吃好饭"了。 
相应地,在二道河子矿,每月产煤 7 万吨,只够井下工人的工资,达到了 9
万吨,全体职工才能领到工资。矿党委书记车永年无奈地说:"我们每个月
25 日以前的煤全是给别人挖的,25 日以后这五六天的 3000 吨煤才是自已
的工资钱、吃饭钱。" 
由此带来的连锁反应是:在采掘进度相对稳定的情况下,煤矿只好增加工
作面,造成采掘、运输、通风等设备超负荷运转。事后的调查也印证了这
一点。而对于城子河矿井底下的这些设备,从集团到各矿,上下一致的说法
是,超期服役,老牛破车,将就着用。 
但是由于多年来效益滑坡,原有的职工队伍流失殆尽。一份资料 称,"井
下采掘工人招不进,稳不住,以前尚能从贵州、云南、四川及山东沂蒙山区
招来协议工,由于拖欠工资,又都走了;多数井下采掘队,30 岁以下的职工已
很难找到,连团支部都组建不起来。" 
这样,一方面矿上养着大量职工家属,一方面一线工人却不得不大量雇用
农民工或者"外包工"。 
专门过来给儿子料理后事的孙连玉一边抽着自卷的烟卷,一边埋怨现在
国有煤矿内部"外包工"太多,"老板太多,老板用人也随便","什么人都能下井,
管理不正规"。 
据知情人透露,6 月 20 日遇难的 115 人中,像孙奎芳、吴成林这样的"外
包工"共有 32 人。 
煤矿和承包老板使用外包工,惟一的也是最重要的原因是外包工成本低
廉。他们和外包工之间是纯粹的雇用与被雇用的关系,实行简单的计件工
资,外包工挖出多少煤,就付出多少现钱,除此之外,双方没有其他关系。而
使用正式工,则要考虑各项福利待遇,矿上甚至要养他一辈子。 
外包工其实只是国有煤矿数量更多的农民矿工的一部分。矿井底下究
竟有多少农民矿工,一位名叫郭升明的矿工说,谁也搞不清楚,"产量高了,呼
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啦啦来一批;产量下去了,又呼啦啦跑掉一批,估计应该占全部矿工的三分之
二以上。" 
直接以赚钱为目的的外包矿老板,来去自由、管理松散的外包工,人数众
多的农民工,这些非常规因素的存在,暴露出城子河煤矿经营管理和用工制
度的混乱,而这就是事故发生的必然因素! 
这就是一个百年国有老矿的生存现实。面对这一现实,黑龙江省经贸委
去年就在一份调查报告中下过这样的结论:"生产安全形势十分严峻,不发生
大的事故带有很大的侥幸成分。" 
但是,面对"6。20"鸡西矿难,如果脱离了国有煤矿所面临的两难困境、
脱离了煤矿工人多年来的窘迫生存,所做出的分析与结论,即便不是简单片
面的,也有违情理和常规。 
 
为国有煤矿把把脉 
在谈起国有煤矿所面临的问题时,业内一位资深人士显得忧心忡 忡。他
说,作为固定资产高达 59 亿的特大企业,鸡西矿业集团经过国家煤炭产业
政策若干次调整后,便一天天衰败下来。和鸡西一起衰败的国有煤矿还有
不少,它们面临着和鸡西一样的问题。 
作为最早进入计划经济并且一直严重依赖计划经济的的煤炭产业,企业
办社会就是它最大的弊病! 
刘维久说, 除了火葬场、检察院,社会上所有部门机构,鸡西煤矿上全有:
中学小学,大大小小的医院,煤矿还要办环保,要搞森工,搞建筑等等。 
在计划经济时代,每建一座矿井,在招收矿工时,煤矿同时要考虑家属及
子女的生活问题,农村户口的要转成城镇户口。这种政策给职工带来了一
些好处,但给企业带来的是难题。大批矿工家属拥入矿区,他们原本有房住、
有地种、有饭吃,但是到了矿区后,就变成了煤矿的负担。 
为了安排职工家属及子女就业,几乎所有的国有煤炭企业都开办了大量
的中小企业,而办这些企业的时候,很少考虑经济规律和经济效益,单纯是为
了安置人员。实事求是地说,这些中小企业根本不具备市场竞争和生存能
力。 
有关专家指出,这实质上是把农业的负担转嫁给了煤矿。 
其次是产业科技化水平太低,还是依靠原始的人海战术。 
有关资料显示,1996 年,国有重点煤矿原煤生产全员效率为 1.9 吨/工,世
界排名最低。 
目前的国有煤矿基本上属于以传统技术为基础的劳动密集型产业,采煤
装备只有一部分达到了世界上先进采煤国的 70 年代末期水平,大多还停留
在别人五六十年代的水平上,科技对经济效益的贡献率仅为 23%,低于全国
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工业企业的平均水平。据统计,1998 年,国有煤炭采选业的全员劳动生产率
为 12958 元/人· 年,远远低于全国工业的 31347 元/人· 年的平均水平。 
目前,一个国有矿井基本上有 3-4 个采区,6-8 个采煤队,10-12 个开掘队
。采区分散,战线长,造成了设备多、用人多、投入大、效率低。 
第三是成本太高,市场竞争力弱。 
由于冗员过多,开采期长,以及设备老化，国有煤矿的吨煤开采成本一直
居高不下。 
以鸡西为例，在 1998 年年产 520 万吨的情况下，吨煤成本高达 160
元，是小煤井成本价的三至四倍，在激烈的市场竞争中，别人卖 130 元/
吨就能赚钱了，而他们每生产 1 吨煤却要亏损 30 元。即便是现在，他们
的成本也在 100 元以上，这样的成本，别说和小煤窑竞争，就是和一些
新兴的国有大矿相竞争，也处于劣势。 
除了上述原因，根据有关专家说，国家的相关政策对国有煤矿的发展
也产生了巨大影响。 
1993 年以前，大型国有煤矿的亏损由国家补贴；1993 年提出煤炭价
格放开，3 年之内砍掉 60 亿元亏损补贴,但是用煤的电力、钢铁和运煤的
铁路 3 个部门,一家也没放开,最终结局是煤价没上去,亏损补贴也没  了。 
而此时小煤窑则异军突起,具备了左右市场的能力。国有煤矿自此与小
煤窑开始了无休止的遭遇战。 
1998 年 7 月,国务院决定将 94 个国有重点煤矿(直属原国家煤炭部)以
及原随煤矿上收的 206 个企事业单位、2379 亿元资产、320 万职工和
133 万离退休人员,全部纳入地方政府管理。而有关资料显示,这 94 家国
有重点煤中,当时共有 81 家亏损,亏损面为 86%,其中鸡西矿务局的亏损挂
帐额是 17.6 亿。 
现在,国家采取每年下达亏损指标的政策,比如鸡西矿业公司去年的亏损
指标是 2.89 亿元,它的总亏损额只要不超过 2.89 亿,就算扭亏为  盈。然
而,鸡西连这个目标也难以实现。 
但是,在国家煤炭经济运行中心博士潘伟尔看来,这样的政策作用寥寥:"
今年可以给两亿,明年也可以给 3 亿,后年怎么办?这样不能解决根本问题
啊。" 
 
国有煤矿何去何从 
世界上几乎所有产煤国家的煤炭行业都是亏损的。德国为了保证就业,
政府出资补贴煤矿;法国的吨煤成本高达 200 美元,远远高出煤炭进口价格
,遂决定 2005 年退出煤炭行业;而日本则在今年上半年关闭了全国最后一
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口煤井。那么,中国的国有煤矿该向哪个方向走呢?这是我们必须思考的问
题。 
据记者了解,在煤炭行业"十五"规划中,列在第一位的就是组建集团龄公
司,加快国有煤矿向现代企业转变。 
当然,谁都知道,这是政府的倡导,也是企业的出路,但现实很残酷,国有老
矿蜕变成现代企业显然困难重重。就在去年的 8 月 28 日,鸡西矿务局一举
变成鸡西矿业集团公司,但 6 月 28 日,副总经理姜明说:"我们就是翻了个牌
子而已。仍然是国有独资,没有多元投资,怎能叫现代企业?当然我们也希
望有人入股,但是你说,就我们企业这个样子,有人愿意吗?" 
潘伟尔博士认为,和石油、天然气一样,煤炭是一种重要的战略资源,我
们国家因为不缺少煤炭,所以很多人忽视它,自 90 年代初以来,就一直把煤
炭行业当作竞争性产业,忽视了它的基础产业职能。相较于日本先后九次
制定煤炭政策,我们国家目前亟须做的事情是,尽快形成一套将  煤、水、
电等能源整合于一体的战略性的宏观政策体系。 
 
资料 
2002 年 1 月至 5 月份,全国煤矿企业共发生死亡事故 1331 起,死亡
2341 人,其中国有重点煤矿发生死亡事故 228 起,死亡 397 人;国有地方煤
矿(包含基建)发生事故 233 起,死亡 360 人;乡镇煤矿发生死亡事故 870 起
,死亡 1584 人(其中,集体煤矿发生 141 起,死亡 317 人,个体煤发生 729 起,
死亡 1267 人)。(资料来源:国家安全生产监督管理局) 
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Summary 
The hegemonic role of the Chinese media is to serve as the mouthpiece of 
the Chinese Communist Party. This assignment has given journalists a 
central role in the party-state’s propaganda and thought work. Central to 
this top-down function was the journalists’ ability to communicate the 
party line to the people, inspire a positive atmosphere and contribute to 
the creation of a socialist society. In this context, the CCP leadership con-
ceived of social problems as ‘negative news’ which were to be limited in 
the public sphere. 
In the Mao era the media was an integrated part of the party-state, but 
as a consequence of the economic reform process, the media has acquired 
more financial and administrative freedom. Marketization and competi-
tion has led to diversification in the media field: entertainment, consumer 
information and human interest-stories have become part of the media 
discourse. New information technology contributed further to the diver-
sification of the emerging media market in China in the 1990s, and the 
growth in critical and investigative journalism, in particular within parts 
of the print media has been one result of this development. 
This dissertation focuses on critical and investigative journalism in the 
press, in particular as it appeared in the newspaper Southern Weekend 
(Nanfang Zhoumo) around the turn of the millennium. Through inter-
views with journalists and analysis of newspaper articles a new media 
discourse is identified: this discourse is characterized by an emphasis on 
social problems, such as corruption, environmental problems, severe ac-
cidents and AIDS. The critical and investigative journalism challenges the 
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mouthpiece role of the Chinese media. Through their discursive strate-
gies, critical journalists contribute to carving out a new political role for 
the Chinese media. This role is a product of journalists’ attempt to in-
crease their autonomy, and of their wish to provide marginalized people 
with a bottom-up channel of communication.  
However, the development of critical journalism also reflects the 
party-state’s wish to utilize new media discourses, while containing the 
perceived negative impact of critical exposures upon social stability. The 
result is that the media acquires a conditional autonomy where the party-
state retains the controlling power. Journalists cannot openly defy the 
party-state’s regulations, but through their discursive strategies they 
push the boundaries restricting what they can write about. A discourse 
analysis of Southern Weekend articles shows that these texts are poly-
phonic, ambiguous expressions: on the one hand, they actively relate to 
the hegemonic mouthpiece discourse, but they also oppose it. The poly-
phonic features of critical and investigative newspaper articles offer a 
discursive advantage in a controlled media environment, because the 
ambiguity makes possible different interpretations while decreasing the 
likelihood of sanctions being imposed by the propaganda authorities.  
The Chinese party-state’s control over the media means that overt 
challenges are dangerous: news organizations can be closed down and 
journalists risk imprisonment. However, during the last two decades 
critical and investigative journalism has become part of the Chinese pub-
lic sphere, and it has achieved a conditional autonomy. Through poly-
phone texts and careful discursive strategies, journalists have succeeded 
in expanding the boundaries of the public sphere, and this contributes to 
a new political role for the Chinese media. 
